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A VINDICATION OF Mr. *Pope*'s ESSAY ON MAN,

FROM THE

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF Mr *DE CROUSAZ*,

Professor of PHILOSOPHY and MATHEMATICKS in the University of *Lausanne*.

By the AUTHOR of

The Divine Legation of Moses *Demonstrated.*

In SIX LETTERS.

Vide quam iniqui sunt divinorum munerum Æstimatores, etiam quidem PROFESSI SAPIENTIAM. *Seneca.*

BRITISH MUSEUM

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A VINDICATION OF Mr. *Pope*'s ESSAY ON MAN.

LETTER I.

Let. I.

WHEN a great Genius, whoſe Writings have afforded the World much Pleaſure and Inſtruction, happens to be enviouſly attack'd and wrongfully accuſed, it is natural to think, that a Senſe of Gratitude due from Readers ſo agreeably entertain'd, or a Senſe of that Honour reſulting to our Country from ſuch a Writer, ſhould raiſe a general Indignation. But every Day's Experience ſhews us the very contrary. Some take a malignant Satisfaction in the Attack; others a fooliſh Pleaſure in a literary Conflict; and the greater Part look on with an abſolute Indifference.

LET. I. Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Remarks on Mr. *Pope*'s *Eſſay on Man*, as he ſaw it thro' the Medium of a *French* Tranſlation, have juſt fallen into my Hands. As thoſe Remarks appear to me very groundleſs and unjuſt, I thought ſo much due to Truth, as to vindicate our Countryman from his Cenſure.

I ſhall therefore in the firſt place give the Reader a fair and juſt Idea of the *Reaſoning* of that Epiſtle, ſo egregiouſly miſrepreſented; in which I ſhall not conſider it as a *Poem*, (for it ſtands not in need of the Licence of ſuch kind of Works to defend it,) but as a *Syſtem of Philoſophy*; and content myſelf with a plain Repreſentation of the Sobriety, Force, and Connection of that Reaſoning.

The firſt fifteen Lines are taken up in giving an Account of his Subject; which he ſhews us (agreeably to the Title) is An ESSAY ON MAN. The next Line tells us for what End he wrote, *viz.*

" To vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

The Men he writes againſt he has frequently told us are ſuch, as

" Weigh their Opinion againſt Providence.

Such as

" —cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjuſt.

Such as fall into the Notion,

" That Vice and Virtue there is none at all.

That they were only ſuch as theſe, we have a remarkable Inſtance in the following Lines of the fourth Epiſtle:

" Oh!

" Oh! blind to Fate, and God's whole Scheme below!
" Who fancy Bliſs to Vice, to Virtue Woe.
" But Fools the Good alone unhappy call.

Now none but *Atheiſts* argue in this manner. The *Theiſts*, indeed, maintain that Happineſs and Unhappineſs fall indifferently here to Good and Bad, and from thence bring an admirable Argument for a future State: And in the Truth of this Principle our Poet entirely agrees with them, Ep. iv. l. 96. where he ſays, that *Ills or Accidents chance to all.* But many of Mr. *Pope*'s Readers, not obſerving this, imagined that he choſe to combat this Propoſition, that *Woe is attach'd to Virtue, and Bliſs to Vice, and that therefore the Good alone are unhappy*, becauſe it was very eaſy to confute it; whereas (ſay they) it was much more difficult to confute this other, *That Good and Ill happen'd to all alike, and that therefore the good Man was frequently unhappy.*

But we ſee plainly they miſtook him, and ſhall ſhew as we proceed, that he was far from deſigning to weaken this Proof of a future State: It is true, that in his fourth Epiſtle, he has ſhewn that God has, even here, ſo graciouſly diſpoſed Matters, that he hath not left Virtue without its Comforts; but this is ſo far from weakening the Notion of a future State, that it ſupports it. For Nature always taught Men to argue in this manner; That if there were nothing here but Diſorder, there was then no Providence to ſet Things right; and if there were no Diſorder at all, there would then want no future State to ſet them right.—To return:

The Poet, as we ſay, having declar'd his *Subject*, and *End* of writing (and ſhewn us [from l. 16. to l. 43.] the

LET. I. Folly of pretending to fathom the Ways of Providence, and to pierce into Immenſity) now inſtructs us from whence he intends to draw his Arguments, namely, from the *viſible Things of God* in this Syſtem, from whence *the inviſible* Things of him, *his eternal Power and Godhead*, may be underſtood.

" Thro' Worlds unnumber'd tho' the God be known,
" 'Tis our's to trace him only in our own.

After this modeſt and ſober Introduction, he enters upon his Argument, and lays down this Propoſition as the Foundation of his *Theſis*, which he reaſonably ſuppoſes will be granted him: *That of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom has formed the beſt*; [l. 43, 44.] From hence he draws two Conſequences,

1. The firſt [from l. 44—51.] is, that as the beſt Syſtem muſt needs be ſuch a one as has a perfect Coherence, and Subordination in all its Parts, from the higheſt to the loweſt, in which there is no Void; then there muſt needs be, ſome where or other, ſuch a Creature as MAN; which reduces the Diſpute to this abſurd Queſtion, *Whether God has placed him wrong?*

The Poet having thus ſhewn that MAN, *the Subject of his Inquiry*, has a neceſſary Place in ſuch a Syſtem as this is confeſſed to be; and that the Abuſe of Free-will, from whence proceeds all moral Evil, is the neceſſary Conſequence of ſuch a Creature's Exiſtence; the next Queſtion is, how theſe Evils can be accounted for, conſiſtently with the Idea we have of God's Attributes? Therefore,

2. The ſecond Conſequence he draws from his Principle (*That of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom has form'd the*

the beſt) is, that whatever is wrong in our private Syſtem, is right, as relative to the whole [l. 50 to 61.] Let. I.

" Reſpecting Man, whatever wrong we call,
" May, *muſt* be right, as relative to All.

i. e. partial Evil is univerſal Good, and ſo Providence is fairly diſculped; and the Illuſtration and Enforcement of this Truth makes up the Body of the Epiſtle.

From all this he draws this general Concluſion, [from l. 60 to 87.] that as what has been ſaid is ſufficient to vindicate Providence, Man ſhould reſt ſubmiſſive and content, and own that every Thing is diſpoſed for the beſt; that to pretend to inquire into the Manner how God conducts this wonderful Scheme to its Completion, is ſo abſurd, that he muſt never expect to find it out, till the Horſe and the Ox come to comprehend why they undergo ſuch different *Manage* and *Fortunes* in the Hand of Man; nay, that ſuch Knowledge, if communicated, would be even pernicious to Man, and make him neglect or deſert his Duty here.

" Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,
" All but the Page preſcrib'd, the preſent State,
" From Brutes what Men, from Men what Spirits
" know,
" *Or who would ſuffer Being here below?*

This he illuſtrates by the Similitude of the Lamb, which is happy in not knowing the Fate that attends it from the Butcher; and from thence takes the Opportunity of obſerving that God is the equal Maſter of all his Creatures,

LET. I. tures, and provides for the proper Happineſs of each Being.

But now the Objector is ſuppos'd to put in, and ſay; "You tell us indeed, that all Things will turn out for "Good; but we ſee ourſelves ſurrounded with preſent "Evils; and yet you forbid us all Inquiry into the "Manner how we are to be extricated; and in a Word, "leave us in a very diſconſolate Condition." Not ſo, ſays the Poet, [from l. 86 to 95.] you may, if you will, receive great Comfort from the HOPE of a happy Futurity; for tho' Man is not bleſſed here, he will be hereafter.

"Hope ſprings eternal in the human Breaſt;
"Man never is, but always to be bleſt.

Now the Reaſon why the Poet places the Proof of a future State in that HOPE or Expectation, which Nature has implanted in Man, I conceive to be this, to give his Syſtem (which is entirely *Platonic*) the utmoſt Grace of Uniformity. But we know this HOPE was *Plato*'s peculiar Argument for a future State; and we nave ſeen it illuſtrated with great Force of Reaſoning, by our moſt eminent modern Divines. Mr. *Addiſon*, in his *Spectators*, ſhews it to have infinite Weight; and our Poet, we ſhall ſee, has urged the Argument as ſtrongly as any one. He ſays here, in expreſs Terms, That *God gave it to us to ſupply that future Bliſs which he at preſent keeps hid from us.*

In his 2d Ep. l. 264, he goes ſtill farther, and ſays, this HOPE quits us not even at Death, when every Thing mortal drops from us.

"Hope

" Hope travels thro', nor quits us when we die.

And in the 4th Ep. he shews how the same Hope is a certain Proof of a future State, from the Consideration of God's giving Man no Appetite in vain, or what he did not intend should be satisfied; which is the Argument that *Plato*, and all since him have urged upon this Head. For describing the Condition of the good Man, he breaks out into these rapturous Strains.

" For him alone Hope leads from Gole to Gole,
" And opens still, and opens on his Soul;
" Till lengthen'd on to Faith, and unconfin'd,
" It pours the Bliss, that fills up all the Mind.
" He sees, why Nature plants in Man alone
" Hope of known Bliss, and Faith in Bliss unknown:
" Nature, whose Dictates to no other kind
" Are giv'n in vain, but what they seek they find.

It is only for the good Man, he tells us, that Hope leads from Gole to Gole, *&c.* it would be strange indeed then, if it should be a Delusion. The Poet therefore, as we said, bids Man comfort himself with Expectation of future Happiness, and shews him that this Hope is a Proof of it: But then he puts in one very necessary Caution,

" Hope *humbly* then, with *trembling* Pinions soar.

And provok'd at those Miscreants, whom he afterwards [Ep. 3. l. 262.] describes as building *Hell on Spite, and Heaven on Pride*, he upbraids them [from l. 95 to 108.] with

LET. I. with the Example of the poor *Indian*, to whom Nature alſo has given this *common* HOPE *of Mankind*. This Savage, tho' his untutor'd Mind had betray'd him into many Whimſies concerning the Nature of that future State, yet is ſo far from excluding any Part of his own Species, (a Vice which could proceed only from falſe Science) that he humanely admits *his faithful Dog to bear him Company*.

The Poet then turns again to the Accuſers of Providence; [from l. 108 to 119.] and ſhews them, that ſuch Complaints end in the higheſt Impiety, in an Attempt to degrade the God of Heaven, and aſſume his Place.

" Go wiſer thou, *&c.* ———
" — cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjuſt.
" If Man alone ingroſs not Heav'n's high Care,
" Alone made *Perfect here*, *Immortal there?*

That is, be made God, *who only is Perfect and hath Immortality*. To this Senſe the Lines immediately following confine us.

" Snatch from his Hand the Ballance and the Rod,
" Rejudge his Juſtice, be the God of God.

He then addreſſes himſelf to his Friend, and remarks that the Ground of all this Extravagance is *Pride*; which, more or leſs, infects the whole Species: — ſhews the ill Effects of it, in the Caſe of the fallen Angels; and obſerves, that even wiſhing to invert the Laws of Order, is a lower Species of their Crime. The Poet then brings an Inſtance of one of the Effects of Pride, which is the Folly

of

of thinking every thing made ſolely for the Uſe of Man. This we have explain'd at large in our third Letter.

Having thus given a general Idea of the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God, and the Folly and Ingratitude of Man, the great Author comes next (after this neceſſary Preparation) to the Confirmation of his *Theſis*, That partial moral Evil is univerſal Good: But previouſly brings an Argument to abate our Wonder at the Phœnomenon of moral Evil, which he builds on a Conceſſion of his Adverſaries [from l. 136 to 146.] "If we aſk you, ſays he, "whether Nature does not err from the gracious End of "its Creator, when Plagues, Earthquakes, and Tempeſts "unpeople whole Regions at once? You readily anſwer, "that God acts by general and not by particular Laws; "and that the Courſe of Matter and Motion muſt be ne-"ceſſarily ſubject to ſome Irregularities, becauſe nothing "created is perfect." Say you ſo? I then ask why you ſhould expect this Perfection in Man? If you own that the great *End* of *God* be (notwithſtanding all this Deviation) human Happineſs, then 'tis *Nature*, and not God that deviates; and do you expect greater Conſtancy in Man?

"Then Nature deviates, and can Man do leſs?

i. e. If Nature, or the inanimate Syſtem on which God has impoſed his Laws, which it obeys as a Machine obeys the Hand of the Workman, may in Courſe of Time deviate from its firſt Direction, as the beſt Philoſophy proves it may; where is the Wonder that Man, who was created a Free Agent, and has it in his own Power every moment to tranſgreſs the eternal Rule of Right, ſhould ſometimes go out of Order?

LET. I. Having thus ſhewn how Moral Evil came into the World, namely, by *Man's Abuſe of his own Free-will*, he comes to the point, the Confirmation of his Theſis, by ſhewing how moral Evil promotes *Good*; and employs the ſame Conceſſion of his Adverſaries, concerning Natural Evil, to illuſtrate it.

1. He ſhews it tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*, or Univerſe, [from l. 145 to 157.] and this by Analogy. "You own, ſays he, that Storms and Tempeſts, Clouds, "Rain, Heat, and Variety of Seaſons, are neceſſary (not-"withſtanding the accidental Evils they bring with them) "to the Health and Plenty of this *Globe*; why then ſhould "you ſuppoſe there is not the ſame Uſe, with regard to "the *Univerſe*, in a *Borgia* and a *Cataline*?" But you ſay you can ſee the one and not the other. You ſay right. One terminates in this Syſtem, the other refers to the Whole.

"But, of this Frame, the Bearings and the Ties,
"The ſtrong Connexions, nice Dependencies,
"Gradations juſt, has thy pervading Soul
"Look'd thro'? Or can a *Part* contain the *Whole*?
"From Pride, from Pride our very Reaſoning ſprings;
"Account for *moral* as for *natural* Things:
"Why charge we Heav'n in thoſe, in theſe acquit?
"In both *to reaſon right*, is *to ſubmit*.

2. But ſecondly, to ſtrengthen the foregoing analogical Argument, and to make the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God ſtill more apparent, he obſerves next [from l. 156 to 165.] that moral *Evil* is not only productive of *Good* to the *Whole*, but is even productive of *Good in our own Syſtem*. It might, ſays he, perhaps appear better to *us*, that there was nothing in this World but *Peace and Virtue*.

"That

" That never Air nor Ocean felt the Wind,
" That never Paſſion diſcompos'd the Mind.

But then conſider, that as our *material Syſtem* ſubſiſts by the Strife of its Elementary Particles, ſo does our *intellectual Syſtem* by the Conflict of our Paſſions, which are the Elements of human Action.

" Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleaſure's ſmiling
" Train,
" Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain,
" Theſe mix'd with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,
" Make and maintain the Balance of the Mind.

For (as he ſays in his ſecond Epiſtle, where he illuſtrates this Obſervation at large)

" What Crops of Wit and Honeſty appear
" From Spleen, from Obſtinacy, Hate or Fear!

But we ſhould do our Author great Injuſtice, to ſuſpect that he intended by this to give any Encouragement to Vice; or to inſinuate the *Neceſſity* of it to a happy Life, on the equally execrable and abſurd Syſtem of the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*. All our Poet's other Writings ſhew the contrary. But what is more to the point, theſe very *Ethic Epiſtles* declare his Meaning to be this. — That Vice is in its Nature the greateſt of Evils; that it came into the World by the Abuſe of Man's Free-will; but that God, in his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, turned the natural Biaſs of its Malignity de-

LET. I. viouſly to the publick Benefit, and made it productive of Good.

" TH' ETERNAL ART EDUCES GOOD FROM ILL.
Ep. 2. l. 165.

This, ſet againſt what we have obſerved of the Poet's Doctrine of a future State, is an Inſtance of his *ſteering* (as he well expreſſes it in his Preface) *between Doctrines ſeemingly oppoſite: If his Eſſay has any Merit, he thinks it is in this.* And doubtleſs it is an uncommon Merit to reject the Extravagances of every Syſtem, and take in only what is rational and ſound. The *Characteriſticks*, and the *Fable of the Bees*, are two ſeemingly inconſiſtent Syſtems: The Extravagancy of the firſt is in giving a Scheme of *Virtue without Religion*; and of the latter, in giving a Scheme of *Religion without Virtue*. Theſe our Poet leaves to any body that will take them up; but agrees however ſo far with the *firſt*, that Virtue would be worth having, tho' itſelf was its only Reward; and ſo far with the *latter*, that God makes Evil, againſt its Nature, productive of Good.

Having thus vindicated Providence, with regard to its Permiſſion of partial moral Evil; the Poet proceeds to ſhew, that tho' his Adverſary's Complaint againſt Providence is on pretence of moral Evil, yet at bottom it all ariſes from a depraved Appetite for fantaſtical Advantages, which if Man had, they would be either uſeleſs or pernicious to him, as not ſuiting his State or Condition. [from l. 164 to 199.] " Tho' God (ſays he) has " ſo bountifully beſtowed on Man, Faculties little leſs " than *Angelick*, yet he ungratefully graſps at higher; " and then, extravagant in another Extreme, with a Paſ-

" ſion

" ſion as ridiculous as that is impious, envies even the " peculiar Accommodations of *Brutes*. But here his own " Principles ſhew his Folly." He ſuppoſes them all made for his Uſe: Now they could be of none, when he had robbed them of all their Qualities. But even by this he would not only be no Gainer but a conſiderable Loſer, as the Poet ſhews, in explaining the Conſequences that would follow from his having his Senſations in that exquiſite Degree in which this or that Animal is obſerved to poſſeſs them. Let. I.

He tells us next, [from l. 198 to 225.] that the complying with ſuch extravagant Deſires would not only be *uſeleſs and pernicious to Man*, but would be breaking the Order, and deforming the Beauty, of God's Creation.

And farther, [from l. 224 to 259.] that this breaking the Order of Things, which as a Link or Chain connects all Beings from the higheſt to the loweſt, would unavoidably be attended with the Deſtruction of the Univerſe.

Having then given a Repreſentation of God's Creation, as *one entire Whole*, where all the Parts have a neceſſary Dependance on and Relation to one another, and where every *Particular* works and concurs to the Perfection of the *Whole*; as ſuch a Syſtem appears very wonderful, and almoſt inconceivable; to reconcile this to our Belief, he ſhews [from l. 258 to 273.] that God is equally and intimately preſent to every Sort of Subſtance, to every Particle of Matter, and in every Inſtant of Being; which eaſes the labouring Imagination, and makes it expect no leſs, from ſuch a *Preſence*, than ſuch a *Diſpenſation*.

And now, as he had promiſed, having *vindicated the Ways of God to Man*, he concludes [from l. 272 to the End] that from what had been ſaid it appears, that the very Things we blame contribute to our Happineſs, either

LET. I. ther as *Particulars*, or as *Parts of the Univerſal Syſtem*; that our *Ignorance* in accounting for the Ways of Providence was allotted to us out of Compaſſion; that yet we have ſo much *Knowledge* as is ſufficient to ſhew us, that we are, and always ſhall be, as bleſt as we can bear; for that NATURE is neither a blind Chain of Cauſes and Effects, nor yet the fortuitous Reſult of wandering Atoms, as the two Species of Atheiſm, the *Stratonic* and *Epicurean*, ſuppoſe it; but the wonderful Art and Direction (unknown indeed to Man) of an all-powerful, all-wiſe, all-good, and free Being.

" *All Nature* is but *Art* unknown to thee,
" *All Chance*, *Direction* which thou can'ſt not ſee.

And therefore we may be aſſured, that the Arguments brought above to prove partial moral Evil productive of univerſal Good, may be relied on; from whence one certain Truth reſults, in ſpite of all the Pride and Cavils of vain Reaſon, That WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY. And this Truth once owned, there is an end of all Complaints againſt Providence.

But that the Reader may ſee, in one View, the *Exactneſs of the Method*, as well as *Force of the Argument*, I ſhall here draw up a ſhort *Synopſis* of it. The Poet begins in telling us his Subject is *An Eſſay on Man*. — His End of Writing is, *to vindicate Providence*. — Tells us againſt whom he wrote, *the Atheiſts*. — From whence he intends to fetch his Arguments, *from the viſible Things of God ſeen in this Syſtem*. — Lays down this Propoſition as the

the Foundation of his Theſis, *that of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom has formed the beſt.* — Draws from thence two Conſequences; 1. *That there muſt needs be ſomewhere ſuch a Creature as Man*; 2. *That the moral Evil which He is the Author of, is productive of the Good of the Whole.* This is his general Theſis; from whence he draws this Concluſion, *That Man ſhould reſt ſubmiſſive and content, and make the Hopes of Futurity his Comfort, — but not ſuffer this to be the Occaſion of* Pride, which is the Cauſe of all his impious Complaints.

He proceeds to confirm his *Theſis.* — Previouſly endeavours to abate our Wonder of the Phœnomenon of *moral Evil.*—Shews firſt *its Uſe to the Perfection of the Univerſe,* by Analogy, from the Uſe of *Phyſical Evil* in this particular Syſtem. — Secondly, *its Uſe in this Syſtem,* where it is turned, providentially, from its natural Biaſs, to promote Virtue.—Then evinces, that tho' the Atheiſt's Complaint againſt Providence is on Pretence of *moral Evil,* yet the true Reaſon is a *depraved Appetite for fantaſtical Advantages,* which he ſhews, if obtain'd, would be *uſeleſs,* or *hurtful* to Man, — and would be deſtructive to the *Univerſe,* as breaking into that Order by which it is ſupported. — He deſcribes this *Order, Harmony, and cloſe Connection* of the Parts. And by giving an Account of the intimate Preſence of *God* to his whole Creation, ſhews the high *Probability* of an Univerſe ſo amazingly harmonious and perfect. From all this he deduces his general Concluſion, that *Nature being neither a blind Chain of Cauſes and Effects, nor yet the fortuitous Reſult of wandering Atoms, but the wonderful Art and Direction of an all-wiſe, all-good and free Being; Whatever is, is Right, with regard to the Diſpoſition of God and its Ultimate Tendency;*

LET. I. *dency*; which granted, all Complaints againſt Providence are at an End.

This is a plain and conſiſtent Account of the Argument of this famous Epiſtle, which tho' here humbled and ſtripped of all its Ornaments, has ſuch a Force of Reaſoning as would ſupport Rhimes as bad as *Donne*'s, and ſuch a Strain of Poetry as would immortalize even the wretched Sophiſtry that Mr *de Crouſaz* has employed againſt it.

I am, Sir, &c.

LETTER II.

HAVING ſhewn what Mr. *Pope*'s Syſtem really is, I come now to ſhew what it is *not*; namely, what Mr *Crouſaz* has the Injuſtice, or the Folly, to repreſent it. He begins with ſaying, that "Mr. *Pope* ſeems to him "quite throughout his Syſtem to embrace the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* of the celebrated *Leibnitz*, which, in "his Opinion, eſtabliſhes a Fatality deſtructive of all Reli-"gion and Morality."—That the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* of *Leibnitz* terminates in Fate, I readily allow; but that Mr. *Pope* has eſpouſed that impious Whimſy, is an utter Chimæra. The *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* was built upon, and is an outrageous Extenſion of, a Conception of *Plato*'s; who combating the atheiſtical Objections about the Origin of Evil, employs this Argument in Defence of Providence. That, amongſt an infinite Number of poſſible Worlds in God's Idea, this which he hath created, and brought into Being, with a Mixture of Evil, is the *beſt*. But if the *beſt*, then Evil conſequently is *partial*, comparatively ſmall, and *tends* to the greater Perfection of the *whole*.—This Notion was eſpouſed and illuſtrated by Lord *Shafts-bury*, and ſince by Mr. *Pope*. But neither was *Plato* a Fataliſt, nor is there any Fataliſm in the Argument. As to the Truth of the Notion, that is another Queſtion;

Let. II.

LET. II. and how far it clears up the very difficult Controverſy about the Origin of Evil, that is ſtill *another*. That it is a full Solution of the Difficulties about the Origin of Evil, I cannot think, for Reaſons too long to be given in this Place. Perhaps we ſhall never have a full Solution here. However, what may juſtify Mr. *Pope* in embracing this *Platonic* Notion, is, that it has been received by the moſt celebrated and orthodox *Fathers* and *Divines* of the ancient and modern Church.

This Doctrine, we own, was taken up by *Leibnitz*; but it was to ingraft upon it a moſt pernicious Fataliſm. *Plato* ſaid, God *choſe* the beſt: *Leibnitz* ſaid, he *could not but* chuſe the beſt. *Plato* ſuppoſed Freedom in God, to chuſe one of two Things equally good: *Leibnitz* contended that the Suppoſition was abſurd; but however, admitting the Caſe, God could *not* chuſe one of two Things equally good. Thus it appears the firſt contended for *Freedom*; and that the latter, notwithſtanding the moſt artful Diſguiſes in his *Theodice*, was a rank *Fataliſt*.

Now we ſee, that from the Principle of *Plato*, as well as that of *Leibnitz*, this grand Conſequence follows, THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT; becauſe every thing in this World, even Evil itſelf, tends to the greater Perfection of the *whole*. This Mr. *Pope* employs as a *Principle* throughout a Poem, intended to humble the Pride of Man, who would impiouſly make God accountable for his Creation. What then does common Senſe teach us to underſtand by *whatever is, is right?* Did the Poet mean *right* with regard to Man, or *right* with regard to God? *Right* with regard to itſelf, or *right* with regard to its ultimate Tendency? Surely *with regard to God:* For he tells us, his Deſign is

"To

" To vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

Surely *with regard to its ultimate Tendency:* For he tell us again,

" All Partial Ill is univerſal Good.

Yet Mr *De Crouſaz* prepoſterouſly takes it the other way; and ſo perverſely interpreted, it is no Wonder that he, and his wiſe Friends, ſhould find the Poem full of Contradictions.

In a Word then, I ſay, the Principle Mr. *Pope* goes upon is *Plato*'s, and every thing he ſays is agreeable to the Syſtem of *Freedom*, and utterly inconſiſtent with that of *Fate:* Yet Mr *De Crouſaz* perſiſts in his Charge: And the firſt Proof he produces is the following Paſſage:

" As much that End a conſtant Courſe requires
" Of Showers and Sunſhine, as of Man's Deſires;
" As much eternal Springs and cloudleſs Skies,
" As Men for ever temp'rate, calm and wiſe.

On which the Examiner thus remarks.—" A conti-
" nual Spring and a Heaven without Clouds would be fa-
" tal to the Earth and its Inhabitants; but can we regard
" it as a Misfortune that Men are always ſage, calm and
" temperate? I am quite in the dark as to this Com-
" pariſon." — Let us ſee if we can enlighten him. The Argument ſtands thus.—Preſumptious Man complains of Moral Evil; Mr. *Pope* informs and checks him thus; This Evil, ſays he, that you complain of, tends to univerſal Good; for as Clouds, and Rain, and Tempeſt, are neceſſary to preſerve Health and Plenty in this ſub-

LET. II. lunary World, ſo the Evils that ſpring from diſorder'd Paſſions are neceſſary. — To what? Not to Man's Happineſs here, but to the Perfection of the Univerſe in general. Again,

" If Plagues or Earthquakes break not Heav'n's
" Deſign,
" Why then a *Borgia* or a *Cataline?*

On which the Examiner —— " Theſe Lines have " no Senſe but on the Syſtem of *Leibnitz*, which con- " founds Morals with Phyſics; and in which, all that " we call Pleaſures, Grief, Contentment, Inquietude, " Wiſdom, Virtue, Truth, Error, Vices, Crimes, A- " bominations, are the inevitable Conſequences of a fa- " tal Chain of Things as ancient as the World. But " this is it which renders the Syſtem ſo horrible, as to " make all honeſt Men ſhudder at it. It is, indeed, ſuf- " ficient to humble human Nature, to reflect that this " was invented by a Man, and that others have adopt- " ed it."—— This is, indeed, very tragical; but we have ſhewn above, that it has its Senſe on the *Platonic*, not the *Leibnitzian* Syſtem; and beſides, that the Context confines us to that Senſe.

What hath miſled the Examiner is, his ſuppoſing that the Compariſon is between the Effects of *two Things in this ſublunary World*; when not only the *Elegancy*, but the *Juſtneſs of it* conſiſts in its being between the Effects of a Thing in the *Univerſe at large*, and the familiar and known Effects of one in *this ſublunary World*. For what is the *Poſition* inforc'd in theſe Lines but this, *that partial Evil tends to the Good of the whole*. *How* does the Poet inforce it? Why, if you will believe the Examiner, by

by illuſtrating the Effects of partial moral Evil in a particular Syſtem, by that of partial natural Evil in the ſame Syſtem, and ſo leaves his *Poſition* in the Lurch; but we muſt never believe the great Poet could talk ſo idly. Does not every one ſee, that the Way of proving his Point was by illuſtrating the Effect of partial moral Evil in the *Univerſe*, by partial natural Evil in a *particular Syſtem*? And will any one ſay this was not his Meaning? Whether partial moral Evil tends to the Good of the Univerſe, being a *Queſtion* which, by reaſon of our Ignorance of many Parts of that Univerſe, we cannot decide, but from known Effects; the Rules of Logick require that it be proved by Analogy, *i. e.* by comparing it to a Thing *certain*; and it is a Thing certain, that partial natural Evil tends to the Good of our particular Syſtem. Who then will any longer doubt that this is the true Meaning of this famous Compariſon? And if ſo, it ſtands clear of Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Objection, and of *Leibnitz*'s Fataliſm.

The Poet, indeed, might have been more explicite in this place, for the Sake of common Readers; but he ſtudied *Conciſeneſs*, as he himſelf tells us in his Preface, where he gives the Reaſon of his Method; and this the Examiner ſhould, in Equity, have conſidered; for not only the *Genius* and *Deſign* of an Author, but his *Method* likewiſe ſhould be brought into Account, if we would make a true Eſtimate of his Performance.

The next Paſſage the Examiner attacks is the following:

" Better for us, perhaps, it might appear,
" Were there all Harmony, all Virtue here;
" That never Air or Ocean felt the Wind;
" That never Paſſion diſcompos'd the Mind;

" But

LET. II. " But all ſubſiſts by elemental Striſe,
" *And Paſſions are the Elements of Life.*

Here the Examiner upbraids Mr. *Pope* for degrading himſelf ſo far as to write to the groſs Prejudices of the People. " In the corporeal Nature (ſays he) there is no " Piece of Matter that is perfectly ſimple; all are com- " poſed of ſmall Particles, called elementary; a Fer- " mentation proceeds from their Mixture, ſometimes " weak, and ſometimes ſtrong, which ſtill farther atte- " nuates theſe Particles; and thus agitated and divided, " they ſerve for the Nouriſhment and Growth of organic " Bodies; to this Growth it is we give the Name of " Life. But what have the Paſſions in common with " theſe Particles? Do their Mixture and Fermentation " ſerve for the Nouriſhment of that Subſtance which " thinks, and do they conſtitute the Life of that Sub- " ſtance?" — Thus Mr *De Crouſaz*, who, as before he could not ſee the *Nature* of the Compariſon, ſo here, by a more deplorable Blindneſs, could not ſee that there was *any* Compariſon *at all*, but which yet is ſo viſible, that it only wants repeating to be ſenſible of it. " You, ſays " Mr. *Pope*, perhaps may think it would be better, that " neither Air or Ocean was vexed with Tempeſts, nor " that the Mind was ever diſcompoſed by Paſſion; but " conſider, that as in the one Caſe our material Syſtem " ſubſiſts by the Striſe of its elementary Particles, ſo in " the Intellectual, the Paſſions of the Mind are, as it " were, the Elements of *human Life*, *i. e.* Actions." All here is clear, ſolid, and well-reaſoned. What muſt we ſay then to our Examiner's wild Talk of *the Mixture and Fermentation of elementary Particles of Matter for the Nouriſhment of that Subſtance that thinks, and of its conſtituting the*

the Life of that Subſtance. I call it the Examiner's, for you ſee it is not Mr. *Pope*'s; and he ought to be loaded with it, becauſe it may be queſtioned whether it was a *ſimple Blunder*, he urging it in ſo invidious a Manner, as to inſinuate that Mr. *Pope* might probably hold the *Materiality of the Soul.* However, if it was a mere Miſtake, it was a pleaſant one, and aroſe from the Ambiguity of the Word *Life*, which in the *Engliſh* Tongue, as *la vie* in *French*, ſignifies both *Exiſtence* and *human Action*, and is always to have its Senſe determined by the Context.

But now we come to the moſt terrible Paſſage of all;

" All are but Parts of one ſtupendous Whole,
" Whoſe Body Nature is, and God the Soul.
" That chang'd thro' all, *&c.*

On which our Examiner — *A Spinoziſt* (ſays he) *would expreſs himſelf in this Manner.* I believe he would, and ſo would St. *Paul* too, writing on the ſame Subject, namely, the Omnipreſence of God in his Providence, and in his Subſtance. *In him we live and move, and have our Being*; *i. e.* we are *Parts* of him, *his Offſpring*, as the *Greek* Poet, a *Pantheiſt*, quoted by the Apoſtle, obſerves: And the Reaſon is, becauſe both profeſs to believe the Omnipreſence of God. But would *Spinoza*, as Mr. *Pope* does, call God *the great directing Mind of all*, who has intentionally created a perfect Univerſe? * Or would Mr. *Pope*, like *Spinoza*, ſay there is but one univerſal Subſtance in the Univerſe, and that blind too? We know

* For that is the Meaning of,

" All Nature is but Art unknown to thee,
" All Chance, Direction which thou canſt not ſee.

Spinoza

LET. II. *Spinoza* would not ſay the firſt; and we ought not to think Mr. *Pope* would ſay the latter, becauſe he ſays the direct contrary throughout the Poem. But it is *this* latter only that is *Spinoziſm*.

But admitting, for Argument's ſake, that there is an Ambiguity in theſe Expreſſions, ſo great, that a *Spinoziſt* might employ them to expreſs his own particular Principles; (and ſuch a thing might well be, without any Reflection on Mr. *Pope*'s Religion, or Exactneſs as a Writer, becauſe the *Spinoziſts*, in order to hide the Impiety of their Principle, are uſed to expreſs the *Omnipreſence* of God in Terms that any religious Theiſt might employ.) In this Caſe, I ſay, how are we to judge of Mr. *Pope*'s Meaning? Surely by the whole Tenor of his Argument. Now take the Words in the Senſe of the *Spinoziſts*, and the Poet labours, in the Concluſion of his Epiſtle, to overthrow all he has been advancing throughout the Body of it: For *Spinoziſm* is the Deſtruction of an Univerſe, where every Thing tends, by a foreſeen Contrivance in all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*. But ſuppoſe him to employ the Paſſage in the Senſe of St. *Paul, that we and all Creatures live, and move, and have our Being in God*, and then it will be the moſt logical Concluſion from all that had preceded. For the Poet having, as we ſay, labour'd throughout his Epiſtle, to prove that every Thing in the Univerſe tends, by a foreſeen Contrivance, and a preſent Direction of all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*; it might be objected that ſuch a Diſpoſition of Things implying in God a painful, operoſe and inconceivable Extent of Providence, it could not be thought that ſuch Care extended to the Whole, but was confined to the more noble Parts of the Creation. This groſs Conception of the Firſt Cauſe the Poet expoſes, by ſhewing

ing that God is equally and intimately preſent to every Particle of Matter, to every Sort of Subſtance, and in every Inſtant of Being, in theſe charming Lines: Let. II.

" All are but Parts of one ſtupendous Whole,
" Whoſe Body Nature is, and God the Soul;
" That chang'd thro' all, and yet in all the ſame,
" Great in the Earth, as in th' ætherial Frame,
" Warms in the Sun, refreſhes in the Breeze,
" Glows in the Stars, and bloſſoms in the Trees,
" Lives thro' all Life, extends thro' all Extent,
" Spreads undivided, operates unſpent,
" Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,
" As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart;
" As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,
" As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns:
" To him no high, no low, no great, no ſmall,
" He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

How exactly true this is, may be ſeen by *the Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, a Work that has entirely demoliſhed the whole Syſtem of *Spinoza*, where the excellent Author has ſhewn the Neceſſity of the *immediate Influence of God*, in every Moment of Time, to keep Matter from falling into its original Nothing.

The Examiner goes on: " Mr. *Pope* has Reaſon to " call this Whole a *ſtupendous Whole*; nothing being " more paradoxical and incredible, if we take his De- " ſcription literally." I will add, nor nothing more ſo than St. *Paul*'s, *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*, if taken literally. I have met with one who took it ſo, and from thence fell into a monſtrous Opinion, *that* Space *was* God.

LET. II. But the Examiner purſues Mr. *Pope* to the very End, and cavils even at the following Lines, which might have ſet him right about the Senſe of the foregoing.

" All Nature is but Art unknown to thee,
" All Chance, Direction which thou can'ſt not ſee;
" All Diſcord Harmony not underſtood,
" *All partial Evil univerſal Good*;
" And ſpight of Pride, in erring Reaſon's Spight,
" One Truth is clear, *whatever is, is* RIGHT.

How unaccountable is his Perverſeneſs! Mr. *Pope*, in this very Poem, has himſelf thus explained *Whatever is, is right*.

" Reſpecting Man, whatever wrong we call,
" May, muſt be right, as relative to *all*.
" — So Man, who here ſeems Principal alone,
" Perhaps acts Second to ſome Sphere unknown,
" Touches ſome Wheel, or verges to ſome Gole;
" 'Tis but a Part we ſee, and not a Whole.

But without any regard to the Evidence of this Illuſtration, Mr *Crouſaz* thus exclaims: " See Mr. *Pope*'s gene-
" ral Concluſion, *all that is, is right*. So that at the
" Sight of *Charles* the Firſt loſing his Head on the Scaf-
" fold, Mr. *Pope* muſt have ſaid, *this is right*; at the
" Sight too of his Judges condemning him, he muſt
" have ſaid, *this is right*; at the Sight of ſome of theſe
" Judges, taken and condemned for the Action which
" he had owned to be right, he muſt have cried out,
" *this is doubly right*." — Never was any thing more amazing than that the Abſurdities ariſing from the Senſe

in

in which the Examiner takes Mr. *Pope*'s grand Principle, *whatever is, is right*, ſhould not have ſhewn him that he had miſtaken the Meaning; for could any one in his Senſes employ a Propoſition in a Senſe from whence ſuch evident Abſurdities immediately ariſe? I had obſerved before, that this Propoſition of Mr. *Pope*'s, *that whatever is, is right*, is a Conſequence of this Principle, that *partial Evil tends to univerſal Good*. This ſhews us the only Senſe in which the Propoſition can be underſtood, namely, that WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY. Now is this any Encouragement to Vice? Or does it take off from the Crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces Good out of Evil? Had Mr. *Pope* abruptly ſaid in his Concluſion, *the Reſult of all is, that whatever is, is right*, Mr *De Crouſaz* had even then been inexcuſable for putting ſo abſurd a Senſe upon the Words, when he might have ſeen that it was a Concluſion from the general Principle above-mentioned; and therefore muſt neceſſarily have another Meaning: But what muſt we think of him? when the Poet, to prevent Miſtakes, had delivered in this very place, the *Principle* itſelf, and this *Propoſition* as the Conſequence of it:

" All Diſcord Harmony not underſtood;
" *All partial Evil univerſal Good*;
" And ſpight of Pride, in erring Reaſon's Spight,
" One Truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right*.

Let. II.

I cannot ſee how he could have told his Reader plainer, that *this* was the Conſequence of *that* Principle, unleſs

LET. II. he had wrote THEREFORE, in great Church Letters.

In Concluſion, if it were of ſuch Men as theſe that Mr. *Pope* ſpeaks, when he expreſſes his Contempt for Modern Philoſophers, he might well ſay,

" Yes, I deſpiſe the Man to Books confin'd,
" Who from his Study rails at human Kind,
" Tho' what he learns he ſpeaks, and may advance
" Some general Maxims, or be right by Chance.

I am, Sir, &c.

LETTER

LETTER III.

UPON a new Reviſe of Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Critique, I find ſeveral Particulars ſtill worthy animadverting upon, as a Supplement to my former Letter. To ſhew the Injuſtice and Impertinence of his *Cenſure*, it will be neceſſary to remind the Reader once again, that the Subject of this Epiſtle is a Juſtification of Providence, againſt the impious Objections of Atheiſtical Men. It is to *vindicate the Ways of God to Man*.—Thus the Poet addreſſes them at the *Beginning*,

Let. III.

" Preſumptuous Man! the Reaſon would'ſt thou find
" Why form'd ſo weak, ſo little, and ſo blind?

" Then ſay not Man's imperfect, *Heav'n in fault*.

As he proceeds, he ſtill applies his Reaſoning to the *ſame Men*:

" Go —— and in thy Scale of Senſe
" *Weigh thy Opinion againſt Providence*:
" Call Imperfection what thou fancy'ſt ſuch;
" Say here *he gives too little, there too much*;
" Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt:
" Yet cry, if Man's unhappy, *God's unjuſt*.

And

And *concludes* with this Reproof to them:

" Ceaſe then, nor *Order*, *Imperfection* name.

Having premiſed thus much, we now proceed to our Commentator.

Mr. *Pope* had ſaid:

" The Lamb thy Riot dooms to bleed to-day,
" Had he thy Reaſon, would he ſkip and play?
" Pleas'd to the laſt, he crops the flow'ry Food,
" And licks the Hand juſt rais'd to ſhed his Blood.
" O Blindneſs to the Future! kindly giv'n,
" That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n.

On which his Commentator: — " We do not, indeed, " perceive any Thing in Beaſts, that ſhews they have an " Idea or Apprehenſion of Death. But, ſurely, with " regard to Man, to reflect on Death, and to contem- " plate the Certainty of it, are of great Uſe to a pru- " dent Life and a happy Death. Reaſon and Religion " agree in this, and a Man muſt want both one and the " other, to cry out,

" O Blindneſs to the Future! kindly giv'n,
" That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n.

" This ſuppoſes that if Men had a Foreknowledge of " their Deſtiny, they would do all they could to avoid " it, and that they would ſucceed: Becauſe, without " this Ignorance, Heaven, it ſeems, could never bring all its

" its *Beings to fill that Circle mark'd out by* it. Yet this, Let. III.
" notwithſtannding, is a Conſequence that can have no
" Place, if it be impoſſible for Men to act with Free-
" dom. But the Doctrine of Fate neceſſarily draws
" us into Contradictions." * — Mr *Crouſaz* introduces his Commentary, by ſolemnly acquainting his Reader,— *That he had, from his very Infancy, a ſtrong Biaſs towards* Logick; *that he has given a conſiderable Time to that Study, and does not repent it; that he has profited by Maxims which he has found in Books not written with a Deſign to give them; that he has run through every Thing that has fallen into his Hands under that Title, or any Thing approaching to it; that he has not even neglected the moſt out-of-faſhion'd Works of this kind: But as the greateſt Treaſure is worthleſs, unleſs well employ'd, he is reſolved to ſpend ſome of it upon Mr.* Pope. † And here you have the Fruits of his long Labours in the Remarks above. Here he has ſhewn, to ſome Purpoſe, his Skill in *extracting Doctrines from Books not deſign'd to give them.* For, I will be reſponſible for the Paſſage above, that the Senſe he has given it was undeſigned by the Poet; who, when he had anſwer'd the atheiſtical Objection about poſitive Evil, the Objector is ſuppoſed to reply to this Effect, — It may be true, what you ſay, that *partial Evil tends to univerſal Good:* But why, then, has not God let me clearly into this Secret, and ſhewn me how it is ſo? The Poet replies, " For very good Reaſons. You were ſent into the
" World on a Task and Duty to be performed there.
" The knowing theſe Things might diſtract you, or
" draw you from your Station. It is, therefore, in
" Mercy that God has hid theſe Things from you.

* Page 63, 64. † Page 27, 28.

" Heav'n

" Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,
" All but the Page preſcrib'd, the preſent State;
" From Brutes what Men, from *Men what Spirits*
" *know*,
" *Or who would ſuffer Being here below?*

" To illuſtrate this by a Similitude. How kindly has " Nature acted by the Lamb, in hiding its Death from " it; the Knowledge of which would have imbitter'd " all its Life." This is the Force of the Poet's Argument; and a beautiful and well connected one it is. But our great *Logician*, inſtead of attending to the Argument of a very cloſe Reaſoner, (whoſe Thread of Reaſoning, therefore, one ſhould have imagin'd might have conducted a Mathematician too, as he is, to the true Senſe of the Paſſage) rambles into a Meaning that could not poſſibly be Mr. *Pope*'s; becauſe it agrees not with the Context, and is directly contrary to what he lays down in expreſs Words in this very Eſſay. Mr *Crouſaz* ſuppoſes, we ſee, that this Inſtance of the *Lamb* was given to ſhew how pernicious a Gift God gave us, when he gave us the Fore-knowledge of our Deſtiny. Mr. *Pope* ſays expreſly, that it was a *friendly Gift*.

" To each *unthinking* Being Heav'n a *Friend*,
" Gives not the uſeleſs Knowledge of it's End:
" To Man imparts it; but with ſuch a View,
" As while he dreads it, makes him hope it too.

i e. " Heaven, which is not only friendly to Man, but " Beaſts, gives not this *latter* the Knowledge of it's End: " becauſe that Knowledge (which is neceſſarily attended " with

" with Anxiety) is uſeleſs to it. On the other hand, Let. III.
" He gives it to Man; becauſe it is of the higheſt Uſe to
" him, who, being to exiſt in a future State, may, by
" Means of this Knowledge, make a fitting Prepara-
" tion for his good Reception there; which Preparation
" will temper, and, at length, quite ſubdue the Anxiety
" neceſſarily attendant (as is ſaid) on this Knowledge,
" by the certain *Hope* of a happy Immortality."

After theſe extraordinary Fruits of our Critick's long Application to *the Art of Thinking*, he goes on for four Pages together, * to ſhew how uſeful and neceſſary it is for Man to cultivate his Underſtanding. You aſk againſt whom he diſputes? He thinks againſt Mr. *Pope*. But I do not know whether he will find another of his Mind. Here we muſt recollect what we obſerved above of the Subject of the Poem; which is a Vindication of Providence againſt the impious Cenſurers of it. As theſe will not acknowledge it juſt and good, becauſe they cannot comprehend it, and as this Argument is founded altogether upon *Pride*, the Poet thought proper to mortify that Pride; which could not be done more effectually, than by ſhewing them, that even a Savage *Indian* reaſoned better. What are we to conclude from this? That Mr. *Pope* intended to diſcourage all Improvements of the human Underſtanding? Or that it was only his Deſign to deter Men from going out of their Depth, and pretending to judge of Infinity with the ſcant Ideas of a Man? Mr *Crouſaz*, contrary to common Senſe, and the whole Tenor of the Epiſtle, has choſe the former Part.

* Page 66 to 70.

Mr. *Pope* ſays,

" Go wiſer thou, and in thy Scale of Senſe
" Weigh thy Opinion againſt Providence.
" Call Imperfection what thou fancy'ſt ſuch,
" Say here he gives too little, there too much;
" Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt:
" Yet cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjuſt.

To this, the Commentator: — " To whom does " Mr. *Pope* addreſs himſelf in this long Period? Is it " to thoſe preſumptuous Men who are continually " confounding themſelves, and abuſing the Fruit- " fulneſs of their Imaginations, to teize good Chri- " ſtians with Objections againſt Providence? Their " Raſhneſs and Impatience well deſerve, in my Opinion, " the Cenſures Mr. *Pope* here inflicts upon them." * — Wonderful! Our Logician has, at length, found out the Subject of Mr. *Pope*'s Epiſtle. Why then did he not do Juſtice to Truth, by ſtriking out all the reſt of his Remarks? For as ſure as this one is right, all the reſt are wrong.

Mr. *Pope* cries out,

" From Pride, from Pride, our very Reaſoning
" ſprings;
" Account for moral, as for nat'ral Things:
" Why charge we Heav'n in thoſe, in theſe acquit?
" In both to Reaſon right, is to ſubmit.

* Page 79.

Our

Our Commentator answers him — "Why, then, does Let. III.
"Mr. *Pope* pretend to reason upon the Matter, and rear
"his Head so high, and decide so dogmatically, upon
"the most important of all Subjects."† This is exceeding pleasant. — Suppose Mr *Crousaz* should undertake to shew the Folly of pretending to penetrate into the Mysteries of *revealed* Religion, as here Mr. *Pope* has done of *natural*, must he not employ the Succours of Reason? And could he conclude his Reasonings with more Truth and Modesty, than in the Words of Mr. *Pope*? — *To reason right, is to submit*.—But he goes on, "If you will "believe him [Mr. *Pope*] the Sovereign Perfections of the "eternal Being have *inevitably* determined him to create "this Universe, because the Idea of it was the most "perfect of all those which represented many possible "Worlds. Notwithstanding, there is nothing perfect in "this Part, which is assigned for our Habitation; it "swarms with Imperfections; it is God who is the Cause "of them, and it was not in his Power to contrive Mat-"ters otherwise. The Poet had not the Caution to re-"cur to Man's Abuse of his own Free-will, the true "Source of all our Miseries, and which are agreeable to "that State of Disorder in which Men live by their "own Fault." * — I will venture to say, every Part of this Reflection is false and calumnious. The first Part of it, that the Divine Wisdom, according to Mr. *Pope*, *inevitably* determined, and that he *had not Power to contrive Matters otherwise*, I have shewn to be so in my last Letter. That Mr. *Pope* has *thrown the Cause of Moral Evil upon God, and has not the Caution to recur to Man's Abuse of his own Free-will*, is as false a Calumny. He

† Page 94. * Page 94, 95.

LET. III. has thrown the Cauſe entirely upon *that Abuſe*, in theſe Lines, ſpeaking of natural and moral Evil:

" WHAT makes all Phyſical and Moral Ill!
" There deviates Nature, and here WANDERS
" WILL.
" GOD SENDS NOT ILL.

When the Poet had told us this, and acquitted the ſupreme Cauſe, he then imforms us what is God's Agency, after Natural and Moral Evil had been thus produced by the Deviation of Nature, and Depravity of Will; namely, that he hath ſo contrived, in his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, that Good ſhall ariſe from this Evil.

" ——— If rightly underſtood,
" All partial Ill is univerſal Good:

" God ſends not Ill, 'tis Nature lets it fall,
" Or Chance eſcape, and Man improves it all.

And ſpeaking in another Place of God's Providence, he ſays,

" That counter-works each Folly and Caprice,
" That diſappoints th' Effects of ev'ry Vice.

What is this but bringing Good out of Evil? And how diſtant is that from being the Cauſe of Evil?

After this, a Man ſhould never think of writing more till he had rectified what he had already wrote ſo much amiſs.

Mr.

Let. III.

Mr. *Pope*,

" *Nature* to theſe, without Profuſion, kind,
" The proper Organs, proper Powers aſſign'd.

Mr *Crouſaz*. " In this Verſe, by the Term *Nature*, " we muſt neceſſarily underſtand the *Author of Nature*; " it is a Figure much in Uſe. Spinoza has employ'd " all his Metaphyſicks to confound theſe two Significa- " tions." * Therefore, I ſuppoſe, Mr. *Pope* muſt not employ the Word at all, tho' it be to vindicate it from that Abuſe, by diſtinguiſhing its different Significations. But this we are to conſider as a Touch of our Logician's Art. It is what they call *Argumentum ad invidiam*.

The Poet had ſaid,

" Far as Creation's ample Range extends,
" The Scale of ſenſual, mental Powers aſcends:
" Mark how it mounts to *Man's imperial Race*,
" From the green Myriads in the peopled Graſs.

The Tranſlator ſays, a little ſtronger,

" Juſqu' a l'Homme, *ce Chef, ce Roy de l'Univers!*

On this the Commentator, — " That Place of Ho- " nour, which the Poet has refuſed to Man in another " Part of his Epiſtle, he gives him here, becauſe it ſerves " to embelliſh and perfect the Gradation. At every

* Page 99.

" Step

LET. III. " Step Mr. *Pope* forgets one of thoſe grand and moſt " eſſential Rules, which Mr *Des Cartes* lays down in " his *Method*, that is, exactly to review what one aſ- " ſerts, ſo that no Part be found to be *gratis dictum*, nor " the Whole repugnant to itſelf." * This we are to underſtand, as ſaid, Διαλεκτικῶς. But I ſhall beg leave to obſerve that our Logician here gives his Leſſons very impertinently. For that Mr. *Pope*, in calling the *Race of Man imperial*, has beſtowed no Title upon him in this Place, which he had refuſed him elſewhere. He with great Piety and Prudence ſuppoſes what the Scripture tells us to be true, *that Man was created Lord of this inferior World*; he ſuppoſes it, I ſay, in theſe Lines of this very Epiſtle,

" Without this juſt Gradation could they be
" *Subjected* theſe to thoſe, and *all to thee?*
" The Powers of all ſubdu'd by thee alone,
" Is not thy Reaſon all thoſe Powers in one? †

He expreſly aſſerts it in the third Epiſtle.

" Heav'n's Attribute was univerſal Care,
" And *Man's Prerogative to rule*, but ſpare. ‡

And this is in the very Place where he gives the Deſcription of Man in Paradiſe.

What was it then that could miſlead our Critic ſo far as to imagine Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himſelf? I ſuppoſe it was ſuch Paſſages as theſe, of which there are not a few in the *Eſſay on Man:*

* Page 108. † Ver. 221. ‡ Ver. 161.

" Aſk

" Aſk for what End the heav'nly Bodies ſhine,
" Earth for whoſe Uſe? Pride anſwers, 'Tis for
" mine.
" For me kind Nature wakes her genial Power,
" Suckles each Herb, and ſpreads out every Flower;
" Annual for me the Grape, the Roſe renew,
" The Juice nectareous, and the balmy Dew;
" For me the Mine a thouſand Treaſures brings,
" For me Health guſhes from a thouſand Springs;
" Seas roll to waſt me, Suns to light me riſe,—*&c.*

And again,

" Has God, thou Fool! work'd ſolely for thy Good,
" Thy Joy, thy Paſtime, thy Attire, thy Food?
" Who for thy Table feeds the wanton Fawn,
" For him as kindly ſpreads the flow'ry Lawn.
" Is it for thee the Lark aſcends and ſings?
" Joy tunes his Voice, Joy elevates his Wings.—

I have been betrayed by the Charms of the Poetry into a longer Quotation than was neceſſary; but theſe were the Paſſages that made Mr *Crouſaz* ſeriouſly imagine the Poet had contradicted himſelf. But in Truth this is ſo far from contradicting what was ſaid before, that it is a perfect Juſtification of it, and of what the Scripture tells us concerning it. And becauſe this Matter has been generally miſtaken, to the Diſcredit of the Poet's religious Sentiments, I ſhall endeavour to explain it. Scripture ſays, that Man was made the *Lord* of All; but he becoming at length intoxicated with Pride, the common Effect of Soveraignty, erected himſelf, like leſſer Monarchs, into

LET. III. into a *Tyrant*. But in what does Tyranny conſiſt, but in ſuppoſing *all made for the Uſe of one?* And ſo, taking thoſe Freedoms with *all*, conſequent on ſuch a Principle. This was the Caſe of Man; He ſoon began to conſider the whole Animal Creation as his Slaves, rather than his Subjects; as being created for no Uſe of their own, but only for *his*; and ſo uſed them with all poſſible Barbarity: And not content with that, to add inſult to his Cruelty, he endeavour'd to philoſophize himſelf into a Belief, that Animals were mere Machines, inſenſible of Pain or Pleaſure. And thus, as Mr. *Pope* ſays, *Man* affected to be the *Wit*, as well as *Tyrant of the Whole* *. Our Commentator can tell us what deep Philoſopher it was that invented this witty Syſtem, and by the Aſſiſtance of what *Method* ſo wonderful a Diſcovery was brought to Light. It became then one who adhered to the Scripture Account of *Man's Dominion*, to reprove this Abuſe of it, and to ſhew that,

" Heav'n's Attribute was *univerſal Care*,
" And *Man's Prerogative to rule*, BUT SPARE.

The Tranſlator, as we obſerv'd, turned the Words,—*to Man's imperial Race*,—by,

" Juſqu' a l'Homme, *ce Chef, ce Roy de l'Univers!*

Even to Man this Head, this King of the Univerſe. Which is ſo ſad a Blunder, that it contradicts Mr. *Pope*'s whole Scheme. Who, altho' he allows Man to be King of this inferior World, is far from thinking him *King of*

* Ep. iii. ver. 54.

the

the Univerſe. If the Syſtem itſelf could not teach the Tranſlator this, yet methinks the following Lines of this very Epiſtle might; Let. III.

" So Man, who here ſeems *Principal* alone,
" Perhaps acts *Second* to ſome Sphere unknown.

If the Tranſlator imagined Mr. *Pope* was here ſpeaking *ironically*, where he talks of *Man's imperial Race*, and ſo would heighten the Ridicule by *ce Roy de l'Univers*, the Miſtake is ſtill worſe; the Force of the Argument depending upon its being ſaid *ſeriouſly*. For the Poet is ſpeaking of a Scale, from the *higheſt* to the loweſt, in the Mundane Syſtem.—But what is moſt remarkable, in this Matter, is, that our profound Philoſopher could not ſee the Advantage he had againſt this abſurd Line of the Tranſlator, but criticiſes it as if it had meant no more than *Man's imperial Race*; and, conſequently, as we have ſhewn, with his uſual Succeſs.

Mr. *Pope* ſays of God,

" Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,
" As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart."

The Commentator remarks, that " one ſhould make " a criminal Abuſe of theſe pompous Expreſſions, if " once launched out with Spinoza, to confound the " Subſtance of God with our own; and to imagine that " the Subſtance of what we call *Creature*, is the ſame " with that Being's, to which we give the Name of *Crea-* " *tor*." *Spinoza* is ſtill the Burthen of the Song. To cut this Matter ſhort, we ſhall therefore give Mr. *Pope*'s

LET. III. own plain Sentiments, in a Line of this very Eſſay, that overturn all *Spinoziſm* from its very Foundations.

" THE WORKMAN FROM HIS WORK DISTINCT
" WAS KNOWN,
" And ſimple Reaſon never ſought but one."

But the Commentator is, at every Turn, crying out,—*A Follower of* Spinoza *would expreſs himſelf juſt ſo.* I believe he might; and I will explain this Riddle to Mr *Crouſaz*. That execrable Wretch, to diſguiſe his Impiety, covered it with ſuch Expreſſions as concealed it a long Time from his Friends and Acquaintance, as we may ſee by his Literary Correſpondence. Hence it muſt neceſſarily happen, that every the beſt intentioned, moſt orthodox Writer, will uſe many Expreſſions, that a *Spinoziſt* would employ.

To perſiſt, therefore, from henceforth, in this Acciſation, will deſerve a Name, which it is not my Buſineſs to beſtow.

Mr. *Pope* concludes thus;

" Ceaſe then, nor Order Imperfection name:
" Our proper Bliſs depends on what we blame.
" Know thy own Point: this kind, this due Degree
" Of Blindneſs, Weakneſs, Heaven beſtows on thee.
" Submit.—In this, or any other Sphere,
" Secure to be as bleſt as thou canſt bear:
" Safe in the Hand of one diſpoſing Power,
" Or in the natal or the mortal Hour."

" The

" The Heart gives itſelf up (ſays Mr *Crouſaz*) to the " Magnificence of theſe Words.—But I ask Mr. *Pope*, " with regard to ſuch conſolatory Ideas, whether he was " not beholden, in ſome Meaſure, to Religion for " them?" * This is in the true Spirit of modern Controverſy.—Our Critick had taken it into his Head, that the Poet had no Religion; tho' he does not pretend his Proofs to riſe higher than to a legitimate Suſpicion; and finding here a Paſſage that ſpoke plainly to the contrary, inſtead of retracting that raſh uncharitable Opinion, he would turn this very Evidence of his own Miſtake into a new Proof for the Support of it; and ſo inſinuate, you ſee, that Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himſelf. He then preaches, for two Pages together, on the Paſſage, and ends in theſe Words: — " From all this I conclude, " that the Verſes in Queſtion are altogether edifying in " the Mouth of an honeſt Man, but that they give Scan- " dal and appear profane in the Mouth of an ill one."† How exactly can *Rome* and *Geneva* jump on ſome Occaſions! So the Conclave adjudged, that thoſe Propoſitions, which in the Mouth of St. *Auſtin* were altogether edifying, became ſcandalous and profane in the Mouth of *Janſenius*. Let. III.

Thus have I gone thro' what I thought material in his Commentary on the firſt Epiſtle: I will only obſerve, that Mr *Crouſaz* has, in ſeveral Places, charged Mr. *Pope* with pretended Abſurdities and Impieties, for which his *free* Tranſlator is only anſwerable. But as he profeſſes not to underſtand *Engliſh*, thoſe Things may be paſſed over.

* Page 124, 125. † Page 127.

LET. III. However, it may not be amiſs to give an Inſtance or two of this Matter, as a Specimen of this Part of the Performance.

The Tranſlator ſays,

" Il ne deſire point cette celeſte Flame,
" Qui des purs Seraphins devore & nourrit l'Ame.*

That is, the Savage *does not deſire that heavenly Flame, which, at the ſame Time that it devours the Souls of pure Seraphims, nouriſhes them.* Mr *Crouſaz* remarks: — " Mr *Pope*, by exalting the Fire of his Poetry by an " Antitheſis, throws, occaſionally, his Ridicule on thoſe " heavenly Spirits. The *Indian*, ſays the Poet, contents " himſelf without any Thing of that Flame, which de- " vours at the ſame Time that it nouriſhes." But Mr. *Pope* is quite free from this Imputation; nothing can be more grave or ſober than his *Engliſh* on this Occaſion.

" To *be*, contents his natural Deſire;
" He aſks no Angel's Wing or Seraph's Fire.

But neither, I dare ſay, did the Tranſlator mean any Thing of Ridicule in his *devore & nourrit l'ame*. It is the ſober ſolid Jargon of the Schools; and Mr *l'Abbe* no doubt had frequently heard it from the Benches of the *Sorbonne*. Indeed had a Writer like Mr. *Pope* uſed ſuch an Expreſſion, one might have ſuſpected that he was not ſo ſerious as he ſhould be.

* Page 77.

The

The Poet, ſpeaking of God's Omnipreſence, ſays:

" —As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,
" As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns.

Which Mr *l'Abbe* has thus tranſlated,

" Dans un homme ignore ſous une humble chaumiere,
" Que dans le Seraphin rayonnant de lumiere. *

That is, *as well in the ignorant Man, who inhabits an humble Cottage, as in the Seraphim encompaſſed with Rays of Light.* Our *Frenchman* here, in good earneſt, thought, that *a vile Man that mourned* could be none but ſuch a one as lived in a Cottage. Which has betrayed Mr *Crouſaz* into this important Remark: — " For all that, we " ſometimes find in Perſons of the loweſt Rank, a Fund " of Probity and Reſignation, that preſerves them from " Contempt; their Minds are indeed but narrow, yet " fitted to their Station, *&c.*" — But Mr. *Pope* had no ſuch childiſh Idea in his Head. He was oppoſing here the human Species to the angelic, and ſo ſpoke of *that*, when compared to *this*, as vile and diſconſolate. The Force and Beauty of the Reflection depend on this Senſe; and, what is more, the Propriety of it; and it is amazing that neither the Tranſlator nor Critick could ſee it.— There are many Miſtakes of this Nature, both of one and the other, throughout the Tranſlation and the Commentary. The Tranſlation is indeed an elegant one, and

* Page 120.

often

Let. III. often well expreſſes the Senſe of the Original; but yet ſometimes it both envenoms and miſtakes it.

But I muſt by no means forget our Critick's Remark on theſe Lines of Mr. *Pope*'s fourth Epiſtle, ſpeaking of the *good* Man:

" For him alone *Hope* leads from Gole to Gole,
" And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul;
" Till lengthen'd on to *Faith*, and unconfin'd,
" It pours the Bliſs, that fills up all the Mind.
" He ſees, why Nature plants in Man alone
" Hope of known Bliſs, and Faith in Bliſs unknown:
" Nature, whoſe Dictates to no other kind
" Are giv'n in vain, but what they ſeek they find.

To this Mr *Crouſaz:* — " I made my Remarks as I " went along in reading the Poem of Mr *Du Reſnel*; " and in Proportion as I advanced in it, I have had the " moſt agreeable Satisfaction to find, that my Commen- " taries have been too haſty and immature on this " Poem; in ſo clear a Light has the illuſtrious Abbe " placed thoſe Truths, which the Proſe Tranſlator had " delivered with much leſs Preciſeneſs. In this Tranſlation " I evidently meet with the ſacred Terms of *Faith*, *Hope*, " and *Charity*; but I don't know where he had them. " And it is not eaſy for me to find, how the Ideas which " I have been accuſtomed to fix to them can agree with " them. I am puzzled to know what they have to " do here."

This, to uſe our Critick's own Words, is a Specimen of that *Galimatias*, that runs through his whole Commentary. He ſuſpects, he approves, he doubts, he applauds, but it all ends in Calumny and Condemnation.

Here

Here you have an old Veteran Controverſialiſt of Seventy-five, who gives the World his *ſecond Thoughts*, (for he had wrote his *Examen* before he compoſed this Commentary) telling us, he wrote at random; that he compoſed the greateſt Part of his Remarks, before he had read over the Book he wrote againſt; a Book containing a regular well digeſted Syſtem, whoſe Parts having a mutual Dependance, neceſſarily ſupport and illuſtrate each other. But if a Man would make ſo free with himſelf as to tell ſuch a ſtrange Story to the World, which certainly he had a Right to do, he ſhould have made Satisfaction for his Folly, eſpecially as his moral Character was concerned in it, by ſtriking out all thoſe odious Imputations with which the foregoing Part of his Commentary abounds. Inſtead of this, he was not only content to leave the Calumnies of *Fataliſm* and *Spinoziſm* unretracted; but has thought fit to renew them, even after this Confeſſion of his haſty *premature* Way of Writing. What muſt we think of ſuch a Writer? — But after all, perhaps, this Acknowledgment is mere Mockery, as he is very full of it in his *Examen*, where he pretends to acquit the Poet of *Fataliſm*. All I can ſay, is, that if it be a Joke, it is as *dull* a one as that; which is ſaying more of it, than, I believe, can be ſaid of any other Man's.

I thought to have gone on upon his Commentaries on the reſt of Mr. *Pope*'s Epiſtles; but, as our great Poet himſelf ſays,

" 'Tis beſt ſometimes one's Cenſure to reſtrain,
" And charitably let the Dull be vain;

and

LET. III. and looking them over, I found ſuch a continual Repetition of Miſtakes and falſe Repreſentations, that I was almoſt aſhamed of having gone ſo far. It is amazing that a Man could write a whole Book, in direct Contradiction to the very Principle himſelf lays down in it, to proceed by: *L'Exactitude tres ſcrupuleuſe* (ſays he, p. 196) *nuiroit aux fins de la poeſie; mais on doit ſe faire une Loi d'interpreter une expreſſion par l'autre, de peur de attribuer a un Poete des idees qui lui feroient du tort.* Here then I'll ſtop in good Time, having already gained my Point in theſe few haſty Obſervations; which was to vindicate Mr. *Pope* from much unjuſt Cenſure; and to ſhew our Libertines, that they were never more miſtaken, than when they ſuppoſed the *Eſſay on Man* countenanced any of their Follies.

I am, &c.

LETTER

LETTER IV.

IN one of my former, I charged the *French* Translation of *the Essay on Man* with now and then miſtaking its *Original:* this, as well for its being one of the principal Cauſes of the Commentator's Impertinences, as to juſtify my Cenſure, I ſhall make the Subject of the preſent Letter. LET. IV.

I have already dwelt ſo long on the *firſt Epiſtle*, that I ſhall take my Specimen of the Tranſlator's Errors from the Introduction to the *ſecond*. And in order to give the Reader a clearer Idea of them, I ſhall previouſly explain the Poet's Reaſoning in that Introduction.

Mr. *Pope* had ſhewn, that the Ways of God are too high for our Contemplation; from whence he concludes, that

" The proper Study of *Mankind* is *Man*.

This *Concluſion* from the Reaſoning of the firſt Epiſtle, he methodically makes the Subject of his *Introduction* to the *ſecond*; which treats of Man's Nature. But here the Accuſers of Providence would be apt to object, and ſay,— " Admit we had run into an Extreme, while we pre- " tended to cenſure or penetrate the Deſigns of Provi- " dence; a Matter indeed too high for us; yet have you

LET. IV. " gone as far into the Oppoſite, while you only ſend us " to the Knowledge of ourſelves. You muſt mock us, " when you talk of this as a *Study*; for ſure we are in- " timately acquainted with our own Natures." Thus, I ſay, would they be apt to object; for there are no Sort of Men more over-run with *Pride*, as Mr. *Pope* has fully ſhewn in his firſt Epiſtle, eſpecially that Kind of Pride, which conſiſts in a boaſted knowledge of human Nature. Hence we ſee the whole Argument of the late infidel Books againſt Religion turns on a ſuppoſed Inconſiſtency between Revelation, and what they pretend to ſay are the Dictates of human Nature. The Poet therefore, to convince them that this Study is not ſo eaſy a Task as they imagine, [from l. 2 to 19.] deſcribes the dark and feeble State of the human Underſtanding, with regard to the Knowledge of ourſelves: which is the *firſt* Argument for the Difficulty of it. He brings a *ſecond* from Fact, and ſhews [from l. 18 to 31.] that neither the *cleareſt* Science, which reſults from the *Newtonian* Philoſophy, nor the *moſt ſublime*, which is taugh tby the *Platonick*, will at all aſſiſt us in this Study; nay, what is more, that Religion itſelf, when grown *Fanatical and Enthuſiaſtick*, will be equally uſeleſs: tho' pure and ſober Religion will beſt inſtruct us in Man's Nature, that Knowledge being eſſential to Religion, whoſe *Subject* is Man conſidered in all his Relations, and conſequently whoſe *Object* is God.

To give this ſecond Argument from Fact the greater Force, he illuſtrates it, [from l. 30 to 43.] by the nobleſt Example that ever was in Science, the incomparable *Newton*, whom he repreſents as ſo much ſuperior to *his own Species*, that the Angelick Beings, when they ſaw him of late unfold all the Law of Nature, were in doubt

doubt whether he was not to be reckon'd of *theirs*; juſt as Men, when they ſee the ſurpriſing Inſtances of Sagacity in an Ape, are almoſt tempted to think he ſhould be ranked in their number. Yet this *wondrous Creature*, who ſaw ſo far into the Works of *Nature*, could go no farther in *human* Knowledge, than the Generality of his Species; for which the Poet gives this very juſt Reaſon:— In all other Sciences, the Underſtanding is uncheck'd and uncontroll'd by any oppoſite Principle; but in the Science of Man, the Paſſions overturn as faſt as Reaſon can build up. LET. IV.

" Alas, what Wonder! Man's ſuperior Part
" Uncheck'd may riſe, and climb from Art to Art;
" But when his own great Work is but begun,
" What Reaſon weaves, by Paſſion is undone.

This is a plain Account of the Poet's fine Reaſoning in his Introduction. The Whole of which his elegant Tranſlator has ſo unhappily miſtaken, that of one of the moſt forceable and beſt connected Arguments, he has made one of the moſt obſcure and inconſiſtent, which even the officious Commentator could ſcarce make worſe by his important and candid Remarks. — Thus beautifully does Mr. *Pope* deſcribe Man's Weakneſs and Blindneſs, with regard to his own Being:

" — Plac'd on this Iſthmus of a middle State,
" A Being darkly wiſe, and rudely great,
" With too much Knowledge for the Sceptick ſide,
" With too much Weakneſs for the Stoick's Pride,
" He hangs between; in doubt to act or reſt,
" In doubt to deem himſelf a God or Beaſt;

ET. IV.

" In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer,
" Born but to die, and reaſoning but to err.

But as he has given this Deſcription of Man for the very contrary Purpoſe, to which Scepticks are wont to employ ſuch Kind of Paintings, namely, not to deter Men from, but to excite them to the Diſcovery of Truth; he hath, with great Judgment, repreſented Man as doubting and wavering between the *right* and *wrong* Object; from which State there are great Hopes he may be relieved by a careful and circumſpect Uſe of Reaſon. On the contrary, had he ſuppoſed Man ſo blind as to be buſied in chuſing, or doubtful in his Choice, between two Objects *equally wrong*, the Caſe had appeared deſperate, and all *Study* of Man had been effectually diſcouraged. But his Tranſlator not ſeeing into the Force and Beauty of this Conduct, has run into the very Abſurdity I have here ſhewn Mr. *Pope* has ſo artfully avoided.

The Poet ſays,

" Man hangs between; in doubt to ACT or REST.

Now he tells us 'tis Man's Duty to *Act*, not to *Reſt*, as the *Stoicks* thought; and to their Principle this latter Word alludes, he having juſt before mentioned that Sect, whoſe Virtue, as he ſays, is

" ——— fix'd as in a Froſt;
" Contracted all, retiring to the Breaſt:
" But Strength of Mind is EXERCISE, not *Reſt*.

But

But the Tranſlator is not for mincing Matters,

" Seroit-il en naiſſant *au travail condamné?*
" Aux *douceurs du repos* ſeroit-il deſtiné!

According to him, Man doubts whether he be condemned to a ſlaviſh Toil and Labour, or deſtined to the Luxury of Repoſe; both which are extravagant Errors, and directly contradict Mr. *Pope*'s whole Deſign, which is to recommend the Study of Man. Mr *De Crouſaz* himſelf had ſome Glimmering of the Abſurdity of theſe two Lines; and becauſe he ſhall not ſay, I allow him to have ſaid nothing right throughout his whole Commentary, I will here tranſcribe his very words. — " Ce " qui fait encore, que les Antitheſes frapent au lieu d' in- " ſtruire, c'eſt qu'elles ſont outrées. *L'Homme nait-il* " *condamné au travail? Doit-il ſe permettre la molleſſe et* " *le repos?* Quel ſujet de decouragement ou de trouble, ſi " l'on n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux partis ſi contraires? " Mais nous ne naiſſons ni deſtinés a un repos oiſif, ni " condamnés a un travail accablant & inhumain." *p.* 138.

Again Mr. *Pope*,

" In doubt to deem himſelf a *God* or *Beaſt*.

i. e. He doubts, as appears from the Line immediately following this, whether his Soul be *Mortal* or *Immortal*; one of which is the Truth, namely, its Immortality, as the Poet himſelf teaches, when he ſpeaks of the Omnipreſence of God:

" Breathes

" Breathes in our *Soul*, informs our *mortal* Part.

The Tranſlator, as we ſay, unconſcious of the Poet's Aim, rambles, as before:

" Tantot de ſon eſprit admirant l' Excellence,
" Il penſe qu'il eſt Dieu, *qu'il en a la puiſſance*;
" Et tantot gemiſſant des beſoins de ſon Corps,
" Il croit que de la brute, il n'a que les *reſorts*.

Here his Head (turned to a ſceptical View) was running on the different Extravagances of *Alexander*, *Des Cartes*, and *Spinoza*: Sometimes, ſays he, Man thinks himſelf a real God, and ſometimes again a mere Machine; Things quite out of Mr. *Pope*'s Thoughts in this Place.

Again, the Poet in a beautiful Alluſion to the Sentiments and Words of *Scripture*, breaks out into this juſt and moral Reflection upon *Man's* Condition here:

" Born but to die, and Reaſoning but to err.

The Tranſlator turns this fine and ſober Thought into the moſt outrageous Scepticiſm;

" Ce n'eſt que pour mourir, qu'il eſt ne, qu'il reſpire,
" Et *tout ſa raiſon n'eſt preſque qu'un delire*:

and ſo makes his Author directly contradict himſelf, where he ſays,

" With too much Knowledge for the Sceptick Side.

Strange!

Strange! that the Tranſlator could not ſee the Difference between that weak State of Reaſon, in which Error mixes itſelf with all its true Concluſions concerning Man's Nature; and *an abſtract Quality, which we vainly call Reaſon, but which*, he tells us, *is indeed ſcarce any Thing elſe but Madneſs.*

But Miſtakes, like Misfortunes, ſeldom come ſingle; and from the ſame Cauſe, becauſe they influence one another.—For the Tranſlator, having miſtaken both the *Nature* and *End* of the Deſcription of the Weakneſs of human Nature, imagined the Poet's *ſecond* Argument of the Difficulty of the Study of Man from Fact, which ſhews that the *cleareſt* and *ſublimeſt* Science is no Aſſiſtance to it, nor Religion itſelf, when grown *Fanatical and Enthuſiaſtick*; he imagined, I ſay, that this fine Argument was an Illuſtration only of the foregoing Deſcription, in which Illuſtration Inſtances were given of the ſeveral *Extravagances in falſe Science*; whereas the Poet's Deſign was, juſt the contrary, to ſhew the prodigious Force and Vigour of the human Mind, in Studies which do not relate to itſelf; and yet that all its Force avails but little in this Inquiry.

But there was another Cauſe of the Tranſlator's Error; he had miſtaken, as we ſay, the Poet's firſt Argument for a Deſcription of the Weakneſs of the human Mind with regard to *all Truth*; whereas it is only ſuch with regard to the *Knowledge of Man's Nature*. This led him, as it would ſeem, to conclude, that if Mr. *Pope* was to be underſtood as ſpeaking *here* of real and great Progreſs in Science, it would contradict what had been ſaid in the Deſcription; and therefore he turns it to imaginary Hypotheſes.

Let

LET. IV. Let us take the whole Context.

I.

" Go wondrous Creature! mount where Science
" guides,
" Go meaſure Earth, weigh Air, and ſtate the Tides;
" Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray,
" Correct old Time, and teach the Sun his Way.

II.

" Go ſoar with *Plato* to th' Empyreal Sphere,
" To the firſt Good, firſt Perfect, and firſt Fair.

III.

" Or tread the mazy Round his Followers trod,
" And quitting Senſe call imitating God.
" Go teach eternal Wiſdom how to rule,
" Then drop into thyſelf, and be a Fool.

Mr. *Pope* ſays, *Go wondrous Creature*; and he never ſpeaks at random. The Reaſon of his giving Man this Epithet is, becauſe, tho' he be, as the Poet ſays, in another Place, *little leſs than Angel* in his Faculties of Science, yet is he miſerably blind in the Knowledge of himſelf. But the Tranſlator, not apprehending the Poet's Thought, imagined it was ſaid ironically, and ſo tranſlates it;

" Va ſublime Mortel, fier de ton Excellence,
" *Ne crois rien d' impoſſible a ton Intelligence.*

Mr. *Pope*—

" ——— Mount where Science guides,
" Go meaſure Earth, weigh Air, and ſtate the Tides;
" Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray. —

This

This is a Deſcription of the *real* Advances in Science, Let. IV.
ſuch as the *Newtonian*. And the very Introduction to it,
— *Mount where* Science *guides*, ſhews it to be ſo.

But the Tranſlator, carried away with the Fancy of its being an Illuſtration of the foregoing Deſcription, turns the Whole to *vain*, *falſe*, *imaginary* Science, ſuch as that of *Des Cartes*: And to add the greater Ridicule to it, he introduces the Philoſopher, with Compaſs in Hand, meaſuring the Univerſe.

" Le Compas a la main, meſure l' univerſe;
" Regle *a ton gre* le flux & le reflux des mers;
" *Fixe* le poids de l' air, & *commande* aux planetes;
" *Determine le cours de leurs marches ſecretes.*

Regulate, ſays he, *according to your own Will, the Flux and Reflux of the Sea*; and this, *Des Cartes* preſumed to do: But it was *Newton* that *ſtated the Tides*. It is the pretended Philoſopher that *fixes the Weight of the Air*; but the real Philoſopher that *weighs Air*. It was *Des Cartes* that *commanded the Planets, and determined them to roll according to his own good Pleaſure*; but it was *Newton* who

" *Shew'd by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray.*

And when the Tranſlator comes to the third Inſtance, which is that of falſe Religion, he introduces it thus,

" Et joignant la folie a la *temerite*.

Which ſhews how ill he underſtood Mr. *Pope*'s Inſtances of the *Natural Philoſophy* of *Newton*, and the *Metaphy-*

LET. IV. *ſical Philoſophy* of *Plato*. And yet all the Juſtice, the Force, and Sublimity of the Poet's Reaſoning conſiſt in a right Apprehenſion of them.

Mr. *Pope*—

" Go teach Eternal Wiſdom how to rule,
" Then drop into thyſelf, and be a Fool.

Theſe two Lines have only contributed to keep the Tranſlator in his Error; for he took the *firſt* of them to be a *Recapitulation* of all that had been ſaid from l. 18. Whereas *both* of them together are a *Concluſion* from it, to this Effect, " Go now, vain Man, elated with thy " Acquirements in *real* Science and *imaginary* Intimacy " with God: Go and run into all the Extravagances I " have expoſed in the firſt Epiſtle, where thou pretend- " edſt to teach Providence how to govern; then drop in- " to the Obſcurities of thy own Nature, and confeſs thy " Ignorance and Folly."

Mr. *Pope* then confirms and illuſtrates this Reaſoning by one of the greateſt Examples that ever was.

" Superior Beings, when of late they ſaw
" A mortal Man unfold all Nature's Law,
" Admir'd ſuch Wiſdom in an earthly Shape,
" And ſhew'd a *Newton* as we ſhew an *Ape*.

In theſe Lines he ſpeaks to this Effect. — " To make " you fully ſenſible of the Difficulty of the Study of " Man, I ſhall inſtance in the great *Newton* himſelf; " whom, when ſuperior Beings not long ſince ſaw, ca- " pable

" pable of unfolding the whole Law of Nature, they Let. IV
" were ſo ſtruck with his prodigious Science, that they
" doubted whether he ſhould not be reckoned as one
" of their own Species? juſt as Men, when they
" ſee the ſurpriſing Inſtances of Sagacity in an Ape,
" are almoſt tempted to think him of their own kind:
" And yet this wondrous Man could go no farther in
" the Knowledge of his own Nature, than the Gene-
" rality of his Species."

Thus ſtands the Argument, in which the Poet has paid a higher Complement to the great *Newton*, as well as a more ingenious, than any of his moſt zealous Followers.

Yet the Tranſlator, now quite in the dark, by Miſtake heaped upon Miſtake, imagined his Deſign was to depreciate *Newton*'s Knowledge, and humble the Pride of his Followers: Which hath made him play at croſs Purpoſes with his Original.

" Des celeſtes Eſprits la vive Intelligence
" Regarde avec pitie notre foible Science;
" *Newton*, le grand *Newton*, que nos admirons tous,
" Eſt peut-etre pour eux, ce qu'un Singe eſt pour nous.

" The heavenly Spirits, whoſe Underſtanding is ſo
" far ſuperior to ours, look down with Pity on the
" Weakneſs of human Science; *Newton*, the great *New-*
" *ton*, whom we ſo much admire, is perhaps in no higher
" Eſteem with them, than an Ape is with us."

But it is not their *Pity* but their *Admiration* that is the Queſtion here: and it was for no ſlight Cauſe they admired; it was to ſee *a mortal Man unfold the whole Law of Nature*; which, by the way, might have ſhewn the

LET. IV. Tranſlator, that the Poet was ſpeaking of *real* Science in the foregoing Paragraph. Nor was it Mr. *Pope*'s Intention to bring any of the Ape's *Qualities* but its *Sagacity* into the Compariſon. But why the *Ape's* Sagacity, rather than *that* of any other Animal; particularly the *half-reaſoning Elephant*, as the Poet calls it, which ſeem'd, on account of its ſuperior Sagacity to all other Animals, (which he there gives it) to deſerve the Honour as well? Becauſe as none but a Shape approaching to human, joined to Sagacity, could occaſion the Doubt of the Animal's relation to Man (on which Relation the Beauty of the whole Thought depends) the Ape only having that Shape, no other Animal could be employed in the Compariſon.

But this Miſtake ſeems to have led both the Tranſlator and Commentator into a much worſe; into a ſtrange Imagination that Mr. *Pope* had here reflected upon Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s moral Character; which the Poet was as far from doing, as the Philoſopher was from deſerving.

After Mr. *Pope* had ſhewn, by this illuſtrious Inſtance, that a great Genius might make prodigious Advances in the Knowledge of Nature, and at the ſame time remain very ignorant of his own, he gives a Reaſon for it: — In all other Sciences the Underſtanding has no oppoſite Principle to cloud and biaſs it; but in the Knowledge of Man, the *Paſſions* obſcure as faſt as *Reaſon* clears up.

" Could he, whoſe Rules the whirling Comet bind,
" Deſcribe or fix one Movement of the Mind?
" Who ſaw the Stars here riſe, and there deſcend,
" Explain his own Beginning or his End?

" Alas

" Alas what Wonder! Man's ſuperior Part
" Uncheck'd may riſe, and climb from Art to Art;
" But when his own great Work is but begun,
" What Reaſon weaves by Paſſion is undone.

Here we ſee, at the fifth Line, the Poet turns from *Newton*, and ſpeaks of *Man* and his *Nature* in general. Yet the Tranſlator ſeems to apply all that follows to that Philoſopher:

" Toi qui juſques aux cieux oſes porter ta vue,
" Qui crois en concevoir & l'ordre & l'etendue,
" Toi qui veux dans leur cours, leur preſcrire la loi,
" Scais-tu regler ton cœur, ſcais-tu regner ſur toi?
" Ton eſprit qui ſur tout vainement ſe fatigue,
" Avide de ſcavoir, ne connoit point de digue;
" De quoi par ſes travaux s'eſt-il rendu certain?
" Peut-il te decouvrir ton principe & ta fin.

As for the Tranſlator, he has miſtaken the whole Turn of the Argument, in this Introduction, from firſt to laſt, and thereby quite obſcured the ſtrong and well-connected Reaſoning of his Original: But ſhould I take notice of all the Calumnies and Impertinences into which this hath led the *Commentator*, I ſhould quite tire the Reader's Patience: It ſhall ſuffice to tranſcribe his Remarks on theſe laſt Lines of the Tranſlator,— " It is " not to be diſputed, but that whatever Progreſs a great " Genius has made in Science, he deſerves rather Cen- " ſure than Applauſe, if he has ſpent that Time in bar- " ren Speculations, curious indeed, but of little Uſe, " which he ſhould have employ'd to know himſelf, *his* " *Beginning and his End*, and how to regulate his Con- " duct;

LET. IV. " duct; and if, inſtead of that Candour and Humanity,
" and Deſire to oblige, Virtues ſo becoming our Nature,
" he be over-run with Ambition, Envy, and a Rage of
" Preheminence, whoſe Violence and Rancour are at-
" tended with the moſt ſcandalous Effects, of which there
" are too many Inſtances: Vices which Mr. *Newton*
" liv'd and died an entire Stranger to." *

It would be hard to ſay, whether the Tranſlator or Commentator have here rambled fartheſt from their Author's Meaning; but the vile Inſinuations in the Remark are all the Commentator's own; and I have here tranſcribed it, to expoſe the malignant Motive he appears to have had in writing againſt the *Eſſay on Man*.

In a word, they did not ſee (and never were poor Men ſo miſerably bit) that

" Thoſe oft' are Stratagems which Errors ſeem,
" Nor is it *Homer* nods, but we that dream.

The poetical Tranſlator could not imagine ſo great a Poet would pique himſelf upon cloſe Reaſoning; and the faſtidious Philoſopher, of courſe, concluded that a Man of ſo much Wit could hardly reaſon well; ſo neither of them gave the neceſſary Attention to the Poet's Syſtem. A Syſtem logically cloſe, tho' wrote in Verſe, and compleat, tho' ſtudiouſly conciſe: This ſecond Epiſtle particularly (to which the Reaſoning explained above is an Introduction) containing the trueſt, cleareſt, and conſequently the beſt Account of the Origin, Uſe, and End of the Paſſions, that is, in my Opinion, any where to be met with.

* Page 147.

I have

I have only a Word to add, with regard to the Tranſlator: It may be thought hard to call the *Expreſſions* of a *Poet*, as he is, to ſo ſtrict an Account; but he is here to be conſidered only in Quality of Tranſlator to a much greater Poet: Whoſe Reaſoning he has frequently miſtaken; and whoſe Works want nothing but to be fairly examined by the ſevereſt Rules of Logick and good Philoſophy, to become as illuſtrious for their Senſe, as they have long been for their Wit and Poetry.

I am, &c.

LETTER

LETTER V.

LET. V.

I SHOULD never have imagined that ſo clear and plain a Piece of Reaſoning, as Mr. *Pope*'s ſecond Epiſtle on the *Paſſions*, could need a Comment, had not I ſeen that of Mr *Crouſaz*; which (tho' extremely free with Inſinuations of Spinoziſm and Irreligion) miſtakes it from End to End. So true is the old Saying, *Homine imperito nihil eſt iniquius*. Having, therefore, in the foregoing Letter explained the Introduction, I now go on to the Body of the Diſcourſe.

The Poet [from l. 43 to 49.] begins with pointing out the *two* grand *Principles* in human Nature, *Self-Love* and *Reaſon*. — Deſcribes their *general* Nature: The firſt *ſets* Man upon acting, the other *regulates his Action*. However, theſe Principles are *natural*, not *moral*: And, therefore, in themſelves, neither *good* nor *bad*; but *ſo*, only as they are directed.

" Nor this a *good*, nor that a *bad* we call,
" Each works its End, to move or govern all.

This laſt Obſervation is made with great Judgment, in Oppoſition to the deſperate Folly of thoſe *Fanatics*, who, as the *Aſcetic*, pretend to eradicate *Self-Love*; as the *Myſtic*,

Myſtic, would ſtifle *Reaſon*; on the ridiculous Fancy of their being *moral*, not *natural* Principles. Let. V.

The Poet proceeds [from l. 48 to 57.] more minutely to mark out the diſtinct Offices of theſe *two Principles*, which he had before aſſigned only in general; and here he ſhews their *Neceſſity*; for without the *former*, Man would be *unactive*, and without the *latter* active to no *Purpoſe*.

" Fixt like a Plant to his peculiar Spot,
" To draw Nutrition, propagate and rot:
" Or Meteor-like flame lawleſs thro' the Void,
" Deſtroying others, by himſelf deſtroy'd.

Having thus explained the *Ends* and *Offices* of each Principle, he comes in the next Place [from l. 56 to 69.] to ſpeak of their *Qualities*: And ſhews how they are fitted to diſcharge thoſe Functions, and anſwer their reſpective *Intentions*. The Buſineſs of *Self-Love* being to incite to Action, it is quick and impetuous; and moving inſtinctively, it has, like *Attraction*, its Force prodigiouſly increaſed as the Object approaches, and proportionably leſſen'd as that recedes. On the contrary, *Reaſon*, like the *Author of Attraction*, is always calm and ſedate, and equally preſerves itſelf, whether the Object be near, or far off. Hence the *moving* Principle was made more *ſtrong*; the *reſtraining*, more *quickſighted*. The Conſequence he draws from this View of the Caſe is, that, if we would not be carried away to our Deſtruction we muſt always keep Reaſon upon Guard.

But it would be objected that, if this Account be true, human Life would be *moſt* miſerable, and, even in the wiſeſt, a perpetual Conflict between Reaſon and the Paſſions. To this therefore the Poet replies, [from l. 67

LET. V. to 71.] that Providence has ſo graciouſly contrived, that even in the voluntary Exerciſe of Reaſon, as in the mere mechanical Motion of a Limb, *Habit* makes that, which was at firſt done with Pain, eaſy and natural. And farther, that the *Experience* gained by the long Exerciſe of Reaſon goes a great Way towards *eluding* the Force of the Paſſions.

" Attention Habit and Experience gains;
" Each ſtrengthens Reaſon and Self-love reſtrains.

From this Deſcription of *Self-love* and *Reaſon*, it appears, as the Poet ſhews [from l. 70 to 83.] that both conſpire to one End, namely *human Happineſs*; the Difference being only this, that the *firſt* haſtily ſeizes every thing which has the Appearance of Good; the *other* weighs and examines whether it be indeed what it appears.

This ſhews, as he next obſerves, the Folly of the *Schoolmen*, who conſider them as two *oppoſite* Principles, the one *Good* and the other *Ill:* And it is a moſt judicious and ſeaſonable Obſervation; for this dangerous School Opinion was one of the chief Supports of the *Manichean* or *Zoroaſtran* Error, the Confutation of which was one of the principal Ends of the Author, in writing. For if there be two Principles in Man, *good* and *bad*, it is natural to think him the joint Product of the two *Manichean* Deities, one of whom contributed his Reaſon, the other his Paſſions, rather than the Creature of *one individual Cauſe*. This was *Plutarch*'s Notion, and, as we may ſee in him, of the more ancient *Manicheans*; it was of Importance therefore to reprobate and ſubvert an Opinion that ſerved to Support ſo dangerous an Error.

" Let

" Let ſubtle Schoolmen teach theſe Friends to fight,
" More ſtudious to *divide* than to unite:
" And Grace and Virtue, Senſe and Reaſon ſplit
" With all the raſh Dexterity of Wit.

But the *French* Tranſlator deceived, as it ſhould ſeem, by the Ambiguity of the Word *divide*, has miſtaken theſe Lines for a Reflection, not on the Theology, as Mr. *Pope* intended them, but on the *Logic* of the *Schools*, with which the Poet had here nothing to do: This, it is true, delights in a Multiplicity of Diſtinctions without Difference, which is indeed a Fault, but not of that high Malignity as the other; that which the Poet cenſures leading directly into Error, this which his Tranſlator reproves only hindering our Progreſs in Truth or Science.

" Qu' un Scholaſtique vain cherchant a *diſcourir*
" *Cache la Vérité* loin de la découvrir,
" Que par un *long tiſſu d' Argumens inutiles*
" Par des tours ambigus, par des raiſons *inutiles*
" *Voulant tout diviſer juſques a l' infini*
" Il ſepere avec art ce qui doit être uni.

Now tho' this Fault in the *Logic of the Schools* be univerſally owned and condemned by all *out of it*, and by no one more than by Mr *De Crouſaz* himſelf, in his Books of Logic, yet in pure Contradiction to Mr. *Pope*, who as he thought (thro' the Tranſlator's Error) had condemned it, he could not forbear ſaying — *A Poet may happen to write with more Elegance than a Schoolman, and yet for all*

LET. V. *that not be able to expreſs himſelf with more Juſtice and Preciſion.**

The Poet having given this Account of the Nature of *Self-love* in *general*, comes now to *anatomize* it, in a Diſcourſe of the *Paſſions*, which he aptly names the *Modes of Self-Love*; the Object of all theſe, he ſhews [from p. 82 to 91.] is *Good*; and when under the Guidance of Reaſon, *real Good*; either of our own, or of another's; when fairly aiming at our *own*, the *Paſſion* is call'd *Prudence*, when at another's, *Virtue*.

Hence (as he ſhews from l. 90 to 95.) appears the Folly of the *Stoics*, who are for *eradicating* the Paſſions, Things ſo neceſſary both to the Good of the *Individual*, and of the *Kind*. Which prepoſterous Method of promoting Virtue, he therefore very reaſonably reproves.

But as it was from Obſervation of the Evils occaſion'd by the Paſſions, that the *Stoics* thus extravagantly projected their Extirpation, the Poet recurs [from l. 94 to 101.] to his grand Principle, ſo often before, and to ſo good Purpoſe, inſiſted on, that

" ——*partial Ill is univerſal Good*;

and ſhews, that, tho' the Tempeſt of the Paſſions, like that of the Air, may tear and ravage ſome few Parts of Nature in its Paſſage, yet the ſalutary Agitation produced by it preſerves the whole in Life and Vigour. This is his *firſt* Argument againſt the *Stoics*, which he illuſtrates by a very beautiful Similitude, on a Hint taken from Scripture Story.†

* Page 152. † 1 *Kings* c. xix. ver. 11, 12.

" Nor

" Nor God alone *in the ſtill Calm* we find,
" He mounts the *Storm* and walks upon the Wind.

But the Tranſlator, not taking the Alluſion, has turn'd it thus:

" Dieu lui-meme, Dieu ſort de *ſon profond repos.*

And ſo has made an *Epicurean* God of the Maſter of the Univerſe, of whom Scripture afforded Mr. *Pope* this grand and ſublime Idea.

Mr *De Crouſaz* does not ſpare this Expreſſion of *God's coming out of his profound Repoſe.* — *It is* (ſays he) *exceſſively poetical, and preſents us with Ideas which we ought not to dwell upon.* But when he goes on — *there is nothing in God's directing the Storm which can authorize the Paſſions that diſturb our Happineſs,* * he talks very impertinently. Mr. *Pope* is here only ſhewing the natural Effects of the Paſſions, and how by *God's* gracious Diſpoſition they are turned, from their natural Biaſs, to promote the Happineſs of Mankind. As to the Way in which they are to be treated by *Man,* in whom they are found, all that he contends for in favour of them, is only, that they ſhould not be quite rooted up and deſtroyed, as the *Stoics* and their Followers in all Religions fooliſhly attempted. For the reſt, he conſtantly repeats this Advice:

" The Action of the *Stronger* to ſuſpend,
" Reaſon ſtill uſe, to Reaſon ſtill attend.

* Page 158.

His

LET. V. His *ſecond* Argument againſt the *Stoics* [from l. 100 to 113.] is, that *Paſſions* go to the Compoſition of a *moral Character*, juſt as *Elementary Particles* go to the Compoſition of an *organized Body*: Therefore for Man to go about to deſtroy what compoſes his very Being, is the Height of Extravagancy: 'Tis true, he tells us that theſe *Paſſions*, like *Elements*, muſt be tempered, ſoftened and united in order to perfect the Work of the *great Plaſtic Artiſt*; and this is *Reaſon's* Office.

" Suffice that Reaſon keeps to Nature's Road,
" Subject, compound them, follow her and God.
" Love, Hope and Joy, fair Pleaſure's ſmiling Train,
" Hate, Fear and Grief, the Family of Pain,
" Theſe mixt with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,
" Make and maintain the Ballance of the Mind.

The Poet proceeds, and ſhews in the next Place, that tho' all the *Paſſions* have their Turn in ſwaying the Determinations of the Mind, yet every Man has one MASTER PASSION that ſtifles or abſorbs all the reſt. This *Fact* he illuſtrates at large, in the *firſt Epiſtle of his ſecond Book*. Here [from l. 112 to 132.] he gives us the *Cauſe* of it — " Thoſe Pleaſures or Goods, which are the " Objects of the Paſſions, affect the Mind, by ſtriking " on the Senſes; but, as thro' the Formation of the " Organs of the human Frame, every Man has ſome " Senſe ſtronger and more acute than others, the Ob- " ject, which ſtrikes that ſtronger or acuter Senſe, what- " ever it be, will be the Object moſt deſired; and, con- " ſequently, the Purſuit of that will be the *ruling* " *Paſſion*."

" All

" All ſpread their Charms, but charm not all alike,
" On different Senſes, diff'rent Objects ſtrike;
" Hence diff'rent Paſſions more or leſs inflame,
" As ſtrong or weak the Organs of our Frame;
" And hence one *Maſter Paſſion* in the Breaſt
" Like *Aaron*'s Serpent ſwallows all the reſt.

— that the Difference of Force in this *ruling Paſſion* ſhall at firſt, perhaps, be very ſmall or imperceptible; but *Nature*, *Habit*, *Imagination*, *Wit*, nay even *Reaſon* itſelf will aſſiſt its Growth, 'till it has at length drawn and converted every other into itſelf.

All this is explained in a Strain of Poetry ſo wonderfully ſublime, as ſuſpends for a while the *ruling Paſſion* in every Reader, and ingroſſes his whole Admiration. It concludes thus,

" Nature its Mother, Habit is its Nurſe;
" *Wit*, Spirit, Faculties, but make it worſe;
" *Reaſon* itſelf but gives it Edge and Power,
" As Heav'n's bleſt Beam turns Vinegar more ſour.*

This leads the Poet to lament the Imbecillity of *human Reaſon* [from 138 to 151.] and the honeſt Purpoſe he had

* The Poet in ſome other of his *Epiſtles* gives Examples of the Doctrine and Precepts here delivered. Thus in that of the Uſe of Riches, he has illuſtrated this Truth in the Character of *Cotta*:

" Old *Cotta* ſham'd his Fortune and his Birth,
" *Yet was not* Cotta *void of Wit or Worth.*
" What tho' (the Uſe of barb'rous Spits forgot)
" His Kitchen vy'd in Coolneſs with his Grot?
" If *Cotta* liv'd on Pulſe, *it was no more*
" *Than Bramins, Saints, and Sages did before.*

LET. V. in ſo doing, we have explained in the Comment on the *third Epiſtle*.

But Mr *Crouſaz* will needs have it that the Poet, in this Repreſentation of human Reaſon, has contradicted what he ſaid of it in the 80 and 98 Lines of this Epiſtle. And poſſeſſed with this Notion, he goes on, in his declamatory Way, ſo unworthy a great Logician — *Does Mr.* Pope *take a Pleaſure in blowing hot and cold; in giving us ſucceſſively the Sweet and Bitter, to reduce us to ſuch a State that we mayn't know what to ſtick to. If there be no ill Deſign at Bottom in theſe Contradictions, but that they only ſpring from the imprudent Cuſtom, eſtabliſhed in the Schools, of talking Pro and Con,* &c. * And then tells an idle Common-place Story of Cardinal *Perron*.—In the mean time it happens this is no Contradiction at all, or if it be, it is that very Contradiction into which St. *Paul* likewiſe fell, when he ſo continually recommended the Uſe of Reaſon, and yet ſo energetically deſcribed its Imbecillity and Impotence. But as our *Logician* ſaid before, on a like Occaſion — *this might be edifying in a good Man, yet gives Scandal in an ill one.*

However, as it appears from the Account here given of the *ruling Paſſion*, and its *Cauſe*, which reſults from the Structure of the Organs, that it is the *Road of Nature*, the Poet ſhews [from l. 150 to 157.] that this Road is to be followed. So that the Office of Reaſon is not to direct us what Paſſion to exerciſe, but to aſſiſt us in RECTIFYING that which Nature has ſo ſtrongly impreſſed, and to keep it within due Bounds; for that

" A mightier Power the ſtrong Direction ſends,
" And ſev'ral Men impells to ſev'ral Ends.

* Page 166.

Here

Here Mr *De Crouſaz* ſhews his Maſter-piece of Criti- Let. V.
ciſm, and in his Comment on theſe Lines,

" Yet Nature's Road muſt be prefer'd;
" Reaſon is here no Guide but ſtill a Guard,
" 'Tis her's to RECTIFY not over-throw,
" And treat *this Paſſion* more as Friend than Foe,

pours out the full Stream of his Candour and Humanity. — *The only Refuge I have here left* (ſays he) *is to ſuppoſe that Mr.* Pope *thought the very Mention of this Notion would be ſufficient to expoſe the Ridicule and Horror of it, and of thoſe who regulate their Conduct on ſuch unjuſt and ſhocking Ideas. And I conceive I ſhould do M.* l'Abbé de Sep-Fontaines *a great deal of Injury, if I did not believe this was his Intention in tranſlating this Paſſage. But to have a more perfect Idea of this Ridicule and Horror, let us put the Words into the Mouth of a Confeſſor*, &c.* And ſo he goes on,† with uncommon Gayety, to repreſent a ghoſtly Father encouraging his Penitents in their ſeveral Vices on Mr. *Pope*'s pretended Principles. But we ſhall ſpoil his Mirth, when we ſhew that the Poet's Precept can have only this Meaning — " That as the *ruling Paſſion* is im-
" planted by *Nature*, it is Reaſon's Office to regulate, di-
" rect and reſtrain not to overthrow it. — To regulate
" the Paſſion of *Avarice*, for inſtance, into a parſimoni-
" ous Diſpenſation of the Public Revenues; to direct the
" Paſſion of *Love*, whoſe Object is Worth and Beauty, to
" the τὸ καλὸν, and the τἀγαθὸν, the *ſupreme Beauty and*
" *Good* (as his Maſter *Plato* adviſes) and to reſtrain *Spleen*
" to a Contempt and Hatred of Vice." This is what

* Page 170. † Pages 171—2.

LET. V. the Poet meant, and what every unprejudiced Man could not but ſee he muſt needs mean by RECTIFYING THE MASTER PASSION: Tho' he had not *confined* us to this Senſe, in the *Reaſon* he gives of his *Precept*, in theſe Words,

> " A mightier Power the ſtrong Direction ſends,
> " And ſev'ral Men impells to ſev'ral Ends.

So that had there indeed been an Ambiguity in the *Precept*, the *Reaſon* given would have clearly determined the Senſe of it: For what Ends are they which God impells to, but the Ends of Virtue?

But for a *more perfect Idea* (to ſpeak in his own free Terms) *of the Ridicule* of our Logician's Comment, let us attend to what he remarks on the two laſt Lines.—*Theſe Words* (ſays he) *may be underſtood in more than one Senſe, which is not rare, and may have a more or leſs reſtrained Meaning.* They *are ſuſceptible of a Senſe extravagant and injurious to Providence, and they will admit of a reaſonable one, and very worthy of our Attention.** Here, we ſee, he doubts about the Meaning of the *Reaſon* of the Precept; admits it may have a good one; and yet condemns, without Heſitation, and in the groſſeſt and moſt ſhocking Terms, the *Precept* itſelf; whoſe Meaning muſt yet, according to all Rules, even thoſe of his own Logick, if it have any Rules, be determined by the *Reaſon* of it.

But to return. The Poet having ſhewn that the *ruling Paſſion* (ſince Nature has given it us) is not to be overthrown, but *rectified*, the next Inquiry will be of what Uſe the *ruling Paſſion* is; for an *Uſe* it muſt have, if Rea-

* Page 174.

ſon

ſon is to treat it thus mildly? *This*, he ſhews us [from l. 156 to 187.] is twoſold, *Natural* and *Moral*.

1. It's *natural* Uſe is to conduct Men ſteadily to *one certain End*, who would otherwiſe be eternally fluctuating between the *equal* Violence of various and diſcordant Paſſions, driving them up and down at random.

" Like varying Winds, by *other* Paſſions toſt,
" *This* drives them conſtant to a certain Coaſt.

2. Its *moral* Uſe is to ingraft our *ruling Virtue* upon it.

" Th' eternal Art, educing Good from Ill,
" Grafts on this Paſſion our *beſt Principle*.

Of which the Poet gives ſeveral Inſtances, where the *ruling Paſſion* is converted into its *neighbouring Virtue*.

The Wiſdom of the Divine Artiſt is, as the Poet finely ſhews, very illuſtrious in this Contrivance. For the Mind and Body having now one common Intereſt, the Efforts of Virtue will have their Force infinitely augmented.

" 'Tis thus the Mercury of Man is fixt,
" Strong grows the Virtue with his Nature mixt;
" The Droſs cements what elſe were too refin'd,
" And *in one Int'reſt Body acts with Mind*.

But now *firſt* it would be objected, that *this* makes Men mere Machines, *only acted upon* in the Production of Good out of Evil. The Poet therefore ſhews [from l. 186 to 193.] that Man is a *free Agent*, and has it in

LET. V. his *own Power* to turn the natural Paſſions into *Virtues* or into *Vices*, properly ſo called.

" Reaſon the Biaſs turns from Good to Ill,
" And *Nero* reigns a *Titus*, if he will.

Secondly, it would be objected (by thoſe who did not carefully enough attend the Argument) that tho' the Poet indeed tells us ſome Actions are *beneficial* and ſome *hurtful*, yet he could not call thoſe *Virtuous*, or theſe *Vicious*; becauſe, as he has deſcribed Matters, the *Motive* appears to be only the *Gratification of ſome Paſſion*. To this he may be ſuppoſed to reply, " That the Objectors " miſtake the Argument, which in this Epiſtle (to the " 239th l.) conſiders the Paſſions *only with regard to So-* " *ciety*, that is, with regard to their *Effects* rather than their " *Motives*.—That however 'tis his Deſign to teach that " Actions are *properly virtuous or vicious*; and tho' 'tis dif- " ficult to diſembarras *genuine* Virtue from *ſpurious*, they " having both the ſame Appearance, and both the ſame " publick Effects, yet they may be diſtinguiſhed. If it " be aſked, by what Means? It is replied [from l. 192 " to 195.] by *Conſcience*, which is ſufficient to the Pur- " poſe; for 'tis only a Man's *own* Concern, not *another's*, " to know whether his Virtue be real and ſubſtantial.

" This Light and Darkneſs in our Chaos join'd
" What ſhall divide? *The God within the Mind.*
i. e. *Conſcience.*

The *French* Tranſlator took this literally,

" Qui

" Qui peut donc, ſi ce n'eſt *Dieu* qui nous conduit,
" *Dont la voix ſepara* le jour d'avec la nuit,
" Démêler ce Cahos——

and ſo has made Mr. *Pope* argue very impertinently. — The Objection is, how ſhall *we* diſtinguiſh true Virtue from counterfeit? Mr. *Pope* replies, *by the Dictates of Conſcience*, which is to the Purpoſe. The Tranſlator ſays, *God can diſtinguiſh it*, which is nothing to the Purpoſe: for the Queſtion is, how ſhall *Man* get a true Senſe of his own State and Condition, ſo neceſſary for the Regulation of his Conduct?

But ſtill it will be ſaid, why all this Difficulty to diſtinguiſh true Virtue from the falſe? The Poet ſhews why [from l. 194 to 201.] — "That tho' indeed Vice and " Virtue ſo invade each other's Bounds, that ſometimes " we can't tell where one ends and the other begins, yet " great Purpoſes are ſerv'd by it, no leſs than the perfect- " ting the Conſtitution of the Whole; as Lights and " Shades, which run into one another in a well wrought " Picture, make the Harmony and Beauty of the Compo- " ſition." But on this Account to ſay there is neither Vice nor Virtue, the Poet ſhews [from l. 200 to 207.] would be juſt as wiſe as to ſay there is neither black nor white; becauſe the Shade of *that*, and the Light of *this* often run into one another.

" Aſk your *own Heart* and nothing is ſo plain,
" 'Tis to miſtake them coſts the Time and *Pain*.

It is an Error of *Speculation* that leads Men ſo fooliſhly to conclude, there is *no Vice nor Virtue*. There is another

of

LET. V. of *Practice*, that has more common and fatal Effects; which is next conſidered [from l. 206 to 211.] and is this, — that tho', at the firſt Aſpect, Vice be ſo horrible as to affright all Beholders, yet when we are grown familiar with her by Habit, we firſt ſuffer her, and in Time begin to loſe the Memory of her very Nature.

" Vice is a Monſter of ſo frightful Mien
" As to be hated needs but to be ſeen;
" Yet ſeen too oft, familiar with her Face,
" We firſt endure, then pity, then embrace.

But it is not only that *Extream of Vice next to Virtue*, that betrays us into Miſtakes; we are deceived too, as he ſhews us [from l. 210 to 221.] about the *other Extream*.

" But where th' Extream of Vice was ne'er agreed:
" Aſk where's the North? at *York* 'tis on the *Tweed*;
" In *Scotland*, at the *Orcades*; and there
" At *Greenland*, *Zembla*, or the Lord knows where.

There is yet a *third* Cauſe of this Error of *no Vice no Virtue*, compoſed of the other two, *i. e.* partly *ſpeculative* and partly *practical:* And this too the Poet conſiders [from l. 220 to 227.] ſhewing it ariſes from the *Imperfection* of the *beſt* Characters, and the *Inequallity* of *all*; whence it happens that no Man is extreamly virtuous or vicious, nor extreamly conſtant in the Purſuit of either. Why it ſo happens the Poet aſſigns an admirable Reaſon in this Line,

" For, Vice or Virtue, *ſelf directs it ſtill.*

An

An Adherence or Regard to what is, in the Sense of the World, a *Man's own Interest*, making an Extream in either impossible, its Effect in keeping a good Man from the *Extream of Virtue* needs no Explanation. In an ill Man, *Self-interest* shewing him the Necessity of some kind of Reputation, the procuring and preserving *that* will necessarily keep him from the *Extream of Vice.*

The Mention of this Principle, and its Consequence, which is, that

" Each Individual seeks a several Goal,

leads the Author to observe

" That Heav'n's great View is one and that the whole;

and this brings him naturally round again to his main Subject, namely, *God's producing Good out of Ill*, which he prosecutes [from l. 228 to 239.]

I. *Hitherto* the Poet has been employed in discoursing of the *Use of the Passions*, with *regard to Society at large*, and in freeing his Doctrine from *Objections*. This is the *first* general Division of his Subject.

II. He comes to shew [from l. 238 to 251] the Use of these Passions, *with regard to the more confined Circle of our Friends, Relations and Acquaintance.* And this is the *Second.*

" *Wants, Frailties, Passions* closer still ally
" The common Int'rest, or endear the Tie:
" To *these* we owe true Friendship, Love sincere,
" Each home-felt Joy that *Life* inherits here:

" Yet

LET. V. " Yet from *the ſame* we learn in *its* Decline
" Thoſe Joys, thoſe Loves, thoſe Int'reſts to reſign.

As theſe Lines ſeem not to have been well underſtood by the *Tranſlator*, and are ſcandalouſly miſrepreſented by the *Commentator*, who would inſinuate them to be a kind of Approbation of *Suicide*, * I ſhall here give the Reader their plain and obvious Meaning.

" To theſe Frailties (ſays he) we owe all the Endear-
" ments of private Life, yet when we come to that Age,
" which generally diſpoſes Men to think more ſeriouſly
" of their Proviſion for a future State, the Conſideration
" of the *Grounds* of thoſe *Joys, Loves and Friendſhips*,
" which are *Wants, Frailties and Paſſions*, proves the
" beſt Expedient to diſengage us from the *World*; a Diſ-
" engagement ſo neceſſary for that Proviſion we are
" now making for *another*." The Obſervation is new, and would in any Place be extreamly beautiful, but has *here* an infinite Grace and Propriety, as it ſo well confirms, by an Inſtance of great Moment, the Poet's general Theſis, *That God makes Ill, at every Step, productive of Good*. After this, one muſt be ſo far from any Inclination to tranſcribe the ſcandalous Traſh in the 205th and 206th Pages of Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Commentary, that one can't read it without the higheſt Indignation.

III. The Poet having thus ſhewn the Uſe of the Paſſions in *Society* and in *domeſtic Life*, he comes in *the laſt Place* [from l. 250 to the End] to ſhew their Uſe to *the Individual*, even in their *Illuſions*; the imaginary Happineſs they preſent helping to make the real Miſeries of

* Page 206.

Life

Life leſs inſupportable. And this is his *third* general Diviſion. Let. V.

" —— Opinion gilds with varying Rays
" Thoſe painted Clouds that beautify our Days:
" Each Want of Happineſs by Hope ſupply'd,
" And each Vacuity of Senſe by Pride.
" Theſe build as faſt as Knowledge can deſtroy,
" In Folly's Cup ſtill laughs the bubble Joy.
" One Proſpect loſt, another ſtill we gain,
" And not a Vanity is given in vain.

Which muſt needs vaſtly raiſe our Idea of God's Goodneſs, who has not only provided more than a Counterballance of *real* Happineſs for human Miſeries, but has even, in his infinite Compaſſion, provided for thoſe who are ſo fooliſh as not to have made this Proviſion, an *imaginary* Happineſs; that they may not be *quite* over-borne with the Load of human Miſeries. This is the Poet's great and noble Thought, as ſtrong and ſolid as it is new and ingenious. But ſo ſtrangely perverſe is his Commentator, that he will ſuppoſe him to mean any thing rather than what the obvious Drift of his Argument requires; yet, to ſay Truth, cares not much what Senſe you take it in, ſo you will believe him that the Poet's general Deſign was to repreſent human Life as *one grand Illuſion fatally conducted*. But if the Rules of *Logic* ſerve for any other Purpoſe than to countenance the Paſſions and Prejudices of ſuch Writers, it is Demonſtration that what the Poet here teaches is only this, " That theſe Illuſions are " the Follies of Men, which they *wilfully* fall into, and " thro' their own *Fault*; thereby depriving themſelves of " much Happineſs, and expoſing themſelves to equal

LET. V. " Misery: But that still God (according to his Univer-
" sal way of Working) graciously turns these Follies, in
" some measure, to the Advantage of his distressed and
" miserable Creatures."

" —— Tho' Man's a Fool, yet God is wise.

I am, &c.

LETTER

LETTER VI.

THIS Letter ſhall conclude what I have to ſay upon the *Eſſay on Man*, in an Explanation of the *third Epiſtle*. The Turn of the *Fourth* being more popular, ſeems to need no Comment: But the three Firſt being of a complex and abſtract Nature, the Reader will owe me his Thanks for having ſet in a fair Light the Beauty of the Poet's ſtrong and delicate Reaſoning, which runs equally thro' all, but is not by its Nature equally ſubjected to the Capacity of every Reader. LET. VI.

Mr. *Pope*, in explaining the Origin, Uſe, and End of the Paſſions in the ſecond Epiſtle, having ſhewn that Man has *ſocial*, as well as *ſelfiſh* Paſſions; that Doctrine naturally introduces the third Epiſtle, which treats of Man as a *ſocial* Animal; and connects it with the ſecond, which conſidered him as an *Individual*. And as the Concluſion from the Subject of the firſt Epiſtle made the Introduction to the Second, ſo here again, the Concluſion of the Second,

" Even mean Self-love becomes, by Force divine,
" The Scale to meaſure other's Wants by thine,

makes the Introduction to the Third,

" Here then we reſt, the Univerſal Cauſe
" Acts to *one* End, but acts by *various* Laws.

The Reaſon of *Variety* in thoſe Laws, all which tend to *one* and the ſame End, the Good of the *Whole*, is, becauſe there is the Good of the *Individual* likewiſe to be provided for; and this makes, as the Poet ſays elſewhere,

" Each Individual ſeek a *ſeveral* Goal.

But to prevent their reſting *there*, God has made each need the Aſſiſtance of another; and ſo,

" On mutual Wants, builds mutual Happineſs.

It was neceſſary to explain theſe two firſt Lines, the better to ſee the Force and Pertinency of what follows, [from l. 2 to 7.] where the Poet warns thoſe to take Notice of this Truth, whoſe Circumſtances placing them in an *imaginary* Station of Independence, and a *real* one of Inſenſibility to mutual Wants (from whence general Happineſs reſults) make them too apt to overlook the true Syſtem of Things; ſuch as thoſe in *full Health* and *Opulency of Fortune*. This Caution was neceſſary with regard to *Society*; but ſtill more neceſſary with regard to *Religion:* Therefore he eſpecially recommends the Memory of it to Miniſters, and others, when they *preach* or *pray*; becauſe the Preacher who does not conſider the firſt Cauſe under this View, as a Being conſulting the Good of the Whole, muſt needs give a very *unworthy* Idea of him:

him: And the Supplicant, who prays as one not related to a Whole, or as disregarding the Happiness of it, will not only pray in *vain*, but *offend* his Maker, by an impious Attempt to counterwork his Dispensation. Let. VI.

" In all the Madness of superfluous *Health*,
" The Trim of *Pride*, and Impudence of *Wealth*,
" Let this great Truth be present Night and Day,
" But most be present, when we *preach or pray*.

The Translator not seeing into the admirable Purposes of this Caution, has quite dropt the most material Circumstances contained in the *last* Line; and what is worse, has, for the sake of a foolish Antithesis, destroy'd the whole Propriety of the Thought in the *first* and *second*; and so, between both, has left his Author neither Sense nor System.

" Dans le Sein du bonheur, *ou de l'Adversite*.

Now of all Men, those *in Adversity* have the least need of this Caution, as being the least apt to forget *that God consults the Good of the Whole, and provides for it, by procuring mutual Happiness by Means of mutual Wants:* Because such as yet retain the Marks of any fresh Calamity are most compassionate to others labouring under the same Misfortunes, and most prompt and ready to relieve them.

The Poet then introduces his System of human *Sociability*, [l. 7, 8] by shewing it to be the Dictate of the Creator, and that *Man*, in *this*, did but follow the Example of *general Nature*, which is combined

" In one close System of Benevolence.

This

LET. VI. This he proves *firſt* [from l. 8 to 13.] (on the noble Theory of Attraction) from the OEconomy of the material World; where there is a general Conſpiracy in all the Particles of Matter to work for one End; the Uſe, Beauty, and Harmony of the whole Maſs.

I.

" See plaſtic Nature working to this End,
" The ſingle Atoms each to other tend,
" Attract, attracted to the next in Place,
" Form'd and impell'd it's Neighbour to embrace.

Here again the Tranſlator miſtaking this Deſcription of the *Preſervation* of the material Univerſe by the Principle of Attraction, for a Deſcription of its *Creation*, has quite deſtroyed the Poet's fine analogical Argument, by which he proves, from the Circumſtance of mutual Attraction in Matter, that Man while he ſeeks Society, and thereby promotes the Good of his Species, co-operates with God's *general Diſpenſation*. But the Circumſtance of a *Creation* proves nothing but a *Creator*.

" Voi du *Sein du Cahos* eclater la lumiere,
" Chaque Atome ebranlé courir pour s'embraſſer, *&c.*

The Poet's *ſecond* Argument [from l. 12 to 27.] is taken from the vegetable and animal World; whoſe Beings ſerve *mutually* for the Production, Support, and Suſtentation of each other.

II.

" See Matter next with various Life endu'd
" Preſs to one Centre ſtill, *the gen'ral Good*;

" See

" See dying Vegetables Life ſuſtain,
" See Life diſſolving vegetate again;
" All Forms that periſh other Forms ſupply,
" By Turns they catch the vital Breath and die;
" Like Bubbles to the Sea of Matter born,
" They riſe, they break, and to that Sea return, *&c.*

One would wonder what ſhould have induced Mr *l'Abbe* to tranſlate the two laſt Lines thus,

" *Sort du neant y rentre*, & reparoit au jour.

Comes out of Nothing, and enters back again into Nothing.—

I ſhould not have taken notice of this Miſtake but for Mr *De Crouſaz*'s ready Remark. " Mr. *Pope*, ſays he, " deſcends even to the moſt vulgar Prejudices; when he " tells us, that *each Being comes out of Nothing*, the com- " mon People think that that which diſappears is anni- " hilated. The Atoms, the ſmalleſt Particles, the Roots " of terreſtrial Bodies ſubſiſt, *&c.*" *

But this Part of the Argument, in which he tells us that God,

" Connects each Being, greateſt with the leaſt;
" Made Beaſt in Aid of Man, and Man of Beaſt,
" All ſerv'd, all ſerving ——

awaking again the old *Pride* of his Adverſaries, who cannot bear that Man ſhould be thought to be *ſerving* as well as *ſerved*; he takes this Occaſion *again to humble*

* Page 221.

them

LET. VI. them [from l. 26 to 53.] by the ſame kind of Argument he had ſo ſucceſsfully employed in the firſt Epiſtle, and which our third Letter has conſidered at large.

However, his Adverſaries, loth to give up the Queſtion, will reaſon upon the Matter; and we are now to ſuppoſe them objecting againſt Providence in this Manner. — We grant, ſay they, that in the *irrational*, as in the *inanimate* Creation, *all is ſerved, and all is ſerving*. But, with regard to Man, the Caſe is different; he ſtands ſingle. For his *Reaſon* has endowed him both with Power and Addreſs ſufficient to make all Things *ſerve him:* And his *Self-Love*, of which you have ſo largely provided for him, will diſpoſe him, in his Turn, *to ſerve none*. Therefore your Theory's imperfect. — "Not ſo, replies the "Poet, [from l. 52 to 83.] I grant you, Man indeed "affects to be *the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole*, and "would fain ſhake off

"——— That Chain of Love,
"Combining all below and all above:

"But Nature, even by that *very Gift* of *Reaſon*, checks "this *Tyrant:* For *Reaſon* endowing Man with the Abi- "lity of ſetting together the Memory of the paſt and "the Forecaſt of the future, and paſt Misfortunes mak- "ing him apprehenſive of others impending, this diſpoſes "him to pity and relieve others in a *State* of Suffering. "And the Paſſion growing habitual, naturally extends its "Effects to all that have a *Senſe* of ſuffering. Now as "Brutes have neither Man's *Reaſon*, nor his inordinate "*Self-love* to draw them from the Syſtem of Benevolence, "ſo they wanted not, and therefore have not, this *human* "*Sympathy* of another's Miſery. By which Paſſion,

"we

" we ſee thoſe Qualities, in Man, ballance one another, Let. VI.
" and ſo retain him in that general *Order*, in which
" Providence has placed its whole Creation. But this
" is not all; Man's Intereſt, Amuſement, Vanity, and
" Luxury, tie him ſtill cloſer to the Syſtem of Benevo-
" lence, by obliging him to provide for the Support of
" other Animals; and tho' it be, for the moſt part, only
" to devour them with the greater Guſt, yet this does
" not abate the proper Happineſs of the Animals ſo pre-
" ſerved, to whom *Providence has not given the uſeleſs*
" *Knowledge of their End.* From all which it appears,
" that the Theory is yet entire and uniform.

" Grant that the Powerful ſtill the Weak controul,
" Be Man the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole,
" Nature that Tyrant checks; he only knows
" And helps another Creature's Wants and Woes.
" Say, will the Falcon, ſtooping from above,
" Smit with her varying Plumage, ſpare the Dove?
" Admires the Jay the Inſect's gilded Wings?
" Or hears the Hawk when *Philomela* ſings?
" Man cares for all, *&c.* ———

This is the Force of this fine and noble Argument. The ſenſeleſs and ſcandalous Reflections of Mr *De Crouſaz* on the latter part of it, I have refuted in my firſt and third Letters.

But even to this, as a *Caviller* would ſtill object, we are to ſuppoſe him ſo to do; and to ſay—Admit you have ſhewn that Nature has endowed all Animals, whether rational or irrational, with ſuch Faculties as admirably fit them to promote the *general Good:* But in its Care for *this*, has not Nature neglected to provide for the *pri-*

LET. VI. *vate* Good of the Individual? We have Cauſe to think it has, and we ſuppoſe that on this account it kept back from Brutes the Gift of Reaſon, (ſo neceſſary a Means of Happineſs) becauſe Reaſon, as we find in the Inſtance of Man (where there is Occaſion for all the complicated Contrivance you have deſcribed above, to make the Effects of his Paſſions counterwork the immediate Powers of his Reaſon, in order to keep him ſubſervient to the general Syſtem) Reaſon, we ſee, naturally tends to draw Beings into a *private*, independent Syſtem.

This the Poet anſwers by ſhewing [from l. 82 to 109.] that *Inſtinct* gains the End of *private* Happineſs in thoſe Animals to which it is the only Guide, full as well as *Reaſon* does in Man. Which he proves by this convincing Argument, that in the firſt caſe God directs *immediately*, in the latter *mediately*, thro' Man.

" Say, where full Inſtinct is th' unerring Guide,
" What Pope or Council can they need beſide?
" And Reaſon raiſe o'er Inſtinct as you can,
" In this 'tis *God directs*, in that 'tis *Man*.

The Commentator, (whom I will ſuppoſe in Charity to have ſeen nothing of this fine and ſober Reaſoning, nor to have been apprehenſive of the *Objection* which occaſioned it, tho' that Objection ariſes directly from the Subject) accuſes the Poet of deſigning to *repreſent Brutes as perfect as Man, who is of a Nature ſuſceptible of Religion.* * But if he could not ſee the Chain of Reaſoning, he might yet, methinks, have attended to this plain Denunciation of the Poet, with which he introduces the Diſcourſe that gives Mr *De Crouſaz* ſo much Offence.

* Page 229.

" Whe-

" Whether with Reason or with Instinct blest,
" *Know* all enjoy the Power, *which suits 'em best*:
" To Bliss alike by that Direction tend,
" *And find the Means proportion'd to the End.*

Which shews the *Perfection* spoken of is not a Perfection comparative with that of any other Being, but proportioned to the End of that Being itself.—

The Poet now comes to the *main* Subject of his Epistle, the Proof of Man's *Sociability*, from the two general Societies composed by him; the *natural*, subject to *paternal* Authority; and the *civil*, subject to the *magisterial*: Which he has had the Address to introduce, from what had preceded, in so easy and natural a Manner, as shews him to have the Art of giving all the Grace to the Dryness and Severity of Method, as well as Wit to the Strength and Depth of Reason. For the philosophic Nature of his Work requiring he should shew by what Means those Societies were introduced, this affords him an Opportunity of sliding gracefully and easily from the Preliminaries into the main Subject; and so of giving that Perfection of Method thereto, which we find only in the Compositions of great Writers.

For having just before, tho' to a different Purpose, described the Power of bestial Instinct to attain the Happiness of the *Individual*, he goes on in speaking of that Instinct as it is serviceable to the *Kind*, [from l. 108 to 148.] to illustrate the Original of Society. He shews, that tho', as he had before observed, God had founded the proper Bliss of each Creature in the *Nature* of its own *Being*, yet these not being independent Individuals, but Parts of

LET. VI. a Whole; God, to bleſs that Whole, built mutual Happineſs on mutual Wants: Now for the Supply of mutual Wants, Creatures muſt neceſſarily come together; which is the firſt Ground of Society. He then proceeds to that which is called *natural*, ſubject to *Paternal* Authority, and ariſing from the Union of the two Sexes; deſcribes the imperfect Image of it in Brutes, then explains it at large in all its Cauſes and Effects: And, laſtly, ſhews, that as IN FACT it is founded and preſerved by mutual Wants, the Supplial of which cauſes mutual Happineſs; ſo is it likewiſe in RIGHT, by Equity, Gratitude, and the Obſervance of the Relation of Things in general.

" Reflection, Reaſon, ſtill the Ties improve;
" At once extend the Int'reſt, and the Love:
" With Choice we fix, with Sympathy we burn,
" Each Virtue in each Paſſion takes its Turn;
" And ſtill new Needs, new Helps, new Habits riſe,
" That graft Benevolence on Charities;
" Mem'ry and Forecaſt juſt Returns engage,
" That pointed back to Youth, this on to Age;
" While Pleaſure, Gratitude, and Hope combin'd,
" Still ſpread the Int'reſt, and preſerv'd the Kind.

But now the Atheiſt and *Hobbiſt*, againſt whom Mr. *Pope* writes, deny the Principle of *Right*, or of *natutural Juſtice*, before the Invention of *civil Compact*, which, they ſay, gave Being to it: And accordingly have had the Effrontery publickly to declare *that a State of Nature was a State of War*. This quite ſubverts the Poet's *natural Society*: Therefore, the next Step he takes after his Account of *that* State, is to ſupport the *Reality* of it, by overthrowing the oppugnant Principle

Principle of *no natural Juſtice*; which he does [from l. 147 to 170.] by ſhewing, in a fine Deſcription of *the State of Innocence*, as repreſented in Scripture, that a State of Nature was ſo far from being without *natural Juſtice*, that it was, at firſt, the Reign of God, where *Right* and *Truth* univerſally prevail'd. LET. VI.

" Nor think in Nature's State they blindly trod,
" The State of Nature was the Reign of God.
" Self-love and ſocial at her Birth began,
" Union, the Bond of all Things, and of Man.
" Pride then was not; nor *Arts* that Pride to aid,
" Man walk'd with Beaſt, joint Tenant of the Shade, *&c.*

Now let us hear Mr *De Crouſaz*, who knew no more of the Courſe of the Argument that led Mr. *Pope* to this beautiful Deſcription, than he knew of his *Engliſh*; tho' he tells us, *he had redoubled his Attention upon this Epiſtle.* *— Mr. *Pope* (ſays he) *ſpeaks with the Aſſurance of an Eye-witneſs of what paſſed in this firſt Age of the World* †. — And well he might, when conducted by his Faith in Scripture Hiſtory. —*That which he here repreſents*, ſays he, *is much leſs credible in itſelf, than that which* Moſes *teaches us.* † Now what muſt we think of our Logician's Faith, who taking it for granted, that Mr. *Pope* would not borrow of *Moſes*, has here condemn'd, before he was aware, the Credibility of Scripture Hiſtory? For the Account the Poet gives of the *State of Innocence* is indeed neither more nor leſs, nor other, than that very Account of *Moſes* himſelf.

He goes on, — *This Religion, common to Brutes and Men,*

* Page 218. † Page 240.

inſinuates

LET. VI. *insinuates to us, that in those happy Times, Men had no more Religion than Brutes:* *

This wise Reflection points at the following Lines,

" In the same Temple, the resounding Wood,
" All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God.

But does not the Poet speak, in this very place, of Man as officiating in the priestly Office at the Altar, and offering up his blameless eucharistical Sacrifice to Heaven?

" The Shrine with Gore unstain'd, with Gold undrest,
" Unbrib'd, unbloody, stood the blameless Priest.

How scandalous then is this Aspersion? As to the Line,

" All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God,

our Logician should be sent to Scripture for its Meaning; who, had he been as conversant with the *Psalmist* as with his *Burgersdicius*, would have learned to have judged more piously as well as more charitably: The *inspired* Poet calling to Mind (as Mr. *Pope* did here) the *Age of Innocence*, and full of the great Ideas of those

" ——— Chains of Love,
" Combining all below, and all above;

Which

" Draw to one Point, and to one Centre bring
" *Beast*, *Man*, or *Angel*, *Servant*, *Lord* or *King*;

* Page 240.

Breaks

Breaks out into this rapturous and divine Apoſtrophe, to call back the devious Creation to its priſtine Rectitude. That very State Mr. *Pope* deſcribes above — "Praiſe "the Lord all ye *Angels*, praiſe him all ye Hoſts. "Praiſe him Sun and Moon, praiſe him all ye Stars "of Light. Let them praiſe the Name of the Lord, "for he commanded and they were created. Praiſe "the Lord from the Earth ye Dragons, and all "Deeps. Fire and Hail, Snow and Vapour, ſtormy "Wind fulfilling his Word: Mountains and all Hills, "fruitful Trees, and all Cedars; *Beaſts* and all Cattle, "creeping Things, and *flying Fowl*: *Kings* of the Earth, "and all *People*; *Princes* and all *Judges of the Earth*, let "them praiſe the Name of the Lord; for his Name "alone is excellent, his Glory is above the Earth and "Heaven." *Pſalm* cxlviii. Let. VI.

To return. — Strict Method, (of which, by this time, the Reader finds our Poet no unexact Obſerver) leads him next to ſpeak of that Society which ſucceeded the *natural*, namely the *civil*. But as he does nothing abruptly, he firſt explains [from l. 169 to 200.] the *intermediate Means* which led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society. Theſe were the *Invention* and *Improvement of Arts*. For while Mankind lived in a mere State of Nature, unconſcious of the Arts of Life, there was no need of any other Society, than that which we may call *paternal*; but when Arts were found out and improved, then that now perfect Society, the *civil*, became neceſſary. And for theſe two Reaſons; *Firſt*, to bring thoſe Arts already found to *Perfection*; and, *Secondly*, to ſecure the Product of them to their rightful *Proprietors*. The Poet, therefore, now comes, as we ſay, to the *Invention of Arts*, but being always intent on the great End for which he wrote his *Eſſay*, namely,

LET. VI. namely, to mortify that *Pride*, which occaſions the impious Complaints againſt Providence, he with the greateſt Art and Contrivance ſpeaks of theſe *Inventions* as only Leſſons learnt of mere Animals guided by Inſtinct; and thus, at the ſame time, gives a new Inſtance of the wonderful Providence of God, who has contrived to teach Mankind in a Way not only proper to humble *human Arrogance*, but to raiſe our Idea of infinite Wiſdom to the greateſt height. All this he does in a *Proſopopœia* the moſt ſublime that ever entered into the human Imagination.

See him from *Nature* riſing ſlow to *Art!*
To copy *Inſtinct* then was *Reaſon's* Part:
Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature ſpake —
" Go, from the Creatures thy Inſtructions take;
" Thy Arts of Building from the *Bee* receive,
" Learn of the *Mole* to plow, the *Worm* to weave;
" Learn of the little *Nautilus* to ſail,
" Spread the thin Oar, and catch the driving Gale, &c.
" Yet go! and thus o'er all the Creatures ſway,
" Thus let the Wiſer make the reſt obey,
" And for thoſe *Arts* mere *Inſtinct* could afford,
" *Be crown'd as Monarchs*, or as *Gods ador'd*.

The Delicacy of the Poet's Addreſs in the firſt Part of the laſt Line is very remarkable — I obſerved that, in this Paragraph, he has given an Account of thoſe *intermediate Means* that led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society, namely, the Invention and Improvement of Arts. Now here, on his Concluſion of this Account, and Entry upon the Deſcription of civil Society itſelf, he connects the two Parts the moſt graceſully that can be conceived, by

by this hiſtorical Circumſtance, that it was the *Invention* of thoſe Arts, which raiſed to the Magiſtracy, in this new Society now formed for the *perfecting* them. Let. VI.

I cannot leave this Part without taking notice of the ſtrange Turn the Tranſlator has given to theſe two Lines,

" Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature ſpake,—
" Go, from the Creatures thy Inſtructions take.

" La Nature *indigne* alors ſe fit entendre;
" Va *malheureux* mortel, va, lui dit elle, apprendre
" Des *plus vils* animaux.——

One would wonder what ſhould make him repreſent Nature in ſuch a Paſſion at Man, and calling him Names, when Mr. *Pope* ſuppoſes her in her beſt good Humour, and Man the moſt *happy* in the Direction here given. But what led him into this Miſtake was another full as groſs. Mr. *Pope*, deſcribing the State of Innocence, which ends at theſe lines,

" Heaven's Attribute was univerſal Care,
" And Man's Prerogative to rule, but ſpare.

turns, from thoſe Times, to a View of *theſe latter Ages*, and breaks out into this tender and humane Complaint,

" Ah how unlike *the Man of Times to come!*
" Of half that live the Butcher and the Tomb;
" Who, Foe to Nature, hears the general Groan,
" Murders their Species, and betrays his own, *&c.*

Unluckily, the Tranſlator took this *Man of Times to come* for the Corrupter of that *firſt Age*; and ſo imagined

LET. VI. the Poet had introduced Nature only to ſet things right again; then he ſuppoſed, of courſe, ſhe was to be very angry, and not finding Mr. *Pope* had repreſented her in any great Emotion, he was willing to improve upon his Author.

To proceed, after all this neceſſary Preparation, the Poet ſhews [from l. 199 to 216.] how Civil Society followed, and the Advantages it produced. But theſe are beſt deſcribed in his own Words:

" Great Nature ſpoke, obſervant Men obey'd;
" Cities were built, Societies were made:
" Here roſe one little State; another near
" Grew by like Means, and join'd thro' Love or Fear.
" Did here the Trees with ruddier Burthens bend,
" And there the Streams in purer Rills deſcend?
" What War could raviſh, Commerce could beſtow,
" And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.
" Converſe and Love Mankind might ſtrongly draw,
" When Love was Liberty, and Nature Law.
" Thus States were form'd. ——

Nothing can be juſter than this Account, or more corroborating of the Poet's general Theory. Yet his Tranſlator has a ſtrange Fatality in contradicting him, whenever he attempts to *paraphraſe his Senſe*.

The firſt Line Mr *l'Abbe* turns thus,

" Pars ces mots la Nature excita l'Induſtrie,
" *Et de l'Homme feroce enchaina la furie,*

Chained up the Fury of Savage Man,

And

And ſo contradicts his Author's whole Syſtem of *Benevolence*, and goes over to the Atheiſt's, who ſuppoſes the *State of Nature* to be *a State of War*. That which ſeems to have miſled him was theſe Lines:

" What War could raviſh, Commerce could beſtow,
" And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.

But the Tranſlator ſhould have conſidered, that tho' his Author maintains *a State of Nature to be a State of Peace*, yet he never imagined there could be *no* Quarrels in it. He well knew, that *Self love drives thro' Juſt and thro' Unjuſt*. He puſhes no Syſtem to an Extravagance; *but ſteers between Doctrines ſeemingly oppoſite*, or, in other Words, follows Truth uniformly throughout.

The Poet now returns [at l. 216 to 242.] to what he had left unfiniſhed in his Deſcription of *natural Society*. This, which appears irregular, is indeed a fine Inſtance of his thorough Knowledge of the Art of Method. I will explain it.

This third Epiſtle, we ſee, conſiders *Man with reſpect to Society*; the ſecond, *with reſpect to himſelf*; and the fourth, *with reſpect to Happineſs*. But in none of theſe Relations does the Poet ever loſe ſight of him under *that* in which he ſtands to *God*; it will follow therefore, that ſpeaking of him *with reſpect to* Society, the Account would be then moſt imperfect, were he not at the ſame Time conſidered *with reſpect to his* Religion; for, between theſe two there is a cloſe, and while Things continue in Order, a moſt *intereſting* Connection.

LET. VI.

" True Faith, true Policy, united ran;
" That was but Love of God, and this of Man.

Now *Religion* ſuffering no *Change*, nor *Depravation*, when Man firſt entered into civil Society, but continuing the ſame as in the State of Nature, the Poet to avoid Repetition deferred giving Account of his *Religion*, 'till he had ſpoken of the Origin of *that* Society. Thence it is, that he here reſumes the Account of the *State of Nature*, that is, ſo much of it as he had left untouched, which was only the *Religion* of it. This conſiſting in the *Knowledge* of one God, the Creator of all Things, the Poet ſhews how Men came by it. — That it was either found out by *Reaſon*, which giving to every Effect a Cauſe, inſtructed them to go from Cauſe to Cauſe, till they came to the firſt, who being cauſeleſs would neceſſarily be judged ſelf-exiſtent; or taught by *Tradition*, which preſerved the Memory of the Creation. — He then tells us what theſe Men, undebauched by falſe Science, underſtood by God's NATURE and ATTRIBUTES. *1ſt*, Of God's *Nature*; that they eaſily diſtinguiſhed between the *Workman and the Work*, and ſaw the *Subſtance* of the Creator to be diſtinct and different from *that* of the Creature; and ſo were in no Danger of falling into the horrid Opinion of the *Greek* Philoſophers, and their Follower *Spinoza*. And ſimple Reaſon teaching them, that the Creator was but *One*, they eaſily ſaw that *all was right*; and were in as little Danger of falling into the *Manichean* Error, which, when *oblique Wit* had *broke the ſteady Light* of Reaſon, imagined *all was not right*, having before imagined all was not the Work of *One*. *2dly*, What they underſtood of God's *Attributes*; that they eaſily conceived a *Father* where

where they had found a Deity, and that a ſovereign Being could only be a ſovereign *Good*. Let. VI.

" *Till then*, by Nature crown'd each Patriarch ſate,
" King, Prieſt, and Parent of his growing State, *&c.*
" —Till drooping, ſick'ning, dying, they began
" Whom they rever'd as God, to mourn as Man.

I.

" Then looking up from Sire to Sire explor'd
" One great firſt Father, and that firſt ador'd.

II.

" Or plain Tradition that this all *begun*,
" Convey'd unbroken Faith from Sire to Son.

I.

" The Worker from the Work diſtinct was known,
" And ſimple Reaſon never ſought but *one*.
" 'E're Wit oblique had broke that ſteady Light,
" Man, like his Maker, ſaw that *all was right*.

II.

" To Virtue in the Paths of Pleaſure trod,
" And own'd a *Father* when he own'd a God.
" Love all the Faith, *&c.* ——

Mr *l'Abbe*, not apprehending that the Poet was here returned to finiſh his Deſcription of the State of Nature, has run into one of the greateſt Miſtakes a Tranſlator could well commit. He has taken this Account of *true Religion*, for an Account of the *Origin of Idolatry*, and thus fatally embelliſhes his own Blunder,

" Jaloux

" Jaloux d'en conſerver les traits & la figure,
" Leur zele induſtrieux inventa la Peinture.
" Leurs neveux attentifs à ces hommes fameux
" Qui par le droit du ſang avoient régné ſur eux,
" Trouvent-ils dans leur ſuite un grand, un premier pere,
" Leur aveugle reſpect l'adore & le révere.

Here you have one of the fineſt Pieces of Reaſoning in the world, turn'd, at once, into as mere a heap of Nonſenſe. You will wonder how this came about: The unlucky Term of *Great firſt Father* confounded our Tranſlator, and he took it to ſignify a *Great-Grandfather*. But he ſhould have conſidered that Mr. *Pope* always repreſents God as every wiſe and good Man would do, and as our Religion directs us to do, under the Idea of a *Father*. He ſhould have obſerved that the Poet is here deſcribing thoſe Men, who

" To *Virtue* in the Paths of Pleaſure trod,
" And own'd a *Father*, where they own'd a *God*.

You may be ſure Mr *De Crouſaz* has not let theſe fine Strokes about the *Original of Painting* eſcape him. But here the Critick (which is a Wonder) proves more clear ſighted than the Tranſlator; he ſaw that the Lines in Queſtion were a Continuation of ſomething *not immediately preceding*; but that was *all* he ſaw, as may appear from his important Remark. " We ſhall be miſtaken, " (ſays he) if we regard this Paſſage as a Continuation of " the Hiſtory immediately going before. It would be " too great an Anachroniſm to ſuppoſe it. The Govern-
" ment

" ment of Fathers and Families did not ſucceed that of Kings; on the contrary, the Reign of *theſe* was eſta- " bliſhed on the Government of *thoſe*."* Let. VI.

Order leads the Poet to ſpeak next [from l. 241 to 246.] of the Corruption of *civil Society* into Tyranny, and its Cauſes; and here, with the greateſt Art as well as Truth, he obſerves, it aroſe from the Violation of that great Principle, which he ſo much inſiſts upon throughout his Eſſay, *That each was made for the Uſe of all.*

" Who firſt taught Souls enſlav'd, and Realms undone,
" Th' enormous Faith of *many made for one?*
" That proud Exception to all Nature's Laws,
" T' invert the World, and counterwork its Cauſe.

But we may be ſure, that in this Corruption, where natural Juſtice was thrown aſide, and *Force*, the Atheiſt's Juſtice, preſided in its ſtead, Religion would follow the Fate of civil Society. We know, from ancient Hiſtory, it did ſo. Accordingly, Mr. *Pope* [from l. 245 to 270.] with corrupt Politicks deſcribes corrupt Religion and its Cauſes; he *firſt* informs us, agreeable to his exact Knowledge of Antiquity, that it was the Politician and not the Priest (as our illiterate Tribe of Free-thinkers would make us believe) who firſt corrupted Religion. *Secondly*, that the Superstition he brought in was not invented by him, as an *Engine* to play upon others, (as the dreaming Atheiſt feigns, who would thus miſerably account for the Origin of Religion) but was a *Trap* he firſt fell into himſelf. And this agreeably to the Poet's vaſt Knowledge of human Nature. For that *Impotency* of Mind, as the *Latin* Writers

* Page 249.

call

LET. VI. call it, * which gives Birth to all the enormous Crimes neceſſary to ſupport a Tyranny, naturally ſubjects its Owner to all the *vain*, as well as *real* Terrors of Conſcience. Hence the whole Machinery of *Superſtition*.

" She, 'midſt the Lightning's Blaze and Thunder's Sound,
" When rock'd the Mountains, and when groan'd the Ground,
" She from the rending Earth and burſting Skies,
" Saw Gods deſcend, and Fiends infernal riſe.

And it is no Wonder that thoſe, who had ſo impiouſly attempted to counterwork the Deſign of Nature, by acting as if *many were made for one*, ſhould now imagine they ſaw all Nature armed againſt them.

It is true, the Poet obſerves, that afterwards, when the Tyrant's Fright was over, he had Cunning enough, from the Experience of the Effect of Superſtition upon himſelf, to turn it by the Aſſiſtance of the Prieſt (who for his Reward went Sharer with him in his Tyranny) as his beſt Defence againſt his Subjects.

" With Heaven's own Thunders ſhook the World below,
" And play'd the God an Engine on his Foe.

For a Tyrant naturally and reaſonably takes all his

* They expreſſed the *Paſſion for tyrannizing* by this Word. A fine *Roman* Hiſtorian ſays of *Marius*, that he was *Gloriæ inſatiabilis*, IMPOTENS *ſemperque inquietus*. And of *Pompey*, *Potentiâ ſuâ nunquam aut raro ad* IMPOTENTIAM *uſus*.

Slaves

Slaves for his Enemies. But hear theſe momentous Truths infinitely better told by our Poet himſelf: LET. VI.

" Force firſt made Conqueſt, and that Conqueſt Law,
" Till Superſtition *taught the Tyrant Awe*;
" Then *ſhar'd the Tyranny*, then *lent it Aid*,
" And *Gods of Conqu'rors*, Slaves of Subjects made.

Having given the *Cauſes* of Superſtition, he next deſcribes its *Objects*:

" Gods partial, changeful, paſſionate, unjuſt;
" Whoſe Attributes were Rage, Revenge and Luſt:
" Such as the Souls of Cowards might conceive;
" And form'd like Tyrants, Tyrants wou'd believe.

It is notorious that the Pagan Gods, as deliver'd in Antiquity, are here very exactly deſcribed. This is a convincing Proof of the Truth of that Original which the Poet gives to Superſtition: For if theſe Phantaſms were firſt raiſed in the Imagination of Tyrants, they muſt have the Qualities here given them. For *Force* being the Tyrant's greateſt Virtue, and *Luxury* his greateſt Happineſs, the Attributes of his God would of Courſe be *Revenge and Luſt*; in a Word, the *Antitype* of himſelf. But there was another, and more material Cauſe, of the Reſemblance between a Tyrant and a Pagan God; and that was the making *Gods of Conquerors*, as the Poet ſays, and ſo canonizing a Tyrant's Vices with his Perſon. That theſe Gods ſhould ſuit a People humbled to the Stroke of a Maſter, will be no wonder, if we recollect a Saying of the *Ancients*;—*That, that Day which ſaw a Man a Slave, took away half his Virtue.*

LET. VI. The artful Inference our Poet draws from all this [from l. 269 to 284.] is to confirm what he had advanced in his *ſecond* Epiſtle, concerning the Nature and Effects of *Self-love*.—It drives (ſays he) through Right and Wrong; it cauſes the Tyrant to violate the Rights of Mankind; and it cauſes the People to vindicate that Violation. For *Self-love* being common to the whole Species, and ſetting each Individual in purſuit of the ſame Objects, it became neceſſary for each, if he would ſecure his own, to provide for the Safety of another's. And thus Equity and Benevolence aroſe from that ſame *Self-love*, which had given Birth to Avarice and Injuſtice.

" For what one likes, if others like as well,
" What ſerves one Will, when many Wills rebell?
" How ſhall he keep, what ſleeping or awake
" A weaker may ſurpriſe, a ſtronger take?
His Safety muſt his Liberty reſtrain;
All join to guard what each deſires to gain.

The Poet has now deſcrib'd the Riſe, Perfection, and Decay of civil Policy and Religion, in the early Ages. But the Deſign had been imperfect, had he here drop'd his Diſcourſe; there was after this a Recovery from their ſeveral Corruptions. Accordingly the Poet has choſen that happy Period for the Concluſion of his Song. But as good and ill Governments and Religions ſucceed one another without end, he now, with great Judgment, leaves *Facts*, and turns his Diſcourſe [from l. 283 to 304.] to ſpeak of a more laſting Reform of Mankind, in the Invention of thoſe *philoſophic Principles*, by whoſe Obſervance a Policy and Religion may be for ever kept from ſinking into Tyranny and Superſtition.

" 'Twas

" *'Twas then* the ſtudious Head, or gen'rous Mind,
" Follower of God, or Friend of human Kind,
" Poet or Patriot roſe, but to reſtore
" The Faith and Morals, Nature gave before;
" Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,
" If not God's Image, yet his Shadow drew;
" Taught Pow'r's due Uſe to People and to Kings,
" Taught not to ſlack nor ſtrain its tender Strings.

The eaſy and juſt Tranſition into this Subject, from the foregoing, is very remarkable. In the foregoing, he had deſcribed the Effects of Self-love; now the *Obſervation* of theſe Effects, he, with great Art and high Probability, makes the *Occaſion* of thoſe Diſcoveries, which ſpeculative Men made of the *Principles* of Policy and Religion, deſcribed in the preſent Paragraph; this, I ſay, he ſeems to hint at in that fine Tranſition,

" Twas then the ſtudious Head, *&c.*

Mr *De Crouſaz*, who ſaw nothing of this Beauty, ſays, — *It is not eaſy to gueſs to what Epoch Mr.* Pope *would have us refer his* then.* He has indeed proved himſelf no good *Gueſſer*; which yet is the beſt Quality of a Critick. I will therefore tell him without more ado, Mr. *Pope* meant the *polite and flouriſhing Age of* Greece; and thoſe Benefactors to Mankind, which, I preſume, he had principally in View, were *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, who, of all the Pagan World, ſpoke beſt of *God*, and wrote beſt of *Government*.

* Page 261.

LET. VI. But now the Poet, having ſo much commended the Invention and Inventors of *the philoſophic Principles of Religion and Government*, leſt an ill Uſe ſhould be made of this, by Mens reſting in *Theory* and *Speculation*, as they have been always too apt to do, in Matters whoſe *Practice* makes their Happineſs; he warns his Reader againſt this Error, by a Condemnation of all ſuch Indiſcretions.

" For *Forms* of Government let Fools conteſt;
" Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt.
" For *Modes* of Faith let graceleſs Zealots fight;
" His can't be wrong, whoſe Life is in the Right.
" All muſt be falſe that thwart this one great End,
" And all of God that bleſs Mankind, or mend.

The Seaſonableneſs of this Reproof will appear evident enough to thoſe who know, that mad Diſputes about *Liberty* and *Prerogative* had *once* well nigh overturned our Conſtitution; and that others about *Myſtery* and *Church Authority* had almoſt deſtroyed the very Spirit of our holy Religion.

But it is ſtrange to think how theſe fine Lines have been miſunderſtood: The Author, againſt his own expreſs Words, againſt the plain Senſe of his Syſtem, has been conceived to mean, *That all Governments and all Religions were the ſame.* But as this wrong Judgment proceeded from Men's Ignorance of the *Reaſon* of the Reproof, as explained above, that Explanation is alone ſufficient to rectify their Miſtake.

However, not to leave him under the leaſt Suſpicion, in a matter of ſo much Moment, I ſhall juſtify the Senſe I have given to this Paſſage more at large.

To

To ſuppoſe him to mean, that *all Forms of Government are indifferent*, is making him directly contradict the preceding Paragraph; where he loads the Patriot with Commendations, for diſcriminating the *true* from the *falſe* Modes of Government. He, ſays the Poet, Let. VI.

" Taught Pow'r's due Uſe to People and to Kings,
" Taught not to ſlack, nor ſtrain its tender Strings;
" The leſs and greater ſet ſo juſtly true,
" That touching one muſt ſtrike the other too;
" Till jarring Int'reſts of themſelves create
" Th' according Muſick of a *well-mixt State.*

Here he recommends the *true* Form of Government, or a *mix'd Monarchy*. In another Place he as ſtrongly condemns the *falſe*, or the abſolute *Jure Divino* Form:

" ——For Nature knew no *Right Divine* in Men.

To ſuppoſe him to mean, *that all Religions are indifferent*, is an equally wrong as well as uncharitable Suſpicion. Mr. *Pope*, tho' his Subject in this *Eſſay on Man* confines him to *natural Religion*, (his Purpoſe being to vindicate God's natural Diſpenſations to Mankind againſt the Atheiſt) yet gives frequent Intimations of a more ſublime Diſpenſation, and even of the Neceſſity of it; particularly in his *ſecond* Epiſtle, [l. 139.] where he ſpeaks of the *Weakneſs and Inſufficiency of human Reaſon.*

" We wretched Subjects, tho' to lawful Sway,
" In this weak Queen * ſome Favourite † ſtill obey.

* Reaſon. † The Paſſions.

" Ah!

LET. VI.

" Ah! if ſhe lend not Arms as well as Rules,
" What can ſhe more, than tell us we are Fools,
" Teach us to mourn our Nature, not to mend,
" A ſharp Accuſer, but a helpleſs Friend.

St. *Paul* would not have employed other Arguments, when diſpoſed to give the higheſt Idea of the Uſefulneſs of Chriſtianity. ‡——But it may be the Poet finds a Remedy in *natural Religion*; far from it. He there leaves *Reaſon* unrelieved. What is this then but an Intimation, that we ought to ſeek for a Cure in that Religion which only dares profeſs to give it.

Again, in his fourth Epiſtle, [l. 331.] ſpeaking of the good Man, the Favourite of Heaven, he ſays,

" For him alone, *Hope* leads from Gole to Gole,
" And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul;
" Till lengthen'd on to *Faith*, and unconfin'd,
" It pours the Bliſs that fills up all the Mind.

But *natural Religion* never lengthened *Hope* on to *Faith*: nor did any Religion, but the Chriſtian, ever conceive that *Faith* could fill the Mind with Happineſs.

Laſtly, The Poet, in this very Epiſtle, and in this very Place, ſpeaking of the great Reſtorers of the Religion of Nature, intimates that they could only draw God's *Shadow, not his Image*.

" Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,
" If not *God's Image*, yet his *Shadow* drew.

‡ See his Epiſtle to the *Romans*, Chap. vii.

As

As reverencing that Truth, which tells us that this Diſcovery was reſery'd *for the glorious Goſpel of* Chriſt, *who is the* IMAGE OF GOD.* LET. VI.

Thus having fully deſcribed Man in his *ſocial Capacity*, which he ſhews is ſupported by the *two different Motions of Self-love*, he illuſtrates this wonderful Diſpenſation by as admirable a Simile; with which he concludes his Epiſtle:

" On their own Axis as the Planets run,
" Yet make at once their Circle round the Sun;
" So two conſiſtent Motions act the Soul,
" And one regards it's Self, and one the Whole.
" Thus God and Nature link'd the gen'ral Frame,
" And bad Self-Love and Social be the ſame.

I will here, in concluſion, take notice, becauſe I could find no other Place ſo proper to do it, of one great Beauty that ſhines thro' the whole *Eſſay*: It is, that the Poet, whether he ſpeaks of Man as an *Individual*, a Member of *Society*, or the Subject of *Happineſs*, never miſſes an Opportunity, while he is explaining his *State* under any of theſe Capacities, to illuſtrate it, in the moſt artful manner, by the Inforcement of his grand Principle, *That every Thing tends to the Good of the Whole*. From whence his Syſtem receives the reciprocal Advantage of having his grand *Theorem* realized by *Facts*, and his *Facts* juſtified on a *Principle of Right*.——

Now let the Reader believe, if he will, what our great Logician inſinuates to be his Sentiments, in *p.* 346 of his *Commentaire*: " That certain Perſons have con-
" jectured, that Mr. *Pope* did not compoſe this *Eſſay* at

* 2 Cor. iv. 4.

" once,

LET. VI. "once, and in a regular Order; but that after he had "wrote ſeveral Fragments of Poetry, all finiſhed in "their Kind; one, for Example, on the Parallel be-"tween *Reaſon and Inſtinct*; another upon Man's "groundleſs *Pride*; another on the Prerogatives of "*Human Nature*; another on *Religion and Superſti-"tion*; another on the *Original of Society*; and ſeveral "Fragments beſides, on *Self-Love* and the *Paſſions*; he "tack'd theſe together as he could, and divided them "into four Epiſtles, as it is ſaid was the Fortune of the "*Rhapſodies* of *Homer*." Yes, I believe juſt as much of Mr. *Popes*'s *Rhapſodies*, as of *Homer*'s. But if this be the Caſe, that the *Leaves* of theſe *two great Poets* were wrote at random, toſſed about, and afterwards put in Order, like the *Cumæan Sibyls*; then what we have till now thought an old lying Bravado of the Poets, *That they wrote by Inſpiration*, will become a ſober Truth.

However, ſo honourable an Account of *Rhapſody-Writing* ſhould by all means be encouraged, as of great Conſolation to certain modern Writers in Divinity and Politicks. But the Miſchief is, our Logician has unluckily given us a Proof in his own caſe, that *all Rhapſodiſts* are not ſo happy.

As to *Homer*, one might hope thoſe old exploded Fooleries about him, might by this Time be forgotten. But as to his Tranſlator, it muſt be owned, he has given ſufficient Cauſe of Diſguſt to our *Philoſophers* and *Men of Reaſon*. For till now, every Poet, good, bad, and indifferent, ſtuck fairly to his Profeſſion: But Mr. *Pope*, being the laſt of the poetic Line amongſt us, on whom the large Patrimony of his whole Race is devolved, ſeems deſirous, as is natural in ſuch caſes, to ally himſelf to a more

more lasting Family; and so, after gathering all the Laurels that Poetry could yield him, has the Assurance to boast, LET. VI.

" That not in Fancy's M..ze he wander'd long,
" But stoop'd to *Truth*, and moraliz'd his Song.

I have really endeavoured to set the Merits of the Cause in a fair Light. The Reader may now judge for himself. I have given a Specimen of Mr *De Crousaz*'s Reasoning, and I have given a Specimen of Mr. *Pope*'s; and to do them both Justice, I have taken Notice of the Mistakes of the Translator, by which the one hath been misled, and the other so much misrepresented.

But now, in what Light, must we think, will the graver Christian Reader regard the Calumnies we have here confuted? How sad an Idea must this give him of the present Spirit of Christianity, that a Work, wrote solely to recommend the *Charity* that Religion so strongly inforceth, and breathing nothing but Love to God and universal Good-will to Man, should bring upon the Author such a Storm of uncharitable Bitterness and Calumny, from a pretended Advocate of Religion? A Religion, the very Vitality of which (if we may believe the Propagators of it) is Universal Benevolence: *For the End of the Commandment is Charity.* * Conformably hereunto we may observe, that in their *Epistles* to the Churches, whatever the Occasion was, whatever Discipline they instituted, whatever Points of Faith they explained, whatever Heresies they stigmatized, whatever Immoralities they condemned, or whatever Virtues they

* 1 Tim. i. 5.

LET. VI. recommended, CHARITY was ſtill conſtantly the Thing enforced, as the very End of all, *the bond of Perfectneſs*. † The *beloved* Diſciple of our Lord, particularly, who may be ſuppoſed to know his Maſter's Will, hath wrote *his* Epiſtle on ſet Purpoſes to recommend this ſingle Virtue: At a Criſis too, when, as Hereſies were ſpringing up apace, a modern Controverſialiſt would be apt to think he might have employed his Time better. And why (it may be reaſonably aſked) ſo very much on *Charity*, in an Age when Chriſtians had ſo few Provocations or Temptations to violate it? For their Faith being yet chaſte from the Proſtitutions of the *Schools*, and their Hierarchy yet uncorrupted by the Gifts of *Conſtantine*, the Church knew neither *Bigotry* nor *Ambition*, the two fatal Sources of uncharitable Zeal. I will tell you, It was the Providence of their prophetic Spirit, which preſented to them the Image of thoſe miſerable Times foretold by their Maſter, when *Iniquity ſhould abound, and the Love of many wax cold*.* So that if the Men of thoſe Times ſhould dare to violate *this Bond of Perfectneſs*, after ſo many repeated Admonitions, they might be found altogether without Excuſe. For I can by no means enter into the Views of that profound Philoſopher, who diſcovered that *Jeſus* and his Followers might preach up Love and Charity, the better to enable a Set of Men, ſome Centuries afterwards, to tyrannize over thoſe whom the *engaging Sounds of Charity and Brotherly Love* had intrapped into Subjection.‡

I am aware, that certain modern Propagators of the Faith, aided with a *School Diſtinction*, will tell you, that it is pure Charity which ſets them to work; and that

† Col. iii. 14. * Mat. xxiv. 12.
‡ Characteriſticks, Vol. i. p. 87. Vol. iii. p. 115. Ed. 1737.

what

what you call *Uncharitableneſs* when they inſult the Fame, the Fortune, or the Perſon of their Brother, is indeed the very height of Charity, a Charity for his *Soul*. This too may be the Height of the Hangman's Charity: But St. *Paul*'s was of another Make. His was *not eaſily provoked, thought no Evil, bore all Things, hoped all Things, endured all Things*.* It was a Charity that conſulted the temporal Peace, and inſpired him with all Candor and a good Opinion, of his Brother. Let. VI.

I leave it with Mr *De Crouſaz* to reflect on the different Conduct to which the exceſs of Zeal in the Service of Religion has tranſported him. For I will, in Charity, believe it to be truly that; notwithſtanding we every Day ſee the moſt deſpicable Tools of *others Impotency*, and the vileſt Slaves to their *own Ambition*, hide their corrupt Paſſions under the ſame Cover. This learned Gentleman ſhould reflect on what the ſober Part of the World will think of this Conduct. For tho' the Apoſtle bids aged Men be ſound in Faith, he adds immediately, and in Charity, in Patience † likewiſe. But where was his *Charity* in labouring, on the ſlighteſt Grounds, to repreſent his Brother as propagating *Spinoziſm* and Immorality? Where was his *Temper*, when he became ſo furious againſt him, on the Suppoſition of his eſpouſing a *Syſtem* he had *never read*, that of *Leibnitz*; and juſtifying a Doctrine he had *never heard of*, The *præ-eſtabliſhed Harmony*? Where was his *Patience*, when, having conceived this of Mr. *Pope* on the meer Authority of a *moſt miſtaken Tranſlation*, he would not ſtay to inquire whether the Author owned the Faithfulneſs of it? but publiſhed his Conceptions, and the ſtrongeſt

* 1 Cor. xiii. 5, 7. † Titus ii. 2.

LET. VI. Accuſations upon thoſe Conceptions, to the whole World? If either himſelf, in any of theſe Imaginations, or the Tranſlator in any Part of his Verſion was wrong, his continuing to do this, Volume after Volume, was a deliberate and repeated Act of the higheſt Injuſtice, as an Imputation of this Kind is the greateſt Injury a virtuous Man can receive.

If Mr *De Crouſaz* preſumes his Zeal for the Honour of God will excuſe his Violations of Charity towards Men, I muſt tell him *he knows not what Spirit he is of*— *If a Man* (ſays the beloved Diſciple of our Lord) *ſay I love God and hateth his Brother, he is a Liar: for he that loveth not his Brother whom he hath ſeen, how can he love God whom he hath not ſeen?** A Free-thinker may perhaps laugh at the Simplicity of this Argument, which yet he would affect to admire, could any one find it for him in *Plato*. But let him for once condeſcend to be inſtructed by an *idiot Evangeliſt*, † while he reaſons thus — "You ſay you *love God* tho' you hate your Brother: "Impoſſible! The Love of any Object begins originally, "like all the other Paſſions, from Self-love. Thus we "love ourſelves, by Repreſentation, in our Off-ſpring; "which Love extends by degrees to our remoter Rela- "tions, and ſo on thro' our Neighbourhood, to all the "fellow Members of our Community. And now Self- "love, refined by Reaſon and Religion, begins to loſe "its Nature, and deſervedly aſſumes another Name. "Our Country next claims our Love; we then extend "it to all Mankind, and never reſt till we have, at "length, fixed it on that *moſt amiable* of all Objects, "the great Author and Original of Being. This is the "Courſe and Progreſs of human Love.

* 1 John iv. 20. † See *the Diſcourſe of Free-thinking.*

"God

" God loves from Whole to Parts, but human Soul
" Muſt riſe from Individual to the Whole.

Now (purſues the Apoſtle) I reaſon thus; " Can you, " who are not yet arrived at that inferior Stage of Benevolence, the Love of your Brother, *whom you have* " *ſeen*, that is, whom the Neceſſities of Civil Life and " a Senſe of your mutual Relation might teach you to " love, pretend to have reached the very Height and " Perfection of this Paſſion, the Love of God *whom* " *you have not ſeen?* That God whoſe wonderful Oeconomy in his Syſtem of Creation, which makes him " ſo amiable, you cannot have the leaſt Conception of; " you, who have not yet learnt that your own private " Syſtem is ſupported on the great Principle of Benevolence? *Fear* him, *flatter* him, *fight* for him, as you dread " his Power, you may; but to *love* him, as you know " not his *Nature*, is impoſſible." This is the Apoſtle's grand and ſublime Reaſoning; and it is with the ſame Thought on which the Apoſtle founds his Argument that our moral Poet ends his Eſſay, as the juſt and neceſſary Concluſion of his Work.

" *Self-love* but ſerves the virtuous Mind to *wake* *
" As the ſmall pebble ſtirs the peaceful Lake:
" The

* In this lies the Difference between Mr. *Pope*'s Syſtem and that of *Rochefoucault*, *Eſprit*, and their wordy Diſciple *Mandeville*. They found that Self-love was the *Origin* of all thoſe Virtues which Mankind moſt admire, and therefore fooliſhly ſuppoſed it was the *End* likewiſe, and ſo taught that the higheſt Pretences of Diſintereſtedneſs were only the more artful Diſguiſes of Self-love. But Mr. *Pope*, who ſaw as well as they and the reſt of Mankind, that the Paſſions began

LET. VI.

" The *Centre* mov'd, a *Circle* ſtrait ſucceeds,
" Another ſtill, and ſtill another ſpreads;
" *Friend*, *Parent*, *Neighbour*, firſt it will embrace,
" His *Country* next, and next *all human Race*;
" Wide, and more wide, the O'erflowings of the Mind
" Take ev'ry Creature in, of every Kind;
" *Earth* ſmiles around, with boundleſs Bounty bleſt,
" AND HEAV'N BEHOLDS ITS IMAGE IN HIS BREAST.

I am, &c.

began in Self-love, knew human Nature better than to imagine they terminated there. He knew Reaſon and Religion could convert Self-iſhneſs into its very Oppoſite; and therefore teaches, that

" Self-love but ſerves the virtuous Mind to wake;

and thus hath vindicated the Dignity of human Nature, and the Philoſophic Truth of the Chriſtian Doctrine.

F I N I S.

K with Preced.

A

Seventh Letter,

Which finiſhes the

VINDICATION

OF

Mr *Pope*'s ESSAY ON MAN,

FROM THE

MISREPRESENTATIONS

OF

Mr *DE CROUSAZ*,

Profeſſor of PHILOSOPHY and MATHEMATICKS in the Univerſity of *Lauſanne*.

By the REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON, M. A.

Chaplain to his Royal Highneſs the Prince of Wales.

Vide quam iniqui ſunt divinorum munerum Æſtimatores, etiam quidem PROFESSI SAPIENTIAM. *Seneca.*

LONDON:

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LETTER VII.

THE Poet in the two foregoing Epiſtles having conſidered MAN with regard to the MEANS, (that is, *in all his Relations* as an *Individual*, or Member of *Society*) comes now in this laſt to conſider him with regard to the END *of Life*, that is, HAPPINESS. LET. VII.

It opens with an *Invocation* to *Happineſs*, in the manner of the ancient Poets, who when deſtitute of a Patron *God*, applied to the *Muſe*, and if ſhe was not at hand, took up with any ſimple *Virtue*, to inſpire and proſper their Deſigns. This was the *ancient Invocation*, which few modern Poets have had the Art to imitate with any degree of Spirit or Decorum; while our Author, not content to heighten this poetic Ornament with the Graces of the *Antique*, has alſo contrived to make it ſubſervient to the Method and Reaſoning of his philoſophic Compoſition. I will endeavour to explain ſo uncommon a Beauty.

It is to be obſerved that the Pagan Deities had all their *ſeveral Names* and *Places of Abode*, with ſome of which they were ſuppoſed to be more delighted than others,

and conſequently to be then moſt propitious when invoked by the favourite *Name* and *Place*: Hence we find the Hymns of *Homer*, *Orpheus*, and *Callimachus*, to be chiefly employed in enumerating the ſeveral Names and Places of Abode which the Patron Deity had aſſumed. Now our Poet, with great Delicacy of Addreſs, hath made theſe *two Circumſtances* ſerve to introduce his Subject, according to the exacteſt Rules of Logic. His Purpoſe is to write of *Happineſs*; Method therefore requires that he firſt define what Men mean by *Happineſs*, which he does in the Ornament of a Poetic *Invocation*.

" O *Happineſs*! our Being's End and Aim,
" *Good*, *Pleaſure*, *Eaſe*, *Content*! whate'er thy NAME.

After the *Definition*, that which follows next, in order of Method, is the *Propoſition* or Expoſition of the Subject, which in this Epiſtle is the detecting the *falſe* Notions of Happineſs, and ſettling and explaining the *true*; and this the Poet proſecutes throughout the next 16 Lines. Now the Enumeration of the ſeveral ſuppoſed *Places of Abode* of Happineſs, (which in imitation of the ancient Poets he next mentions in the Invocation, and which makes ten of the 16 Lines) is a Summary of *falſe Happineſs*.

" Plant of Cœleſtial Seed, if dropt below,
" Say in what mortal Soil thou deign'ſt to grow?
" Fair op'ning to ſome *Court's* propitious Shine,
" Or deep with *Diamonds* in the flaming Mine?

" Twin'd

" Twin'd with the Wreaths *Parnaſſian Laurels* yield,
" Or reap'd in *Iron Harveſts* of the Field?

The ſix remaining Lines deliver the *true* Notion of Happineſs, which is ſumm'd up in theſe two;

" Fixt to no Spot is Happineſs ſincere,
" 'Tis no where to be found, or every where.

Having thus *defined* the Terms, and delivered his *Theſis*, the Poet proceeds quite thro' the Body of his Epiſtle to ſupport it.

He begins [from l. 18 to 27] with detecting the *falſe Notions of Happineſs*. Theſe are of two kinds, the *Philoſophic* and *Popular*; the latter he had recapitulated in the *Invocation*, when *Happineſs* was call'd upon at her ſeveral ſuppoſed Places of Abode: The *Philoſophic* then only remained to be delivered.

" Ask of the *Learn'd* the way, the Learn'd are blind,
" This bids to *ſerve*, and that to *ſhun* Mankind:
" Some place the Bliſs in *Action*, ſome in *Eaſe*,
" Thoſe call it Pleaſure, and Contentment theſe.

The Confutation of theſe *Philoſophic* Errors, he ſhews to be very eaſy, *one common Fallacy* running through them all; namely this, That inſtead of telling us in what the *Happineſs of Mankind* conſiſts, which was what was asked of them, each buſies himſelf to explain in what he placed *his own Happineſs*.

" Who thus define it, ſay they more or leſs
" Than this? that Happineſs is Happineſs.

And here before we go any further, it will be proper that we turn to our *Logician*, who blind to theſe Beauties in the admirable Diſpoſition of the Subject, is extremely ſcandalized at the Poet for not proceeding immediately to explain *true Happineſs* (after having defined his Terms and delivered his Theſis), but for going back again (as he fancies) to a Conſideration of the *falſe*. —— Speaking of the 16 Lines, he ſays — " Happineſs is then near me, " and I feel myſelf conſiderably refreſhed, but by ill Luck " it is only for a Moment, my Doubts preſently return, " and I find myſelf in the Hands of a Poet, who can " do what he will with me, and who having placed me " on the very Borders of Happineſs, on a ſudden ſhuts " up all its Avenues*."

But a very little *Patience* and *Impartiality* would have ſhewn him, that they were immediately laid open again in the very next Lines [from 26 to 33,] where the Poet ſhews, that if you will but take the Road of *Nature*, and leave that of *mad Opinion*, you will ſoon find Happineſs is a Good of the Species, and, like common Senſe, equally diſtributed to all Mankind.

" Take Nature's Path, and mad Opinion's leave,
" All States can reach it, and all Heads conceive;
" Obvious her Goods, in no Extreme they dwell,
" There needs but thinking right, and meaning well;
" And mourn our various Portions as we pleaſe,
" Equal is common Senſe, and common Eaſe.

* Page 271.

But

But this is ſo far from ſatisfying our Bully-Critic, that it only furniſhes him with freſh Matter for a Quarrel. He is much offended at the two firſt Lines. "—— I muſt here renew my Complaints. Take "Nature's Path you ſay; and what am I to underſtand "by this Nature? Muſt I take the *reaſonable Nature* "for my Guide? But, according to you, the Philoſophers "have conſulted it to no purpoſe. Shall I give myſelf "up to the *Animal Nature?* This would ſoon bring "me into a very bad Condition. Encompaſſed with "Doubts and Difficulties, what have I left, but to ſuffer "myſelf to be born away by Chance or Hazard? And "to conclude, that the Counſel here given of taking "*Nature's Path* comes at length to this, to march ſtea-"dily on in the Footſteps of Fatality*."

It would be hard indeed if our Commentator could not find out the Road to *Fatality* in every Step the Poet takes. But here he makes a more awkward Jump to it than uſual, in avoiding the Horns of his own chimerical *Dilemma*. The Poet, ſays he, muſt either mean the *Reaſonable*, or the *Animal Nature*. Agreed. He could not mean the Animal Nature: This too is true. Nor the Reaſonable. Why not? Becauſe it ſtood the Philoſophers in no ſtead. What then? Do you think that he has ever the worſe Opinion of the *Reaſonable Nature* on that Account? They could not poſſibly have run into more Miſtakes about *Happineſs*, than you have about the Poet's Meaning: And yet for all this, I apprehend he will think never the worſe, either of Reaſon, or of himſelf.

But what ſurpaſſes all Belief, after Mr *De Crouſaz* had ſaid this on the two firſt Lines, he goes on with his

* Page 272, 273.

marks

LET. VII. Remarks on the immediately following, *Obvious her Goods &c.* in theſe words. "*See Mr* Pope *once* "*again under the Neceſſity of reſtoring Reaſon to* "*its Rights**." Prodigious! It ſeems then after all, Mr *Pope* by *Nature's Path* did indeed mean the *reaſonable Nature*. For we now ſee it was Mr *De Crouſaz*, not Mr *Pope*, that was *under the Neceſſity of reſtoring Reaſon to its Rights*: And conſidering of what little Service this momentary Depoſition of Reaſon has proved to him, and how ſeverely ſhe was like ſome time or other to reſent this free Treatment from a Logician, one would wonder he ſhould have put himſelf to ſo much trouble and hazard.

To proceed, the Poet having expoſed the *two falſe Species of Happineſs*, the *Philoſophical* and *Popular*, and denounced the *True*; in order to eſtabliſh the laſt, goes on to a Confutation of the two former.

I. He firſt [from l. 32, to 47] confutes the *Philoſophical*: And this two ways:

1. From his *grand Principle*, That *God acts by general Laws*. The Conſequence of which is, that *Happineſs*, which ſupports the well-being of every Syſtem, muſt needs be *Univerſal*, and not *Partial*, as the Philoſophers conceived.

"Remember Man! *The univerſal Cauſe*,
"*Acts not by partial, but by gen'ral Laws*;
"And makes, what Happineſs we juſtly call,
"Subſiſt not in the good of One, but All.

2. From *Fact*, ——— That Man inſtinctively concurs with this Deſignation of Providence, to make Hap-

* Page 281.

pineſs

pineſs univerſal, by his having no Delight in any thing *uncommunicated* or *uncommunicable*. Let. VII.

" There's not a Bleſſing Individuals find,
" But ſome way leans and hearkens to the kind.
" No Bandit fierce, no Tyrant mad with Pride,
" No cavern'd Hermit reſts ſelf-ſatisfy'd.
" Abſtract what others feel, what others think,
" All Pleaſures ſicken, and all Glories ſink.

II. The Poet confutes in the ſecond place [from l. 46 to 75] the *Popular* Error concerning *Happineſs*, namely, that it conſiſts in *Externals*: which he does by inquiring into the Reaſons of the preſent providential Diſpoſition of *external Goods*. A Topic of Confutation choſen with the greateſt Accuracy and Penetration. For if it appears *they* were diſtributed in the manner we ſee them, for Reaſons *different* from the *Happineſs of Individuals*; it is abſurd to think that they ſhould make *part* of that Happineſs.

1. He ſhews firſt, that Diſparity of external Poſſeſſions among Men, was for the ſake of *Society*, and to promote the Harmony and Happineſs of a *Syſtem*.

" Order is Heaven's firſt Law, and this confeſt,
" Some are, and muſt be, greater than the reſt,
" More rich, more wiſe, ———

Becauſe the *want* of external Goods in ſome, and the *abundance* in others, increaſe general Harmony in the *Obliger* and *Obliged*.

" But

" But mutual Wants this Happineſs increaſe,
" All Nature's Difference keeps all Nature's Peace.

2. Becauſe if external Goods were equally diſtributed, they would occaſion perpetual Diſcord amongſt Men, all *equal* in Power.

" But Fortune's Gifts if each alike poſſeſt,
" And each were equal, muſt not all conteſt?

From hence he concludes, That as *External Goods* were not given for the Reward of Virtue, but for many different Purpoſes, God could not, if he intended Happineſs for all, place it in the Enjoyment of *Externals*.

" If then to *all* Men Happineſs was meant,
" God in Externals could not place Content.

Hence he takes occaſion to upbraid the deſperate Folly and Impiety of thoſe, who in ſpite of God and Nature, will yet attempt to place it there.

" O Sons of Earth! Attempt ye ſtill to riſe,
" By Mountains pil'd on Mountains to the Skies?
" Heav'n ſtill with Laughter the vain Toil ſurveys,
" And buries Madmen in the Heaps they raiſe.

I muſt not here omit to obſerve, that the Tranſlator unconſcious of all this fine Reaſoning between the 32 and 75 Lines (where the Poet firſt confutes the *Philoſophic* Errors concerning Happineſs, and next the *Popular*) has ſtrangely jumbled together and confounded his different Arguments, on theſe two different Heads. But this

this is not the worſt, he has perverted the Poet's Words to a horrid and ſenſeleſs Fataliſm, foreign to the Argument in hand, and directly contrary to Mr *Pope*'s general Principles.

The Poet ſays,

" Remember Man! The univerſal Cauſe,
" Acts not by partial, but by general Laws.

His Tranſlator,

——— " Une Loi generale
" Determine toûjours la Cauſe Principale.

That is, *a general Law ever determines the principal Cauſe*, which is the very Fate of the ancient Pagans, who ſuppoſed that Deſtiny gave Law to the *Father of Gods and Men*.

The Poet ſays again,

——— " Order is Heav'ns firſt Law.

That is, *The firſt Law made by God, relates to Order*, which is a beautiful Alluſion to the Scripture Hiſtory of the Creation, when God firſt appeaſed the Diſorders of *Chaos* and ſeparated the Light from the Darkneſs. Let us now hear his Tranſlator.

" L'Ordre, cet inflexible & grand Legiſlateur,
" Qui des decrets du Ciel eſt le premier Auteur:

Order, that inflexible and grand Legiſlator, who is the firſt Author of the Laws of Heaven. A Propoſition abominable in moſt Senſes, and abſurd in all.

But now what ſays Mr *De Crouſaz* to this, who is perpetually crying out, *Fate! Fate!* as Men in Diſtraction call out *Fire?* The Reader will be ſurpriz'd to hear him paſs this cold Reflexion, on two ſo obnoxious Paſſages.

——— "*This* Order, the firſt Author of Laws, *preſents us with very harſh Expreſſions, and bold Ideas, which Mr* Pope *elſewhere condemns as raſh and unjuſtifiable.** But this is his great Moderation, when any thing ſhocking, of the Tranſlator's own Manufacture, preſents itſelf to his Critic: And we ſhall find preſently that he had more than an inſtinctive Apprehenſion of what belong'd to his Countryman.

To proceed, the Poet having thus confuted the two Errors concerning Happineſs, *Philoſophical* and *Popular*, and proved that true Happineſs was neither *Solitary and Partial*, nor yet *placed in Externals*; goes on [from l. 74 to 81] to ſhew in what it *does* conſiſt. He had before ſaid in general, and repeated it, that Happineſs lay in common to the whole Species. He now brings us better acquainted with it, in a more explicite account of its Nature; and tells us, it is all contained in *Health, Peace*, and *Competence*; but that theſe are to be gained only by VIRTUE, namely, by *Temperance, Innocence, Juſtice*, and *Induſtry*.

"Reaſon's whole Pleaſures, all the Joys of Senſe,
"Lye in three Words, Health, Peace, and Competence;
"But Health conſiſts with Temperance alone,
"And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

* Page 282.

The

The first Line, ——— *Reason's whole Pleasures, all the Joys of Sense*, is the most beautiful Paraphrasis for *Happiness*; for all we feel of Good is by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*. The Translator, who seemed little to concern himself with the Poet's Philosophy or Argument, mistook this Description of *Happiness* for a Description of the *intellectual and sensitive Faculties* opposed to one another; and therefore thus translates it.

" Le charme seducteur, dont s'enyvrant les Sens.
" Les Plaisirs de l'Esprit encor plus ravissans.

And so with the highest Absurdity, not only makes the Poet constitute *sensual Excesses* a part of human Happiness, but likewise the Product of Virtue.

After this we shall no longer wonder at such kind of Translations as the following:

Mr *Pope* says,

" And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

The Translator,

" Pour vous O Paix du Coeur, digne fille des Cieux,
" Vous êtes du bonheur le gage precieux.

Conscious Innocence, says the Poet, *is the only Source of internal Peace*, and *Justice* of *external*; therefore Peace is the sole Issue of Virtue: A conclusive Observation in his Argument. *O Peace*, says the Translator, *thou art the precious Pledge of Happiness*, an Observation that concludes only this, that the Translator understood nothing

of the Argument, which ſtands thus: —— Is Happineſs rightly placed in Externals? No, for it conſiſts in Health, Peace, and Competence. Health and Competence are the Product of Temperance and Induſtry, and Peace of Virtue only, that is, outward Peace of Juſtice, inward Peace of conſcious Innocence.

The Poet having thus ſhewn from the Nature of Happineſs, that Virtue gives it, he next inquires, [from l. 38 to 91] whether it can have a Succedaneum, or be given by any other Thing? And on a View of all the Advantages of external Goods without Virtue, determines in the Negative.

" Say in purſuit of Profit or Delight,
" Who riſque the moſt, that take wrong Means or Right?
" Of Vice or Virtue, whether bleſt or curſt,
" Which meets Contempt, or which Compaſſion firſt?

Here Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Remarks are indeed very extraordinary, —— " To whom (ſays he) are theſe In-
" terrogatories addreſſed? — If you refer yourſelf to
" the Judgment of a Troop of young Libertines, ſuch
" as are to be found in great Cities, and in Armies,
" you will certainly not have the Laughers on your
" Side, &c.*" What then? If right Reaſon requires they ſhould, is not that ſufficient for the Poet's Purpoſe, in a Diſcourſe where right Reaſon is continually appealed to, in a Controverſy between him and them? But our Logician's Perverſity is without Example. 'Till now, his Quarrel with the Poet was, that his Arguments flattered

* Page 289, 290.

the

the corrupt Sentiments of Libertiniſm. At preſent he is as captious for their oppoſing thoſe Sentiments. Does not this look as if he were reſolved to approve of nothing Mr *Pope* could ſay? Let. VII.

Our Author having thus largely confuted the miſtake of *Happineſs conſiſting in Externals*, proceeds to expoſe the terrible Conſequences of ſuch an Opinion, on the Sentiments and Practice of all ſorts of Men, making the *Diſſolute* impious and atheiſtical, the *Religious* uncharitable and intolerant, and the *Good* diſcontent. For when 'tis once taken for granted that *Happineſs conſiſts in Externals*, it is immediately ſeen that *ill* Men are often more happy than *good*; which ſets all Conditions on objecting to the ways of Providence, and ſome even on raſhly attempting to rectify its Diſpenſations, tho' by the Violation of Law, divine and human. —— It will be proper to take notice, that the Poet has had the Art to make this Confutation ſerve, at the ſame time, for a full Solution of all Objections which might be made to his main Propoſition, *that Happineſs conſiſts not in Externals*.

I. He begins firſt of all with the *Atheiſtical Complainers*, and purſues their Impiety [from line 90 to 97] with all the Vengeance of his Eloquence.

" Oh blind to Truth, and God's whole Scheme below!
" Who fancy Bliſs to Vice, to Virtue Woe.
" Who ſees and follows that great Scheme the beſt,
" Beſt knows the Bleſſing, and will moſt be bleſt.
" But Fools the *good* alone unhappy call,
" From Ills or Accidents that chance to *all*.

He expoſes their Folly and Impiety, even on their Notions of *external Goods*.

1. By

1. By *Examples* [from line 96 to 109] where he ſhews *firſt*, that if good Men have been untimely cut off, this is not to be aſcribed to their Virtues, but to a Contempt of Life that hurried them into Dangers. *Secondly*, That if they will ſtill perſiſt in aſcribing *untimely Death* to Virtue, they muſt needs on the ſame Principle likewiſe aſcribe *long Life* to it. Conſequently as the Argument in *Fact* concludes both ways, in *Logic* it concludes neither.

" Say was it Virtue, more tho' Heav'n ne'er gave,
" Lamented *Digby*! ſunk thee to thy Grave?
" Tell me, if Virtue made the Son expire,
" Why full of Days and Honour lives the Sire?
" Why drew *Marſeille*'s good Biſhop purer Breath,
" When Nature ſicken'd, and each Gale was Death?
" Or why ſo long, (if long in Life can be)
" Lent Heav'n a Parent to the Poor, and me?

2. He expoſes their Folly [from line 108 to 129] *by Conſiderations drawn from the Syſtem of Nature*; and theſe two-fold, *Natural* and *Moral*. You accuſe God, ſays the Poet, becauſe the good Man is Subject to Natural and Moral Evil: Let us ſee whence theſe proceed. Natural Evil, is the neceſſary Conſequence of a material World ſo conſtituted: But that this Conſtitution was *beſt*, we have proved in the firſt Epiſtle. Moral Evil ariſes from the depraved Will of Man. Therefore neither the one nor the other from God.

" What makes all Phyſical or Moral Ill?
" There deviates Nature, and here wanders Will.

" God

" God ſends not Ill: if rightly underſtood,
" Or partial Ill is univerſal Good;
" Or Change admits, or Nature lets it fall,
" Short and but rare, 'till Man improv'd it all.

But you will ſay, (continues the Poet to his impious Complainers,) why does not God either prevent, or immediately repair theſe Evils? You may as well aſk why does he not work continual Miracles, and every Moment reverſe the eſtabliſhed Laws of Nature.

" Shall burning *Ætna* when a Sage requires,
" Forget to thunder, and recall her Fires?
" On Air or Sea, new Motions be impreſt,
" O blameleſs *Bethel*! to relieve thy Breaſt?
" When the looſe Mountain trembles from on high,
" Shall Gravitation ceaſe if you go by?
" Or ſome old Temple nodding to its Fall,
" For *Chartre*'s Head reſerve the hanging Wall?

This is the force of the Poet's Reaſoning, and theſe the Men to whom he addreſſes it, namely the *Libertine* Cavillers againſt Providence.

II. But now ſo unhappy is the Condition of Humanity, that theſe are not the only Complainers. *Religious* Men are but too apt, if not to *ſpeak out*, yet ſometimes ſecretly to *murmur* againſt Providence, and ſay, *its Ways are not equal*: Such eſpecially as are inordinately devoted to a Sect or Party, are ſcandalized, that the Just, (which they eſteem themſelves) *who are to judge the World*, have no better Lot in their own Inheritance. The Poet therefore now leaves thoſe more *profligate* Complainers, and turns

turns [from line 128 to 147] to the *Religious*, in theſe Words:

" But ſtill this World (ſo fitted for the Knave)
" Contents us not. A better ſhall we have?
" A *Kingdom of the Juſt* then let it be,
" But firſt conſider how thoſe *Juſt* agree.

As the more impious Complainers wanted external Goods, as the Reward of Virtue for the *moral* Man; ſo theſe wanted them for the *Pious*, in order to have *a Kingdom of the Juſt*. To this the Poet holds it ſufficient to anſwer. — Pray Gentleman firſt agree amongſt your ſelves, who *thoſe Juſt* are. We allow,

" The Good muſt merit God's peculiar Care,
" But who but God can tell us who they are?
" One thinks on *Calvin* Heaven's own Spirit fell,
" Another deems him Inſtrument of Hell:
" If *Calvin* feels Heav'ns Bleſſing or its Rod,
" This cries There is, and that, There is no God.

As this is the Caſe, he even bids them reſt ſatisfy'd, remember his fundamental Principle, *That whatever is, is right*, and content themſelves with that common Anſwer which he with ſo much Reaſon and Piety gives to every kind of Complainer.

I have been the more careful to explain this laſt Argument, and to ſhew againſt whom it is directed, becauſe much depends upon it for the Illuſtration of the Senſe, and the juſt Defence of the Poet. For if we ſuppoſe him ſtill addreſſing himſelf to thoſe *impious* Complainers, confuted in the thirty eight preceeding Lines, we ſhould make him guilty of a *Paralogiſm* in the Argument about the

the *Juſt*, and in the Illuſtration of it by the Caſe of *Calvin*. For the Libertines aſk why the *Juſt*, that is, the *moral Man*, is not rewarded. The Anſwer is, that none but God can tell, who the *Juſt*, that is, the *truly faithful Man*, is. Where the Term is changed, in order to ſupport the Reaſon; for about the *truly moral Man* there is no Diſpute; about the *truly Faithful* a great deal. But take the Poet right, as arguing here againſt *religious* Complainers, and the Reaſoning is ſtrict and logical. They aſk why the *truly Faithful* are not rewarded: He anſwers, they may be for ought you know, for none but God can tell who they are. Mr *De Crouſaz*'s Objections to this Reaſoning receive all their Force from that wrong Suppoſition, That the Poet was here arguing againſt Libertine Complainers; and conſequently they have no Force at all.

III. The Poet having diſpatched theſe two Species of Complainers, comes now to the third and ſtill more pardonable Sort, the diſcontented *good Men*, who lament only, that *Virtue ſtarves, while Vice riots*. To theſe the Poet replies, [from l. 146 to 155] that admit this to be the Caſe, yet they have no Reaſon to complain; either of the good Man's Lot in particular, or of the Diſpenſation of Providence in general. Not of the former, becauſe *Happineſs*, the Reward of Virtue, conſiſts not in *Externals*; nor of the latter, becauſe ill Men may gain Wealth by commendable Induſtry, good Men want Neceſſaries, through Indolence or bad Conduct.

But as modeſt as this Complaint ſeems at firſt view, the Poet next ſhews, [from l. 154 to 165] that it is founded on a Principle of the higheſt Extravagance, which will never let the diſcontented *good Man* reſt, till he becomes as vain and fooliſh in his Imaginations as the very worſt

ſort of Complainers. For that when once he begins to think he wants what is his due, he will never know where to ſtop, while God has any thing to give.

But this is not all, he proves next [from l. 164 to 175] that theſe Demands are not only *unreaſonable*, but in the higheſt degree *abſurd* likewiſe. For that thoſe very *Goods*, if granted, would be the *Deſtruction* of that *Virtue* for which they are demanded as a *Reward*. He concludes therefore on the whole, that,

" What nothing earthly gives, or can deſtroy,
" The Soul's calm Sunſhine, and the heart-felt Joy,
" Is Virtue's Prize.——— ,

This laſt Argument, concerning the *Incompatibility* of thoſe Goods moſt deſired, with Virtue, the Poet expreſſes thus,

" Rewards that either would to Virtue bring
" No Joy, or be deſtructive of the Thing.

The Tranſlator thus,

" De ces dons la Vertu connoiſſant le danger,
" Ou les fuit, ou du moins gemit de s'encharger.

Virtue well apprehending the danger of theſe Gifts, either flies from them, or at leaſt groans under the weight of their Enjoyment: And ſo deadens allthe force of the Argument.

But the Poet, ſtill continuing his Diſcourſe to this *third* ſort of Complainers, whom he indulges (as much more pardonable than the *firſt* or *ſecond*,) in rectifying all their Doubts and Miſtakes, now argues

argues with them more at large, and proves both from *Reaſon* and *Example*, how unable any of thoſe things are, which the World moſt admires, to make a *good* Man *happy*. For as to the *philoſophic* Miſtakes concerning Happineſs, there being little danger of their making a general Impreſſion, the Poet, after a ſhort Confutation, diſmiſſes them for all together. But *external Goods* are thoſe Syrens that ſo bewitch the World with Dreams of *Happineſs*, that it is of all Things the moſt difficult to awake it out of it's Deluſions; though, as he proves in an exact review of the moſt pretending, they diſhonour *bad* Men, and add no Luſtre to the *Good*. And that it is only this third and leaſt criminal ſort of Complainers, againſt which the remaining part of the Diſcourſe is levelled, appears from the Poet's ſo frequently addreſſing himſelf from hence forward to his Friend, while he enforces his Arguments in behalf of Providence.

I. He begins therefore [from line 174 to 207] with conſidering Riches. He examines firſt, what there is of *real* Value in them, and ſhews, they can give the *good* Man only that very Contentment he had before, or at moſt but burthen him with a Truſt to be diſpenſed for the Benefit of others: ſince the *good* Man eſteems all, beſide what is ſufficient to ſupply him with the Conveniencies of Life, as entruſted to him by Providence, for the Supplyal of other's Neceſſities.

" For *Riches*, can they give but to the Juſt,
" His own Contentment, or another's Truſt?

It is remarkable, that Mr *Du Reſnel* has neglected to tranſlate theſe two Lines, in which this neceſſary part of the Poet's Argument is contained. So little did he concern himſelf with his Author's Reaſoning. 2. The

r. VII. Poet next examines the *imaginary* Value of Riches, as the Fountain of *Honour*. For his Adverſaries Objection ſtands thus: — As Honour is the genuine claim of Virtue, and Shame the juſt Retribution of Vice; and as *Honour* in their Opinion follows Riches, and Shame Poverty; therefore the *good Man* ſhould be *rich*. —— He tells them in this they are much miſtaken.

" Honour and Shame from no Condition riſe,
" Act well your Part, there all the Honour lies.

That neither *Kings*, though they give Titles, nor *Founders of Families*, though they give Birth, can confer *Honour*; which if ever it is gain'd, muſt be gain'd by our own Virtues.

II. The Poet in the ſecond Place, [from line 206 to 227] unmaſks the falſe Pretences of GREATNESS, and ſhews that the *Hero and Politician* (the two Characters which would monopolize that Quality) after all their Buſtle, effect only this, if they want Virtue, that the one proves himſelf a Fool, and the other a Knave,

" Who wickedly is wiſe, or madly brave,
" Is but the more a Fool, the more a Knave.

III. That as to FAME, [from line 226 to 249] that ſtill more fantaſtic Bleſſing, all of it, beſides what we hear our ſelves, is merely nothing; and that even of this ſmall Portion, no more of it gives the Poſſeſſor a real Satisfaction, than what is the fruit of Virtue,

" Al

" All *Fame* is foreign, but of true Deſert,
" Plays round the *Head*, but comes not near the *Heart*.

IV. Laſtly, [from line 248 to 259.] That even Superior Parts, bring no more real Happineſs to the Poſſeſſor than the reſt, nay put him into a worſe Condition; for that the quickneſs of Apprehenſion, and depth of Penetration do but ſharpen the Miſeries of Life.

" In Parts ſuperior, what Advantage lies,
" Tell, (for You can,) what is it to be wiſe?
" 'Tis but to know, how little can be known,
" To ſee all other's Faults, and feel our own, &c.
" Painful Pre-eminence! yourſelf to view
" *Above Life's Weakneſs, and it's Comforts too.*

This to his Friend——nor does it at all contradict what he had ſaid to him concerning Happineſs in the beginning of the Epiſtle,

" 'Tis never to be bought, but always free,
" And fled from Monarchs, *St John*! dwells with thee.

For he is now proving that nothing external to Man, or what is not in his own Power, can make him happy *here*. The moſt plauſible Rival of *Virtue* is *Knowledge*. Yet even this, he ſays, is ſo far from giving any degree of real Happineſs, that it even deprives Men of thoſe common Comforts of Life, which are a kind of Support to us under the want of Happineſs: Such as the more innocent

nocent of thoſe Deluſions which he ſpeaks of in the ſecond Epiſtle, where he ſays

" Till then Opinion gilds with varying Rays
" Thoſe painted Clouds, that beautify our Days, &c.

Now *Knowledge* (as is there ſaid) *deſtroys* all thoſe Comforts, by ſetting Man *above Life's Weakneſſes*. So that in him, who thinks to attain Happineſs by Knowledge, the Fable is reverſed, and in a prepoſterous attempt to gain the *Subſtance*, he loſes even the *Shadow*. This I take to be the true ſenſe of this fine Stroak of Satyre on the wrong Purſuits after Happineſs.

Having thus proved how empty and unſatisfactory all theſe Greateſt external Goods are, from an Examination of their Nature, the Poet proceeds to ſtrengthen his Argument [from l. 258 to 299] by theſe two further Conſiderations, *1ſt.* that the Acquirement of theſe Goods is made with the Loſs of greater, either as inconſiſtent with them, or as ſpent in attaining them.

" How inconſiſtent greater Goods than theſe;
" How ſometimes Life is riſqu'd, and always Eaſe;

2dly. That the Poſſeſſors of each of theſe goods, nay of all of them together, are generally ſuch as are ſo far from raiſing Envy in a good Man, that he would refuſe to take their Perſons tho' accompanied with their Poſſeſſions. And this the Poet illuſtrates by Examples.

" Think, and if ſtill the Things thy Envy call,
" Say, would'ſt thou be the Man to whom they fall?

Having

Having thus at length ſhewn, that Happineſs conſiſts not in *Externals*, he concludes [from l. 298 to 319] that it is to be found in Virtue alone. Let. VII.

" Know then this Truth (enough for Man to know)
" Virtue alone is Happineſs below.

Which he further confirms in the moſt ſublime Deſcription of it's Nature. Thoſe laſt lines the Tranſlator turns thus,

" Appren donc qu'il n'eſt point icy bas de *Bonheur*
" *Si la Virtu ne régle & l'eſprit, & le Coeur.*

i. e. *Learn therefore that there is no Happineſs here below, if Virtue does not regulate the Heart and the Underſtanding*, which deſtroys the whole Force of the Poet's Concluſion. He had proved, that Happineſs conſiſts neither in *External Goods*, as the *Vulgar* imagined, nor yet in the *Viſionary ways of thinking* peculiar to the *Philoſophers:* He therefore concludes it conſiſts in Virtue alone. His Tranſlator ſays, *without Virtue there can be no Happineſs*: And ſo ſay the Men againſt whom the Poet is here arguing. For tho' they ſuppoſed external Goods requiſite to Happineſs, yet it was, when enjoy'd according to the Rules of Virtue. Mr *Pope* ſays

" *Virtue* Alone is Happineſs below,

and ſo ought his Tranſlator to have ſaid after him.

That Happineſs is *rightly* placed in Virtue, the Poet proves next from hence, that *then* and *then only*, All may partake of it, and All be capable of reliſhing it.

See

" See the ſole Bliſs Heaven *could* on ALL beſtow,
" Which who but feels can taſte, but thinks can know.

The Poet then obſerves with ſome Indignation [from l. 318 to 331] that as eaſy and as evident as this Truth was, yet *Riches* and *falſe Philoſophy* had ſo blinded the Perception, even of *improved* Minds, that the Poſſeſſors of the firſt placed Happineſs in *Externals*, unſuitable to Man's Nature, and the Followers of the Latter in *Viſions*, unſuitable to his *Situation*: while the Simple-minded Man without any other Guide, than the mere Dictate of Nature, found wherein it only could be placed.

" Yet *poor* with *Fortune*, and with Learning blind,
" The bad muſt miſs, the good untaught will find:
" Slave to no Sect, who takes no private Road,
" But *looks thro' Nature up to Nature's God.*
" Purſues that Chain, which links th' immenſe Deſign,
" Joins Heaven and Earth, and Mortal and Divine.
" Sees that no Being any Bliſs can know,
" But touches ſome above and ſome below;
" Learns from the Union of the riſing *Whole*
" The firſt laſt Purpoſe of the Human Soul;
" And knows where Faith, Love, Morals, all began,
" All end, in LOVE OF GOD AND LOVE OF MAN.

But this is not all; The Poet ſhews further, [from l. 330 to 343] that when the ſimple minded Man, on his firſt ſetting out in the Purſuit of Truth, in order to Happineſs, has had the Wiſdom " *To look thro' Nature up to Nature's God*; inſtead of adhering to any Sect or Party, where there was ſo great odds of his chuſing wrong; That then the Benefit of gaining the *knowledge*

of

of God's Will written in the Mind, is not there confined; For that ſtanding on this *ſure Foundation*, he is now *no longer* in Danger of chuſing wrong, amidſt *ſuch Diverſities* of Religions; but by purſuing this grand Scheme of Univerſal Benevolence, in *Practice*, as well as *Speculation*, he arrives at length to the *Knowledge of the revealed Will of God*, which is the *Conſummation* of the Syſtem of Benevolence. LET. VII.

" For him alone *Hope* leads from Gole to Gole,
" And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul,
" 'Till lengthen'd on to *Faith* and unconfin'd,
" It pours the Bliſs, that fills up all the Mind.

But let us once more hear Mr *De Crouſaz*, while he thus deſcants upon this Paſſage : —— " We are brought " at length to the *Truths of Revelation*.——See Man " once again re-eſtabliſhed in his Rights, raiſed as far " above Brutes as Heaven is above the Earth. How in- " finite a Difference between what one reads in this " fourth Epiſtle, and what the Poet ventured to pro- " poſe in the firſt, and in part of the two following. " There corrupt Minds thought, they read their own " Sentiments, and even this, which we find here, is in- " ſufficient to bring them back again from their Pre- " ventions.*"

That the *three firſt* Epiſtles have nothing contrary to the *fourth*, we have not only ſufficiently evinced, but ſhewn likewiſe, that the Doctrine of this laſt, ſo much approved by Mr *De Crouſaz*, is the neceſſary Conſequence of that laid down in every one of the preceeding ſo much con-

* Page 332-3.

demned by him. But, that *corrupt Minds thought they read their own Sentiments there*, nay, that it will *be hard to bring them back again from their Preventions*, I can eaſily conceive; becauſe not only *Partiality* to Mens *own* Opinions, but *Prejudice* againſt the Opinions of *others*, may make them fancy they ſee Doctrines in a *celebrated Writer*, which are indeed not there. And then Self-love on the one Hand, and Self-conceit on the other, may eaſily keep both in their ſeveral Deluſions, againſt all the Power of Conviction. What it is particularly that hath moſt miſled Mr *De Crouſaz*, I will not pretend to ſay. Only ſo far may be neceſſary, to juſtify the Liberty I have taken with him, to obſerve, that but a Part of it is to be charged on the Errors of the *French* Tranſlator. For tho' indeed he tells us he underſtands no *Engliſh*, yet his Knowledge of the *French* was ſufficient to enable him to ſee when this Tranſlator deviated from his Original. For before Mr *Du Reſnel* made his Poetic Verſion, there was one in Proſe, a very cloſe and exact Tranſlation. And if we may believe Mr *De Crouſaz* himſelf this did enable him to ſee the other's Deviations. Hear how he ſpeaks — "I have, as I went along, remarked that "Mr *L'Abbé* is much more moderate in his Expreſſions "than his Original, we may, (and yet without diſguiſing "the Truth) deliver it with Moderation, when the "Great, and eſpecially *crowned Heads* are the Subject, "and this I think is the more commendable Manner of "the two *."

To proceed, the Poet, in the laſt Place, marks out [from l. 342 to 363] the *Progreſs* of his *Good Man's* Bene-

* Page 312.

volence,

volence, puſhed thro' *natural* Religion to *revealed*, 'till it arrives to that Height, which the Sacred Writers deſcribe as the very Summit of Chriſtian Perfection, and with this rapturous Deſcription the Subject of the Epiſtle cloſes.

" *Self-Love* thus puſh'd to ſocial, to divine,
" Gives thee to make thy Neighbour's Bleſſing thine:
" Is this too little, for the boundleſs Heart?
" Extend it, let thy Enemies have part.
" Graſp the whole Worlds of Reaſon, Life and Senſe
" In one cloſe Syſtem of Benevolence.
" Happier as kinder! in whate'er Degree,
" And height of Bliss, but height of Charity.

Mr *De Crouſaz* was reſolved to give a home Stroke at parting. — " A Man *(ſays he)* muſt uſe ſome Ef- " forts to go even ſo far as to love his Enemies. — But " as to what concerns all the Parts of the Univerſe, and " all the living Beings that inhabit it, as well thoſe we " ſee not, as thoſe we ſee, we find nothing in ourſelves " repugnant indeed to the giving them our love; but " then on the other Hand, we do not feel any Motions " towards the rendering it to them. And while ſo " great a Number of Objects, with which we are cloſely " ſurrounded, demand our Attention and Concern, it " appears not only ſuperfluous but even irrational to " teize ourſelves with I cannot tell what Kind of tender- " neſs for the Inhabitants of *Jupiter*, *&c.*" * This preſents him with a pleaſant Idea, and he purſues it with his uſual Grace and Vivacity.

* Page 336.

After this one would ſcarce think that in the very next Words he ſhould confute himſelf; anſwer his own Objections; and vindicate the very Charity he had ridiculed. And yet this he now does, as much without Fear, as the other was without Wit. "I own (*ſays he*) that a Soul devoted to it's "Creator, and ſtruck and raiſed with Admiration at the "attentive View of his mere corporeal Creation, would "be ready to lend thoſe Beings his Voice and Senti- "ments, in order to join with them in an Offering of "Praiſe and Thankſgiving to their common Creator, "whoſe Glory they ſo magnificently declare tho' with- "out any Knowledge of the Truth which they pro- "claim. Nay I go farther, and ſay, that a Soul ſo ſan- "ctified, and at the ſame time well aſſured that there "are innumerable Choirs of happy Intelligences, who con- "tinually adore their Creator in extatic Raptures, far "ſurpaſſing our Conceptions, will *congratulate* with "them on their Glory and Felicity *." Here we ſee deſcribed, and to ſay the Truth not ill, that very State of Mind which produced the Raptures of our admirable Poet,

"Graſp the whole Worlds of Reaſon, Life and Senſe,
"In one cloſe Syſtem of Benevolence.
"Happier as kinder! in whate'er Degree,
"And height of Bliſs but height of Charity.

No ſays our Critic, who would ſtill keep on foot the Cenſure he himſelf has overthrown. The Elevations I ſpeak of, are not *Elevations of Charity for thoſe glorious Intelligences. We are the Objects of their Charity, not they of ours.* † Egregious Philoſo-

* Page 337-8.

† Page 338.

pher!

pher! By Charity Mr *Pope* not only *means* Benevolence, but *calls* it ſo. And *Benevolence* ſurely may be as well exerciſed *towards* Superiors, as *by* them.

But he proceeds,—"This pretended chimerical Affection can have no Foundation but in the chimerical "Syſtem of *a whole*, of which we make a Part, and "of which all the Parts without exception are ſo dependent on each other, that if any one only be "diſplaced, or never ſo little deviating from it's "proper Function, that Diſorder will affect the reſt, and "ſpread itſelf over the whole: and, by conſequence, "extend to us, who make an eſſential Part of that "Whole. *Self-Love* therefore intereſts itſelf in every "Thing that exiſts and moves." *Self-Love* was never ſent on ſuch an Errand, no not by *Rochefoucalt* or *Eſprit* tho' they forced it to do all their Drudgery. Here, a Man who never yet once rightly underſtood *what* his Adverſary *did ſay*, will now pretend to gueſs at his *Reaſons for ſaying*. One might have foreſeen with what Succeſs. But ſomething he has taught us, and it is this, to reſt content with the Poet's own Reaſoning. His Reaſon then for this extended Benevolence is, —that as God has made *a Whole*, whoſe Parts have a perfect Relation to, and an entire Dependency on each other, Man, in extending his Benevolence throughout that *Whole*, acts in Conformity to the Will of his Creator; and therefore this Enlargement of his Affection becomes a Duty.

But the Poet has not only ſhewn his Piety in this Precept, but the utmoſt Art and Addreſs likewiſe in the *Diſpoſition* of it. The *Eſſay on Man opens* with expoſing the impious Murmurings and Concluſions of fooliſh Men againſt the preſent Conſtitution of things.

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As it proceeds, it detects occasionally all those false Principles and Opinions that led them to conclude thus perversely. Having now done all that was necessary in *Speculation*, the Poet turns to *Practice*, and ends his Essay with the Recommendation of an acknowledged Virtue, *Charity*, which if exercised in that Extent that Conformity to the Will of God requires, would effectually *prevent* all Complaints against the present Order of Things: Such Complaints being made with a total Disregard to every thing, but their own private System; and seeking Remedy in the Disorder, and at the Expence of the rest.

The Art and Contrivance we see is truly admirable. But Mr *De Crousaz* pursues his own Ideas. For to know Mr *Pope*'s seems to have been his least Concern throughout the whole Commentary. "This System "[namely of *a Whole*] will carry us to a great length. "*Miracles*, which deviate from the ordinary Course of "Nature, must pass from henceforward as idle Fables. "[Observe his reason.] It was impossible that any kind "of thing which has happened should not have hap-"pened, or not have happened in the Manner it hath*." As to Mr *Pope*'s Fatalism we have said enough of that already. But now if for Disputation-sake we admit what for Truths-sake we should reject, according to my Notions of Logic this Conclusion would follow, *that therefore Miracles could not but have been*; not Mr *Crousaz*'s, *that therefore they never could be.* Miracles are proved like other Matters of Fact, by *human Testimony*. If *that* says, Iron at one time swam, at other times sunk, and we suppose things ordered fatally; these two Events were equally *necessary*. So that to make out his Conclusion he must be forced to add downright Atheism to his Fate.

* Page 339.

Mr

Mr *De Crouſaz* has now puſhed Matters to a decent Length. He has ſaid, the Poet's *Extent of Charity was irrational,* —— *the Syſtem on which it was founded chimerical* —— *that it ended in Fate* —— *and overthrew all Miracles.* One would imagine this ſhould have ſatisfied the moſt Orthodox Reſentment. But there wanted ſomething to make a right Polemical Climax. To crown the whole therefore, he tells us, that, according to the Poet — "The Univerſe would not have been a "Work ſufficiently worthy of God, had there not been "Atheiſts, Superſtitious, Perſecutors, Tyrants, Idola-"ters, Aſſaſſins, and Poiſoners *." What I can find in the *Eſſay* coming neareſt to this is ——— That thoſe Miſchiefs do not deform God's Creation; *becauſe* the divine Art is inceſſantly producing Good out of Evil: and that as this Univerſe is the beſt of all thoſe in God's Idea, therefore whatever is, is right, with reſpect to that Univerſe: Either as tending *in it's own Nature* to the Perfection of it, or made ſo to tend by infinite Wiſdom, *contrary to it's Nature.* The only Conſequence can be drawn from all this is, *That an Univerſe with Atheiſts, Superſtitious, &c. is ſufficiently worthy of God.* How that can infer this other, *That the Univerſe would not have been a Work ſufficiently worthy of God had there not been Atheiſts, Superſtitious,* &c. I leave Mr *De Crouſaz* to make out by his own *Logic,* or which ſeems the more comprehenſive of the two, his own Conſcience.

Thus have I endeavoured to draw out and explain the noble Reaſoning of theſe four Epiſtles. Enough I preſume to convince our Critic's Friends that it has a preciſion and cloſeneſs of Connection rarely to be met

* Page 340.

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with, even in the moſt formal Treatiſes of Philoſophy. Yet in doing this 'tis but too evident I have deſtroyed all that Grace and Energy that animates the original. So right was Mr *Pope*'s Prediction of the Event of ſuch an Undertaking, where he ſays in his Preface —— "*I was unable to treat this part of my Subject more in* "*detail, without becoming dry and tedious*: Or more "Poetically, without ſacrificing Perſpicuity to Orna- "ment, without wandring from the preciſion or break- "ing the Chain of Reaſoning. If any Man can unite "all theſe without Diminution of any of them, I freely "confeſs he will do a Thing above my Capacity.

I am, &c.

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